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PREFACE
This Article is a study of the laws and legal processes of the Romani
people, traditionally known as Gypsies.' The account of the autonomous legal
system of the Romani people provided here may appear so incredible that
some readers may believe that it is based not on research but on insupportable
construction. In fact, this Article finds its support in the extensive and
amorphous nonlegal literature and from the few Romani sources available.
1. The terminological difficulties regarding the word "Gypsy," and the conceptual problems resulting
from them, are described in detail in Part II, infra. "Gypsy" is a designation used by non-Gypsies to
describe the ethnic people who call themselves "Roma." English-language scholarship still refers widely
to "Gypsies" rather than "Roma." See Jan Yoors, Gypsy, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 646, 646 (Int'l
ed. 1989) [hereinafter Yoors, AMERICANA]; Gypsy, 5 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 593 (15th ed.
1990). Difficulties exist in other languages as well. The German word Zigeuner is no longer used in
scholarly writings. A German author reports that, consequently, she began using the word "Roma" in her
writings. Rumanian Gypsies, however, objected to this usage. They preferred to be called Zigeuner. Herta
Muller, Der Staub ist blind-die Sonne ein Krtippel, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEIrUNG, May 4, 1991,
Bilder und Zeiten, at 1, 2 (postscript to article).
This Article uses the term "Gypsy" interchangeably with the term "Roma" to reflect the fact that its
research depends on both Gypsy and non-Gypsy sources. Gypsy authors such as Ian Hancock have used
the term "Gypsy" when addressing a non-Gypsy audience. See IAN HANCOCK, THE PARIAH SYNDROME:
AN ACCOUNT OF GYPSY SLAVERY AND PERSECUTION (1987) [hereinafter HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME].
Throughout this Article we use the alternative spelling "Rumania" for Romania to stress that the term
"Roma" for Gypsies is not linguistically related to Rumanian. This spelling is used by Hancock for the
same reason.
Autonomous Lawmaking
The Article discusses the highly developed internal laws of the Gypsies to
illustrate how private lawmaking is central to the everyday workings of
society. The Vlax Roma, the largest Gypsy group in the United States, have
laws that are generations old, administered by their own courts (kris) and
judges (krisnitorya). For centuries, their courts have functioned autonomously
virtually without regard for those of the host country. Although these judicial
gatherings are not officially recognized and, if noticed, tend to be
misunderstood, they effectively impose sanctions within their own
communities. A detailed examination of the Gypsy legal system can sensitize
us to the private lawmaking that takes place in American society.
Analysis of law usually focuses on the law of the state. This Article,
however, uses the law of the Gypsies as an example of an autonomous legal
system, one which operates outside the parameters of state law. The Article
argues that in most cases in which the autonomous legal system of the Gypsies
clashes directly with the law of the host country, the private legal system of
the Gypsies prevails. More frequently, however, autonomous legal systems and
state law interact in a more subtle manner. Even when they do not come into
conflict, each can powerfully influence the other. Thus, the norms of any legal
system, public or private, may only be preserved intact through a cultural
isolation which is nearly impossible to achieve.
Apart from its central concern with autonomous private lawmaking, this
Article is timely for its consideration of the relationship between ethnicity and
law. Contemporary ethnic tensions have been a major factor in recent bitter
confrontations around the world. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Near East, Armenia
and Azerbaijan, South Africa, India, and Sri Lanka, for example, all have been
affected by ethnic confrontation. Within the United States, the 1992 Los
Angeles riots may have been fueled in part by perceptions of the relationship
between ethnicity and law. The Gypsies themselves are increasingly targets of
persecution in Eastern Europe, where the collapse of communism has revived
not only nationalism and ethnic pride, but also fanaticism and racial hatred.
That hatred is often directed against the Gypsies who, as scapegoats, are
blamed for many past and present ills of society.2 Some of this racial
animosity may stem from ignorance and misinterpretation of the Gypsies'
internal norms, which set them apart from other cultures.
Part I of this Article discusses the concept of autonomous lawmaking and
how it has been neglected in legal scholarship. It then explains why the
Gypsies provide an optimal example for examining private law. Part 1I
describes how problems of terminology and language render terms originating
from non-Gypsy sources inadequate and misleading. It then traces the severe
2. Don Pavel, Wanderers: Romania's Hidden Victims: New Assaults upon the Gypsy Minority, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1991, at 12 (Juliana G. Pilon trans.); Carol J. Williams, Gypsies Feel Curse of Hatred,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at Al.
1993]
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persecution of the Romani people from the Middle Ages to the present times,
and discusses how this persecution has permanently affected the willingness
of the Gypsies to collaborate with any structured inquiry into their culture,
especially their law.
Part LII presents the essential features of Romani law, including its
sanctions. It discusses the significance of Romani law for the survival of
Romani culture. Part IV analyzes some crucial features shared by Gypsy law
and other forms of private lawmaking in our own legal culture. It examines the
roles of oral legal traditions, language, and legal strategies as they relate to the
substance of law. In addition, it discusses how the laws of evidence in private
lawmaking operate. Part V concludes the Article by suggesting a concise
theoretical framework to understand better private lawmaking and its
relationship to state law.
I. INTRODUCTION: SOURCES OF LAW
A. State Law vs. Private Lawmaking
Commonly held assumptions about lawmaking have profound theoretical
and practical consequences. The traditional view is that law originates with the
state? Even if we recognize contracts as a form of private lawmaking, it is
assumed that we make formal agreements essentially with delegated state
power.4 According to these notions, the legitimacy of lawmaking depends on
the authority of the state, or at least on the degree to which the state tolerates
private lawmaking. This view of the primacy of state law is of relatively recent
origin. It can be traced to times of absolutism, when monarchs were perceived
to be the ultimate lawgivers.' Created by the monarch for self-serving
purposes, this conception of law reflects ideas that may no longer be applicable
under contemporary standards and values. The time is ripe to reexamine this
limited view of law and to broaden its scope.
3. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 120-22, 258-60 (5th ed. 1967) (discussing theories of
Thomas Hobbes and John Austin); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 49-76 (1961) (discussing
relationship between sovereign and society); I HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
181-207 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS
63-136 (1964) (discussing theories of John Austin and Hans Kelsen). The jurisprudential conception of legal
positivism often mentioned in this context is less clear than commonly assumed. See Helen Silving, Positive
Natural Law, 3 NAT. L.F. 24, 27-30 (1958).
4. See, e.g., HART, supra note 3, at 94 ("We have already described in some detail the rules which
confer on individuals power to vary their initial positions under the primary rules .... The kinship of these
rules with the rules of change involved in the notion of legislation is clear, and as recent theory such as
Kelsen's has shown, many of the features which puzzle us in the institutions of contract or property are
clarified by thinking of the operations of making a contract or transferring property as the exercise of
limited legislative powers by individuals."); see also KELSEN, supra note 3, at 204 (noting delegation of
power to contract from legal order).




Eugen Ehrlich suggested that in the Middle Ages, prior to the rise of
monarchies when state authority as we understand it arose, most lawmaking
took place in a variety of autonomous institutions and groups, such as cities
and guilds, leaving large geographic areas unregulated.6 Without an effective
central government, private organizations could maintain considerable
autonomy in making rules to govern their own affairs.'
Even though the modem state reaches across broad swaths of territory, its
regulations do not always penetrate all social ordering. The modem equivalent
of the laws of autonomous medieval groups is the informal lawmaking which
takes place whenever people join in groups, associations, or institutions to
pursue common objectives. This Article adopts the broad definition of law
proposed by Cowan and Strickland in 1965:
6. Id. at 14-38. For an analysis of Ehrlich's theories about the evolution of law, see William H. Page,
Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law, in 1914 PROC. ASS'N. AM. L. SCH. 46, reprinted
in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 825 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938). The theories of von Savigny similarly argue
that law, like language, forms within peoples "by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary
will of a law-giver." FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., spec. ed. 1986) (1814). Ehrlich also acknowledged his
indebtedness to Otto von Gierke for his writings about the internal ordering of associations. EHRLICH, supra
note 5, at 24 (referring to OTTO VON GIERKE, DAS DEUTCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECH-T (1868)). For further
background on Gierke's political philosophy, see generally OTTO VON GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederic W. Maitland trans., 1900).
Contemporary scholarship has focused primarily on microlegal systems, which includes small groups,
aggregated units that are characterized by little or no commonality of purpose, and even casual encounters
between individuals. See generally THOMAS A. COWAN & DONALD A. STRICKLAND, THE LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF A CONFINED MICROSOCIETY (University of California, Berkeley Working Paper No. 34,
1965); GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSITION AND PRACTICE (David A. Funk ed., 1988); LEOPOLD J.
POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAv: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971) [hereinafter POSPISIL,
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW]; WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH, THE LAW OF A SMALL GROUP (University of
California, Berkeley Working Paper No. 54, 1967) [hereinafter WEYRAUCH, THE LAW OF A SMALL
GROUP]; Walter 0. Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or Constitution of a Small Group, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 49
(1971), reprinted in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 41 (June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine
eds., 1977) [hereinafter Weyrauch, Basic Law]; Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law in Isolation-the Penthouse
Astronauts, TRANS-ACTION, June 1968, at 39 [hereinafter Weyrauch, Law in Isolation]; Michael Reisman,
Lining Up: The Microlegal System of Queues, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 417 (1985) [hereinafter Reisman, Lining
Up]; Michael Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring: Microlegal Systems and Public Order, 12 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165 (1983) [hereinafter Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring]; Michael Reisman,
Rapping and Talking to the Boss: The Microlegal System of Two People Talking, in CONFLICT AND
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE WORLD TODAY 61 (Institute of Comparative Law in Japan ed.,
1988) [hereinafter Reisman, Rapping].
Stewart Macaulay has written numerous articles about the development of informal legal culture using
examples in the United States. E.g., Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of
School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 185 (1987); Stewart Macaulay,
Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Stewart
Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989). Recently scholars have
pointed to the Jewish legal tradition as expressed in the Torah to provide further support for their argument
that law should be defined by communal acceptance rather than by reference to the law of the state. E.g.,
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 11-19 (1983); Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 865-72 (1993) [hereinafter Stone,
Counter-Text].
7. For a discussion of autonomy in German law, see JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAW 158-59, 325-28 (2d ed. 1921); see also Cover, supra note 6, at 26-33 (discussing origin of legal
meanings in insular autonomous communities).
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Law is an existential condition in which men are carriers of rights and
duties, privileges and immunities. No formal structure supporting the
system of law need be visible. Those accustomed to seeing law only
in its formal institutions, in terms of statutes, decisions, judges,
legislators and administrators miss the point. Law can be found any
place and any time that a group gathers together to pursue an
objective. The rules, open or covert, by which they govern
themselves, and the methods and techniques by which these rules are
enforced is the law of the group. Judged by this broad standard, most
law-making is too ephemeral to be even noticed. But when conflict
within the group ensues, and it is forced to decide between conflicting
claims, law arises in an overt and relatively conspicuous fashion. The
challenge forces decision, and decisions make law.8
This description covers a wide range of human activities in a continuum
that encompasses tribal law and other examples of informal lawmaking, as well
as the more formal charters and bylaws of corporations.
The extent to which such laws are visibly formalized may affect the
relationship between private lawmaking authority and state law. If private
lawmaking is more visible, the state will assume control by legislation and
regulation. Less de facto autonomy will remain in the hands of the private
organization. Frequently, the visible forms of private lawmaking such as
charters and bylaws coincide with unwritten customs which are enforced by
sanctions. Thus, quite independently from the mandates of the state, various
levels of private law may either supplement or conflict with each other. Any
corporate lawyer is aware of corporate customs supported by sanctions that
supplement but sometimes conflict with the more formal laws of the state.
These customs may relate to corporate etiquette, career patterns, or
entertainment expenses, or to such matters as maintaining corporate secrets or
making payments to foreign officials. Other forms of private lawmaking may
have an even broader range. Recent scholarship maintains that fleeting human
encounters do not take place in a legal void, but are governed by culturally
determined understandings and customs which cause them to be more rigidly
enforced than the laws of the state.9
Nevertheless there are still many intellectual obstacles to acknowledging
these forms of private lawmaking. Some view private lawmaking as
8. COVAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 6, at i. Fuller has described informal lawmaking under the
rubric of "implicit law," which he distinguishes from "made law"--i.e., a statute passed under the authority
of the state. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW 43-49 (1968) [hereinafter FULLER, ANATOMY]. This
conceptualization of informal lawmaking may include the rules governing a camping trip of friends, id. at
48-49, the custom of merchants, id. at 45, or tribal law, id. at 74-75.
9. Reisman has described microlegal systems that govem encounters on the street, the act of waiting
in lines, and communications between subordinates and superiors. See generally Reisman, Lining Up, supra
note 6; Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring, supra note 6; Reisman, Rapping, supra note 6. It should
come as no surprise that related legal dynamics govern both microlegal and macrolegal systems. Both




interference with the autonomy of the individual and as lacking fairness and
due process.'0 Private lawmaking also challenges the authority of the state.
The many competing interests that characterize contemporary life inspire
apprehension that chaos would ensue if any single group of participants were
recognized as having autonomous rulemaking powers, t" but that does not
mean that such rules no longer exist or have lost their effectiveness. The
effectiveness of state-sponsored laws in statute books or appellate court
opinions depends in part on how well they incorporate common understandings
of private laws and customs.'
2
10. Perceived injustice commonly occurs in microlegal systems such as the family, schools, and the
workplace. See Allen Barton & Saul Mendlovitz, The Experience of Injustice as a Research Problem, 13
J. LEGAL EDUC. 24,30 (1960). One aspect related by Melitta Schmideberg concerned parent-child relations:
A child may be punished for something which was passed over yesterday and is joked about
tomorrow; it is blamed for things its parents do without qualms. Adults usually have some neat
explanation at hand to cover up their inconsistent and unjust behavior against which children
are helpless. Whenever trouble arises the child is likely to be held responsible, and there are
very few adults who would ever admit to a child that they had been in the wrong. Justice
between parents and children does not exist because there is no equality, and those in authority
are judges in their own cause. The nursery is like a fascist state: a great parade is made of
justice but it depends on the good-will of the authorities whether they dispense justice or punish
whoever dares to complain.
The fact that men may prefer death to a life without freedom and justice shows how
bitterly they must have resented the lack of these in their childhood.
Melitta Schmideberg, On Querulance, 15 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 472, 488 (1946). For a critical description
of the romantic view of private lawmaking as more just and democratic than any other form of law
imposed by a ruler or the state, see FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 8, at 70.
11. Fuller argues against the notion that autonomous private lawmaking necessarily results in chaos.
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 124-29 (1964) [hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY]. See generally
Developments in the Law.-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983
(1963).
12. Sometimes appellate courts openly admit the significance of private laws and customs, for example
when usage (private lawmaking) has supplanted statutory provisions. See, e.g., Spurgeon v. Jamieson
Motors, 521 P.2d 924 (Mont. 1974). Usage in the Wisconsin lumber industry played a significant role in
the application of contract law. JAMES V. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 290 (1964); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACrS §§ 7.13-.14 (1982); FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 8, at 57-59 (arguing that interpretation acts
as a means to adjust "made law" to "implicit law").
With respect to the First Amendment, Ingber maintains that "communal values" should be recognized
and protected within institutional settings. Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual
Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1, 98-102 (1990). A constitutional
document, like any other written enactment, tends to be interpreted and supplemented by an unwritten body
of private law. Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 6, at 52-53. Indeed, the laws of associations, groups, and
institutions have been characterized as a body of unwritten constitutional law that has grown outside of the
written constitution. FULLER, MORALITY, supra note 11, at 128-29 (citing Charles E. Wyzanski, The Open
Window and the Open Door, 35 CAL. L. REv. 336, 341-45 (1947)); see also Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). Grey's theory of an
"unwritten Constitution" appears mostly aspirational, invoking fundamental rights and natural law. The
unwritten constitution described in Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 6, attempts to reflect reality rather
than ideals. This form of unwritten law, although very powerful and to some extent beyond human control,
can bring benefits. But it can also discriminate and oppress.
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Mechanical application of the law often creates perceptions of injustice and
meets with substantial opposition.13 This injustice results when written law
lacks the support of unwritten laws and custom. Unwritten rules often have
greater vitality and power than the traditional public laws that originate in the
cerebral and abstract reasoning of the courts and legislatures. Decisionmakers
work under a continuing pressure to incorporate customary rules into their
decisions. Such incorporation takes place subtly. For instance, a court's
formalistic application of law may be reversed on appeal as an abuse of
discretion or a violation of established canons of interpretation. Yet, in their
written opinions appellate courts rarely articulate that the basis for their
decision rests at least as much on the amorphous body of private law as on
public laws. Appellate judges may not even be aware that this is their source
of law. 4
At trial, in appellate courts, and in negotiations, a skillful lawyer avoids
referring directly to private lawmaking. Instead an attorney merely hints that
his case draws support from private lawmaking, while overtly reasoning in
terms of state-made law. Indeed, lawyers' pleas to juries not to leave their
common sense at the door can be understood as an appeal to interpret public
law in conformity with private law. Lawyers may not be fully aware of this
strategy and often credit "experience" for success. 5 The emphasis of legal
education on the state's law makes it unlikely that a lawyer will be conscious
of private lawmaking. Nevertheless, a good lawyer instinctively avoids arguing
only legal technicalities because doing so often creates the impression that the
13. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (using jurisdictional argument to dispose of
issue of major national significance, citizenship of African Americans); In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
14. Most appellate courts do not explicitly recognize private lawmaking as such and are not conscious
of its underlying dynamics. But see Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 n.l (Cal. 1976) (recognizing that
eightfold increase in nonmarital cohabitation called for decisive statement of law on this subject).
Furthermore, private lawmaking has even greater influence in nonlitigative contexts, such as negotiations,
and in the lower courts, especially when appeals are unlikely. Although empirical evidence is rare, many
lawyers attest that trial judges adhere to precedent and statutory authority loosely and essentially dispose
of cases according to inarticulate standards and hunches which reflect an immense and amorphous body
of informal law. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 78-80 (Paul Gewirtz
ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989); Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274,286-88 (1929); Willard M. McEwen, What Is Never
in the Record but Always in the Case, 8 ILL. L. REv. 594 (1914).
Arzt has queried:
Quite generally one may ask, according to what rules do we conduct ourselves, because we
normally do not consult the written law beforehand.... We are controlled in vast areas by
reason, decency... and conformity. The latter functions differently in small groups, such as
a faculty, than in larger settings. Viewed this way, perhaps the difference between oral and
written concretization [of law] disappears?!
Letter from Gunther Arzt, Professor, University of Bern, Switzerland, to Walter 0. Weyrauch, translated
from German (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with authors). The broad definition of law proposed by Cowan and
Strickland, supra text accompanying note 8, may encompass some aspects of the phenomenon described
by Arzt.
15. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 111 n.2 (1970) ("All successful lawyers are more
or less consciously aware of this technique. But they seldom avow it even to themselves.").
[Vol. 103: 323
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case is weak. Lawyers instead stress social context, communal values, and
public policies, which are often veiled references to private forms of
lawmaking. This Article argues that private lawmaking often prevails over state
law in direct conflicts between the two.'
6
In practice, private lawmaking pervasively influences the legal process.
The sensitivity of lawyers and policymakers to private social norms often
determines whether legislation is effective, whether cases are won or lost, or
whether a legal argument is persuasive. Yet, legal theory and practice generally
ignore this vast body of law. Bar examinations concentrate on traditional laws
of the state, which, in their literal form, have only limited practical
significance. Such an approach underestimates the importance of private law.
Although lawyers do acknowledge the existence of private law rules, they
dismiss them as rules of expediency rather than accept them as coherent
systems. 1
7
These views treat the most important part of the legal process as purely a
matter of common experience that is inevitably subservient to officially
sanctioned laws. Law is divided into two spheres, the conscious laws of the
state and the unconscious private laws, which are in fact substantially more
important. If scholars can sensitize people to the pivotal role of private
lawmaking by exposing its basic dynamics, legal theory will present a more
accurate picture of legal reality. The dichotomy between the law in the books
and the law in action,"8 the latter of which is based mostly on private
lawmaking, would disappear.
16. See Walter 0. Weyrauch et al., The Family as a Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW:
EXPOSITION AND PRACTICE supra note 6, at 153, 156 [hereinafter Weyrauch, Family], where the following
partly overlapping hypotheses are developed in detail. First, informal lawmaking has more vitality than the
traditional law of the state. Second, in a clash between traditional state law and informal private law, the
latter is likely to prevail. Third, legal characterizations are likely to be of little effect, unless supported by
informal private law. Fourth, a result supported exclusively by the law of the state is likely to be perceived
as inhumane and unjust. Fifth, an argument is likely to be persuasive if it can be supported by both the law
of the state and informal private law. Sixth, discretionary decisions are likely to be based on informal
private law. Seventh, discretionary decisions that violate the norms of private lawmaking are prone to be
reversed on appeal. Eighth, legal counseling and planning must take account of informal law. For
illustrations, see infra text accompanying notes 243-54, 266-69. In a conflict between the laws of the state
and "folk norms" in negotiations, the latter tend to govern. Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law,
26 LAwv & SOC'Y REv. 565, 566-67 (1992).
17. See WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 507-
08 (1983) (discussing unwritten standards in adjudication of child custody disputes which deal with sexual
taboos that "cannot be openly acknowledged"); see also Boroff v. Boroff, 250 N.W.2d 613, 617-18 (Neb.
1977) (noting trial court's improper refusal to award custody of twelve-year-old daughter to her divorced
father because she should "get up to her maturity with the mother"); infra note 243.
18. See EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 486-506 (discussing need for study of "living law" in addition to
"legal propositions"); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910)
(discussing relationship between public thought, feeling, and law in action).
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B. Fostering Respect for Private Lawmaking
1. Parallels Between Private Lawmaking and Tribal Law
This Article uses an intensive study of tribal laws19 to illustrate how
scholars can increase awareness of private lawmaking.20 There are important
parallels between legal cultures based on oral traditions and the unwritten laws
within institutions such as courts, corporations, and university faculties .2  In
addition to the practical importance of these forms of lawmaking, legal
scholars should not overlook the relevance of private law to theory. "Tribal"
aspects of private law illuminate larger issues. This Article does not maintain
that contemporary institutions, such as law firms,22 legislative committees,'
juries and appellate courts,24  university faculties,25  corporations, 26  or
19. For the purposes of this Article, "tribal law" means the norms of a homogeneous ethnic group,
mostly based on oral tradition and supported by communal sanctions, which aim to regulate life and
promote the common good. The use of the terms "tribe" or "tribal" does not impute any sense of
primitiveness. The terms are useful for the limited purposes of this Article because they demonstrate that
our law has numerous characteristics that also could be called tribal. These elements of our legal system
lend themselves to comparisons with the laws of the Roma, as will become increasingly apparent as this
Article progresses. But see the references to "primitive law" in E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF
PRIMITIVE MAN 18-28 (1954); KARL. L. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 41-63 (1941).
20. In his comparative law classes Weyrauch found that students were persistently more interested in
tribal law than in the laws of western Europe. The materials included, among others, HOEBEL, supra note
19, at 67-99 (discussing legal norms of "Eskimo" villages); JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMo LUDENS: A STUDY
OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 84-86 (1950) (discussing legal culture of Inuit); and J.F. Holleman,
Disparities and Uncertainties in African Law and Judicial Authority: A Rhodesian Case Study, 17 AFR. L.
STUD. 1 (1979). The Holleman article has significant contemporary relevance. Holleman describes the
effects of a conflict between colonial law and preexisting tribal norms. As faith in the existing tribal legal
order was undermined, violent forms of self-help emerged that outwardly invoked earlier law. The resulting
social disorder was combined with excessive demands for redress. Although the article is confined to
African tribal history, the parallels to American urban riots are evident. Compare Holleman, supra, with
reports of the Los Angeles riots in May 1992 following the Rodney King verdicts. See, e.g., Understanding
the Riots Part I: The Path to Fury, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at T-1. See also reports of the Miami riots
in May 1980, occurring after an all-white jury acquitted four white policemen who had beaten a black
motorist to death. See, e.g., BRUCE PORTER & MARVIN DUNN, THE MIAMI RIOTS OF 1980: CROSSING THE
BOUNDS (1984), reviewed by Anthony Chase, In the Jungle of Cities, 84 MICH. L. REV. 737, 751-59
(1986).
21. See sources cited supra note 6.
22. See generally Walter 0. Weyrauch, An Anthropological Study of the Legal Profession: Erwin 0.
Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 478 (1965) (book review) [hereinafter Weyrauch,
Legal Profession].
23. The Clarence Thomas Senate confirmation hearings, in particular the televised hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee involving Anita Hill, resembled a tribal court in numerous respects: (1) The
adjudicators were all male; (2) the standards applied were based on oral tradition; (3) no clear distinctions
between facts and opinion were maintained; (4) no distinctions between procedure and substance were
observable; (5) standards of relevance tended to be interpreted in the widest possible sense; (6) no
exclusionary rules of evidence were applied; (7) the adjudicators and witnesses played to the wider
audience; (8) the audience, although not physically present, played a major role in the adjudication, in that
the presumed reaction of the audience affected all participants. Cf. Holleman, supra note 20, at 5-9
(characterizing tribal adjudication); see also Dennis E. Curtis, The Fake Trial, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1523
(1992) (analysis of Thomas/Hill hearings).
24. With respect to courts, see generally Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1565 (1966); Eloise C. Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 36 SOC. FORCES 232 (1958).
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families,27 are "tribal," but merely suggests that they share characteristics with
societies that are commonly referred to as tribes. There are close analogies
between tribal lawmaking and informal private law in our daily lives. Thus, if
we understand tribal law, we can better comprehend the operation of our own
legal system.
The analysis in this Article focuses on a tribal system that is operating
autonomously within our society, largely unnoticed: the internal laws and
procedures of the population known as "Gypsies." Perhaps the term "nation"
would be more appropriate for Gypsies than "tribe,"28 although the Gypsies
lack many features usually attributed to nations, such as common territory and
centralized government. The Gypsies do share, however, a common identity
and ethnic origin, a common language, and an identifiable culture. A legal
system of common basic characteristics also exists, even though it may differ
in some respects among various ethnic subdivisions of the Roma.
2. Reasons for Selecting Gypsy Law
This Article focuses on the Roma because the conspicuous absence of
legal scholarship on their laws and courts, amidst an otherwise vast body of
literature, demonstrates that the academy is oblivious to the existence of
embedded autonomous legal systems. The very idea that an autonomous,
cohesive society with its own language and legal system exists in the United
States (and elsewhere) surprises most theorists, and highlights the extent to
which Gypsies have successfully maintained their invisibility within a larger
host society.29 Traditional legal scholarship presumes that different regionally
with respect to juries, see generally Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, The Institutionalization of
Conflict: Jury Acquittals, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 199 (1971); Fred L. Strodtbeck & L. Harmon Hook, The Social
Dimensions of a Twelve-Man Jury Table, 24 SOCIOMETRY 397 (1961).
25. See generally William L. Richard, Note, Faculty Regulations ofAmerican Law Schools (A Survey).
13 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 581 (1964).
26. For a discussion of legal and sociological approaches to various such groups, see generally Joseph
Taubman, Law and Sociology in the Control of Small Groups, 13 U. TORONTO L. REV. 23 (1959).
27. See generally Herma H. Kay, The Family and Kinship System ofIllegitimate Children in California
Law, 67(6) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 57 (1965); Wveyrauch, Family, supra note 16.
28. The Romani Union, an international organization located in Hamburg, Germany, links national
Gypsy organizations and has consultative status within the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. The consultative status enables the Romani Union to speak as a nongovernmental organization at
Economic and Social Council meetings. List of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status
with the Economic and Social Council in 1989: Note by the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR
E/1989/INF/II (1989); see also ANGUS FRASER, THE GypsiEs 315-18 (1992).
In the United States, Gypsies have been recognized as a distinctive ethnic group deserving protection
under antidiscrimination law. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 612 (1987) (dictum by
Justice White referring to Gypsies in suit brought by person of Arab descent); Janko v. Illinois State Toll
Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. I11. 1989) (ruling in favor of Gypsy plaintiff in Title VII
employment discrimination suit, relying on Saint Francis College).
29. Cf. HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 130 (noting that American Gypsies have
learned to hide their identity in order to avoid discrimination); ANNE SUTHERLAND, GypsiEs: THE HIDDEN
AMERICANS 290 (Reissue 1986) (1975) (commenting that most non-Gypsies are ignorant of or doubt the
existence of Gypsies in United States); Albert W. Vogel, The Least Known Minority, Civ. RTS. DIG., Fall
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identifiable legal systems may coexist and be compared. They may also
conflict with each other; the ornate doctrine of conflict of laws has been
developed to resolve these clashes. Yet, legal scholars have consistently failed
to acknowledge the possibility that our legal system is permeated by other
autonomous legal systems. These coexisting autonomous legal systems are
fundamentally "foreign" to the laws of the state, and the study of those
systems remains foreign to much of current legal scholarship.3
This Article resists examining a more remote tribal society, because
distance in time and space encourages detachment. The Gypsies living among
us help reinforce the thesis that autonomous private legal systems have a
pervasive influence on daily life. Indeed, the Romani legal system coexists
with the host legal order wherever Gypsies are present. Legal and political
theories, because they concentrate on the laws of the state, have limited
intellectual apparatus with which to recognize such coexisting legal systems.
A broader conception of law is necessary to account for the flow of "tribal"
law that emanates from associations, groups, and institutions.
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO RESEARCH ON GYPsY LAW
A. Impact of Terminology
The terminology used by non-Gypsies to describe the Romani people
reflects hidden value judgments. The term "Gypsy" as used in scholarly
writings and encyclopedias supports misconceptions that all Gypsies are
migratory, roam the countryside, and are engaged in questionable or illegal
activities, as exemplified by slang terms like "to gyp" (meaning to swindle)
and "gyp joints. 31 It is only natural that many Roma, therefore, view the
1978, at 35; see also RONALD LEE, GODDAM GYPSY 9 (1971) [hereinafter LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY] ("The
greatest strength of the Gypsies is their invisibility. It is not without good reason that many people consider
them to be extinct, for the Roms themselves do everything in their power to perpetuate the myth of their
non-existence.").
30. Some authors, whose work is more related to the social sciences than to traditional legal research,
have commented upon the manner in which legally distinct subgroups may interact with a larger,
enveloping society. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 97-126, referring with
qualifications to EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 24, 36-38; LLE'WELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 27-28;
MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 17 (Max Rheinstein ed. & Edward Shils & Max
Rheinstein trans., 1969); Laura Nader & Duane Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican Communities,
65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963); see also LEOPOLD POSPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW 54 (2d. ed.
1978) ("[T]here are in a society as many legal systems as there are functioning subgroups."); Weyrauch,
Basic Law, supra note 6, at 49 ("Law can be viewed as a network of small group interaction. Basic
characteristics of legal systems govern the interaction and permeate each individual small group."). In the
Middle Ages the Gypsies were recognized as an imperium in imperio, with jurisdiction over their own
affairs. FRASER, supra note 28, at 127.
31. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1015, col. 3 (unabr. ed. 1986) [hereinafter,
WEBSTER'S THIRD]. There is a corresponding slang term among American Roma, to "get gadged," meaning
to be cheated by non-Gypsies (gaje). Notes by Ian F. Hancock, Professor of English and Linguistics at the




word "Gypsy" as offensive. The term also perpetuates the misconception that
the people originated in Egypt. In French, boh6mien and tsigane, and in
German, Zigeuner, have similar meanings and connotations. Like "Gypsy,"
these terms reinforce incorrect perceptions that the Gypsies originally came
from Bohemia (or in the case of tsigane, from Phrygia in Asia Minor and
Thrace).32 The term "Sinti" refers to a part of the Gypsy population that
resides mainly in Germany.33 To attach universal meaning to the word
"Gypsy" is inappropriate.
Nevertheless, non-Gypsies (gaje) use the term "Gypsy" to describe all
Romani people and their descendants, who are believed to have left northern
India about a thousand years ago. 4 Despite the generic label "Gypsy," the
Romani people actually comprise many different groups bound together by
notions of purity and pollution, and by Gypsy law. The research that forms the
basis for this Article deals overwhelmingly with Vlax Gypsies from Wallachia,
Rumania-in particular, the Ma6vaya, Kalderasha, and Lovara. The Vlax are
the largest identifiable group of Gypsies in the United States, although precise
estimates of the size of their population are elusive. Because the Romanichals,
Bashalde, and Sinti have quite different customs, in spite of cultural
similarities, academic literature neglects them.35 Therefore, unavoidably, so
does this Article.36
The literature's ignorance of Romani terminology parallels the legal
scholarship's ignorance of Romani law. The Gypsies call themselves "Roma"
(singular "Rom"), meaning man or husband, but this word is little known
outside Gypsy communities. 37 Its similarity to "Romania," especially in the
adjectival form "Romani," leads to the misconception that Gypsies and
32. Yoors, AMERICANA, supra note 1, at 647 (referring to Michael J. de Goeje and Franz von
Miklo~id).
33. WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH, GESTAPO V-LEUTE 66 (1989); see also REIMER GRONEMEYER &
GEORGIA A. RAKELMANN, DIE ZIGEUNER: REISENDE IN EUROPA 9-11 (1988). The designation as "Sinti"
probably originates from the German word Zinn (tin). Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 2 n.13. This word
likely originated at a time when many German Gypsies worked as tinsmiths.
34. See supra note I (terminology); infra note 57 and accompanying text (history and migrations).
35. See Thomas Acton, Academic Success and Political Failure: A Review of Modern Social Science
Writing in English on Gypsies, 2 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 231, 234-35 (1979); see also Ian F. Hancock,
Gypsies in the United States, 8 ETHNIC F., 72, 73-75 (1988) (reviewing MARLENE SWAY, FAMILIAR
STRANGERS: GYPSY LIFE IN AMERICA 6-13 (1988)) [hereinafter Hancock, Review]. Anthropologists in
particular have mistakenly assumed that Kalderash informants, belonging to the Vlax group, have informed
on customs that apply to all American Gypsies. These misconceptions are so frequent that Acton has coined
the term "Kalderashocentric." Acton, supra at 234-36.
Although the name "Vlax" comes from "Wallachia," many modem Vax populations do not identify
with that region in Rumania, but with an intermediate country or location to which they migrated at a later
time. For example, the Ma~vaya mention a Serbian town, Ma~va, as theirs. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31,
at I n.12. The spelling of names of different Romani ethnic groups, such as the Ma6vaya, varies. We have
followed the spellings suggested by Hancock, although cited authors may have used different spellings.
36. The reader is therefore cautioned against making generalizations about all Gypsies based on the
information presented here.
37. At the First World Romani Congress in 1971, the delegates adopted the term "Roma" as a
collective name for all Gypsies. FRASER, supra note 28, at 316.
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Rumanians are identical or related. Words of Gypsy origin, descended from
Sanskrit sources, are essentially unknown among non-Gypsies. Even the
growing literature of Gypsy scholars uses the term "Gypsies" interchangeably
with "Roma" due to the non-Gypsy world's ignorance of the Romani language.
These misconceptions about the Roma can result in confusion among non-
Gypsy authors. The deeply ingrained notion that all Gypsies are nomadic
overlooks the fact that the Vlax in Wallachia and Moldavia (which are now
parts of Rumania and Moldova) were enslaved until 1856. Indeed, the Vlax
were bound to their owners' homes and farms for about five hundred years.3"
Among the Vlax, the forced sedentary life of serfdom seems to have preserved
internal Gypsy law and strengthened the culture as a whole, although some of
their cultural characteristics probably were acquired from the host
population. 9 The large-scale migration of the descendants of these Gypsies
to the United States may have revived ancient nomadic patterns only to the
extent necessary to avoid local hostility.
B. Impact of Past Persecution
Negative characterizations of the Romani people create corresponding
problems in research efforts, especially those concerning Gypsy law. Most
literature on Gypsies has been produced by non-Gypsy scholars who relied on
the writings of other non-Gypsies and ultimately on Gypsy informants.4" The
Gypsies' views, and their responses to scholarly inquiries, reflect a long and
continuing history of suffering and worldwide persecution, including the
murder of an unknown number of Gypsies in Nazi concentration camps.4'
38. See FRASER, supra note 28, at 57-59; Ian F Hancock, The Romani Diaspora Part One, 1989
WORLD & I 612, 617 [hereinafter Hancock, Diaspora 1].
39. Hancock, Diaspora I, supra note 38, at 617.
40. See Acton, supra note 35, at 234-37; HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 125-27.
41. Estimates of the number of Gypsies who fell victim to the Nazis vary because not all Roma were
brought to concentration camps. Some were shot or hanged as partisans at the Russian front, while others
were summarily executed as "asocials." Moreover, classifications within concentration camps were not
uniform. While Kogon posits that only an "insignificant remnant" of the Romani population survived the
Holocaust, EUGEN KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL: THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS
AND THE SYSTEM BEHIND THEM 39 (Heinz Norden trans., 1950), Ddhring suggests that 20-45% of the
German Gypsy population died as a result of the Holocaust. HANS J. D'HRING, DIE ZIGEUNER IM
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN STAAT 191-92 (1964). Estimates of a million Gypsies killed are probably too
conservative. See Ian Hancock, "Uniqueness" of the Victims: Gypsies, Jews and the Holocaust, 1988
WITHouT PREJUDICE: EAFORD INT'L REV. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 45, 55-56 [hereinafter Hancock,
Holocaust]. But cf. Yoors, AMERICANA, supra note 1, at 647; ULRICH KONIG, SINTI UND ROMA UNTER DEM
NATIONALSOZIALISMUS: VERFOLGUNG UND WIDERSTAND 87-88 (1989) (estimating over 500,000 killed).
The attitude of the German population toward Gypsies continues to be overwhelmingly negative. A
poll taken in the 1960's in a city outside of which a Gypsy camp had long existed indicated that of 200
respondents, 180 expressed hostile sentiments. Luc Jochimsen, Zigeuner hierzulande, in MINDERHEITEN IN
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 21, 49 (Bernhard Doerdelmann ed., 1969). German news reports, while critical of
xenophobia, tend to be ambivalent toward Gypsies, especially those who have recently arrived from other
countries. See, e.g., Ariane Barth, "Hier steigt eine Giftsuppe auf," DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 14, 1991, at 118;
Sabine Riickert & Michael Schwelien, Die Zigeuner sind da!, DIE ZEIT, SepL 25, 1992, at II. For
responses from the United States, see, for example, Andrei Codrescu, Gypsy Tragedy, German Amnesia,
[Vol. 103: 323
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Fearing further persecution, the Gypsies are inclined to distrust all
non-Gypsies.
Tellingly, the Gypsies use the term gaje to refer to all non-Romani people
without differentiating among them. Gaje has pejorative connotations. It
originally meant peasants, or uncivilized and uneducated persons, but it had
connotations comparable to "barbarians" in English. In contemporary usage,
gaje has a more neutral meaning: "non-Gypsy. ' 42 The gaje (singular gajo) are
subject to ridicule and disdain because, from a Gypsy perspective, they do not
conform to norms of proper behavior. The Gypsies generally view the gaje as
having no sense of justice or decency. Even behavior that is "law-abiding" by
gajikane43 standards can be considered inherently indecent. Furthermore, not
only do the Gypsies consider non-Gypsies polluted, they also believe that
Gypsy names and rituals lose their magical effectiveness if uttered to gaje.44
Consequently, the Gypsies believe they should approach and respond to the
gaje with caution,45 especially if the gaje profess good intentions, claim to
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at A27 (criticizing Germany's policy of repatriating Roma to Rumania); Marc
Fisher, Germany's Gypsy Question: Haunting Echoes as a Hated Minority Gets "Retransferred," WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 1992, at FI [hereinafter Fisher, Germany's Gypsies]; Carol J. Williams, For Gypsies, No
Place To Call Home. Ethnic Tension: The Refugees Being Repatriated from Germany Face an Unfriendly
Reception in Romania, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at AS. A recent German constitutional revision has
severely restricted asylum rights. GRUNDGESErZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16a (Germany). The revision,
although couched in general language, primarily applies to Gypsy refugees from Eastern Europe. Stephen
Kinzer, Bonn Parliament Votes Sharp Curb on Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at Al, A4
("More than half of the foreigners now arriving in Germany in search of asylum are from Rumania and
Bulgaria, and most of them are Gypsies."); see also supra note 2. For an exhaustive treatment of German
law relating to Gypsies, see Michael M. Jansen, Sinti and Roma: An Ethnic Minority in Germany, in THE
PROTECTION OF ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE 167 (John Packer & Kristian Myntti eds.,
1993). Concerns have been expressed that recent German legislation is specifically aimed at repatriating
Gypsy refugees to Rumania. Id. at 182.
42. See GRONEMEYER & RAKELMANN, supra note 33, at 9 (defining gaje as peasants, fools); JAN
YOORS, THE GYPSIES 16 (1967) [hereinafter YOORS, GYPSIES] ("All non-Gypsies or outsiders are called
'Gaje,' which he translated as 'peasants.' He looked me in the eyes as he said it, but there was a slight
hesitation in his voice and I sensed the pejorative connotation.") (footnote omitted). According to Hancock
the term gaje refers to male non-Gypsies. HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 137. Hancock
asserts that the term is not necessarily pejorative. However, the context in which the word is used and the
intonation may result in a negative meaning. Following Hancock who stresses the essentially neutral
contemporary meaning of gaje, this Article uses the term interchangeably with the term "non-Gypsy." This
interchangeable use helps to effect the incorporation of a Romani perspective into the Article. It
corresponds to the interchangeable use of the term "Gypsy" (which also may have pejorative connotations)
with the term "Roma." See supra note 1. Absolute neutrality, unfortunately, is not possible because the
linguistic means to express it are inherently flawed. Cf. Walter 0. Weyrauch, Limits of Perception: Reader
Response to Hitler's Justice, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 251-54 (1992) (discussing reader-response school
of literary theory). Some authors capitalize the term gaje. We have consistently used capital letters for Rom
and Gypsy, but not for gaje. The latter term is all-encompassing and does not refer to any distinct ethnic
group or nationality.
43. Gajikano is the singular adjectival form of gaje. The plural adjectival form is gajikane. We are
indebted to Ian Hancock for this clarification; see also IAN HANCOCK, NOTES ON ROMANI GRAMMAR 15-16
(4th ed. 1992).
44. MARTIN BLOCK, GYPSIES 13 (1939); JEAN-PAUL CLtBERT, THE GYPSIES 132 (Charles Duff trans.,
1963) (describing "secular taboo" that prevents disclosure of religious ritual to non-Gypsy world).
45. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 21 (describing how author encountered vehement cursing,
feigned imbecility, pretense of mental retardation, polite imperviousness, alleged deafness and blindness,
mocking lies, and panic in response to tape recording); Vogel, supra note 29, at 36 (noting extreme
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serve the best interest of the Gypsies, or propagate some abstract ideals of
non-Gypsy origin, such as the scholarly pursuit of truth. Romani reservations
apply equally to gajikane notions of due process, civil rights, and neutrality of
law.
As a result of such reservations, persons inquiring into the operation of the
Gypsy legal system cannot count on cooperation. Distortions of reality are
inevitable and they permeate almost every aspect of non-Gypsy scholarship on
the Gypsies. As a further impediment to accuracy in studies of the Gypsies,
gajikane scholars have failed to wrestle with their own deeply ingrained beliefs
in the superiority of their cultural values, including the notions that objective
scholarship and science are possible and that some neutral concept of merit4
6
can determine the value of other cultures. Gajikane scholars implicitly and
paradoxically assume that gajikane standards of measurement are useful in
evaluating the Gypsy culture. Scholars do not characterize themselves as
non-Gypsy; indeed, there is no corresponding word for gaje in our vocabulary.
Yet other cultures that have experienced persecution or that are insular have
words corresponding to the Gypsy term gaje, such as goyim for everyone who
is not a Jew and haole for all non-Hawaiians. All these terms share disparaging
connotations and reflect barriers to communication. 47 Thus widespread failure
to confront the difficulties of gajikane scholars studying Gypsies has resulted
in a subtle yet pervasive cultural insensitivity in most literature on the Gypsies.
suspicion against any form of structured questioning). The evasionary strategies of Gypsies toward
non-Gypsies are ingenious. Yoors reports veiled ridicule, seeming childlike admiration, and an endless
stream of questions meant to induce the non-Gypsies to reply rather than ask questions themselves. If
questions cannot be avoided, multiple inconsistent answers might be given. Gypsies may start scratching
themselves persistently, implying the presence of vermin or they may cough violently suggesting a
contagious lung ailment. YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 50-51.
46. The concept of merit is essentially culturally determined. One of the coauthors has defined merit
as the "ability to act 'responsibly' and to fit and operate well within an existing institutional framework."
Walter 0. Weyrauch, Governance Within Institutions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 141, 151 (1969) [hereinafter
Weyrauch, Governance]. It tends inevitably to disadvantage some ethnic minorities, such as Gypsies,
because they adhere to values different from those of the ruling majority who determine institutional
frameworks. From that perspective, the traditional educational process can indeed damage cultural identity.
See infra note 204. Whether Gypsy children who have been forced into the gajikano educational system
are capable of exercising genuine choice to remain with the Romani people or go elsewhere, is at least
subject to debate. But see W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE
LJ. 401,416-17 (1993) [hereinafter Reisman, Comment]. No doubt, the Romani people are now better off
in the United States than in many other countries, but the American liberal democratic state is in some
respects aspirational and, in spite of major progress in the last decades, not fully realized, particularly in
areas of race relations.
47. LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF YIDDISH 141-42 (1968) (defining goy: "I. A Gentile, i.e., anyone who
is not a Jew... 2. Someone who is dull, insensitive, heartless."); WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 31, at
1030 (defining haole: "one who is not a member of the native race of Hawaii; esp: a member of the white
race").
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C. A Suggested Method for the Study of Gypsy Law
To some extent, this Article faces the same problems as other scholarship
by non-Gypsy authors. Partially to offset any hidden bias, this Article tries to
recognize the perspectives that the Romani people have about themselves and
about non-Gypsies. Although these standards undoubtedly reflect the Gypsies'
own ethnocentrism, they nevertheless articulate viewpoints often neglected in
non-Gypsy scholarship. If this creates an appearance that we are overly
sympathetic to the Gypsies, the basic purpose of our presentation should be
kept in mind. It is less focused on solving the social problems that may result
from the steadfast refusal of an ethnic people to be assimilated and more
concerned with gaining insight into the workings of customary oral traditions
in law, including our own.
Any study of the internal laws of the Gypsies must inevitably reflect the
research difficulties associated with studying Gypsies generally. Not only is it
incorrect to project the legal customs of some Gypsies onto the whole
population, but the memory of severe persecution may affect the willingness
of Gypsies to share confidential information on their law. To the Gypsies, the
purity of their law plays a crucial role in maintaining cultural identity and
integrity against an onslaught of foreign cultural influences that may be
well-motivated, but often are of doubtful value, if not destructive. 4" While
these impediments to the study of Gypsy law leave unanswered numerous
questions, traditional scholarship on Gypsies nevertheless has value because it
does provide some accurate and detailed information which is otherwise
unavailable to non-Gypsies and points to fruitful areas for further research. The
writings of Gypsy authors also have value in that they demonstrate that many
stereotypes of Romani culture may be unfounded. To the extent that existing
uncertainties affect this Article, cautionary signals alert the reader that our
presentation, especially with regard to the particularities of Gypsy law, is not
meant to be conclusive.
The research method employed here is similar to the one Thomas Acton
employed.49 Many case studies of Gypsies already exist. Typically these
studies focus on a small group of Gypsies and then make generalizations about
all Gypsies. Thus, Acton argued that another such project would add little to
the state of knowledge on Gypsies; instead he favored a synthesis of the
48. Sutherland suggests that the concepts of religion, tradition, and law, as embodied in the term of
romaniya, are interrelated. Accordingly, a person's identification as a Rom appears to depend on the
unquestioning acceptance of these spiritual values rather than on external factors, such as ethnic origin.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 17-18, 29.
Sutherland reports also in the new preface to her book, reissued in 1986, that the scholarly
information in the earlier 1975 edition was misused by the police to prosecute Gypsies. ANNE
SUTHERLAND, THE HIDDEN AMERICANS, at xii (Waveland Press, Inc. 1986) (1975).
49. THOMAS A. ACTON, GYPSY POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 2-3 (1974). Acton argues that even
inconsistent or inaccurate existing studies could be useful if supplemented by his own field research.
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existing data. Although he rarely quoted it in his work, Acton used his field
research primarily as an aid to analyze the existing literature.50 Similarly, this
Article uses the emerging literature of Romani scholars for critical insights into
the writings of gajikane authors.
I. GYPSY LAW5 '
An important goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the Gypsy legal
system not only protects the Gypsies from external and internal threats, but
also serves as a code that organizes Gypsy society. In particular, Gypsy law
has evolved to insulate Gypsies from the host society, and thus to maintain its
own insularity from the host legal system.
A. Historical Origins and Ethnic Setting
There are anywhere from three to fifteen million Gypsies living in forty
countries today.52 Although research in linguistics suggests a common Indian
source, the origins of the Gypsy people remain unclear because their history
is largely unrecorded. Some social scientists attribute this lack of recorded
history to the high rate of illiteracy among the Gypsies. Interestingly, Gypsy
illiteracy may have been purposeful.53 Gypsies share a fervent belief in their
own uniqueness, and ethnocentricity has kept them from violating their
prohibition against cultural integration. Likewise, myths surrounding the
Gypsies and their origins might have been a matter of faith, or perhaps were
devised to mislead non-Gypsies, and thus to support their own cultural
50. Id. at 3.
51. This discussion of Gypsy law deals primarily with Vlax Gypsies of Rumanian origin, the largest
identifiable group of Roma in the United States. Other Gypsies, such as the Romanichals from northern
Europe and the British Isles, adhere to similar notions of purity and pollution, but have less formalized
procedures. See Ronald Lee, The Kris Romani, ROMA, July 1987, at 19, 19-20 [hereinafter Lee, Kris].
Much of the factual information is based on the works of authors such as Jean-Paul Cldbert, Rena
C. Gropper, Ian Hancock, Ronald Lee, Jean-Pierre Lidgeois, John B. McLaughlin, Carol J. Miller, Judith
Okely, Matt T. Salo, Sheila M. Salo, Carol Silverman, Anne Sutherland, Marlene Sway, Carl-Herman
Tillhagen, Elwood B. Trigg, and Jan Yoors, as cited in this Part. Because of the multitude of detailed facts
and parallel observations, for example, on marime and the kris, references have been grouped together and
all relevant references may not be given in each individual instance.
52. World estimates vary significantly and are highly unreliable. See, e.g., JEAN-PIERRE LItGEOIS,
GYPSIES: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 45-46 (1986) (12-15 million); MARLENE SWAY, FAMILIAR
STRANGERS: GYPsY LIFE IN AMERICA 6 (1988) (8-10 million); Mary Lou Fulton, 'King of the Gypsies'
Seeks New Image for His People, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1989, § 2, at 1 (3-5 million). Lidgeois suggests that
political motives, and the dominant populace's attitude toward the Romani population, have led to denials,
underestimates, and even exaggerations of statistical census data. LIIGEOIS, supra, at 45. Equally important
is the desire of the Roma to protect themselves by concealing ethnicity from a dominant, hostile host
country. Hancock estimated the American Romani population at between 750,000 and 1,000,000. Hancock,
Diaspora I, supra note 38, at 613. The true figure may be higher than any of the estimates because of the
traditionally high birthrate of Gypsies. The U.S. Census figure of about 1,600 Gypsies in the United States
for 1980 is absurdly low. See id.; Yoors, AMERICANA, supra note 1, at 650.
53. See CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 132-33; see also infra notes 192, 203-04 and accompanying text.
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insularity.54 A history of persecution has further reinforced this isolationism.
As a result of suspicion and hostility, countries in western and central Europe
have tried for centuries to rid themselves of the Roma. State-sponsored
discriminatory measures have included forced assimilation and slavery, as well
as the systematic murder of Gypsies in Nazi concentration camps.5 5 In spite
of this persecution, or perhaps because of it, Gypsies have succeeded
remarkably in retaining their cultural identity, often by engaging in the
migratory behavior characteristic of the nomads of Asia. 6
The precise reasons why the Roma left their homeland remain uncertain.
Current research suggests that the Roma are descendants of the Dravidians
who inhabited India before the arrival of Indo-European populations. They
appear to have left northern India between A.D. 1000 and 1025 during a period
of frequent invasions of the Sind and Punjab regions by Islamic forces.
Although the ethnic and caste origins of the Roma may have been mixed,
prolonged separation from the Punjab weakened their identification with the
subcontinent and eventually resulted in a culturally distinct population.
Linguistic evidence supports this theory, but a more detailed historical
foundation is still lacking.
No reliable sources document the arrival of the Gypsies in the United
States or their departure from other countries.5 An initial handful may have
come with Columbus, and later England deported others. 59 A significant
number of Gypsies arrived in the United States with the immigration waves of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the United States, the Gypsies
were not identified as such for quite some time, for several reasons. First, the
United States, with its vast size and mobile population, offered a favorable
environment for a population that often does not adhere to a sedentary life.
Second, Gypsies commonly do not identify themselves as Gypsies, but merely
54. SwAY, supra note 52, at 39.
55. Id. at 44; Toby F. Sonneman, Buried in the Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A17. For a
discussion of the systematic lack of recognition given the Romani holocaust, see generally Sybil Milton,
The Context of the Holocaust, 13 GERMAN STUD. REV. 269 (1990). For further details, see supra note 41.
56. CLABERT, supra note 44, at 201-02. This does not apply to the Vlax who were enslaved in
Rumania for 500 years and thereby compelled to stay in a designated location. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
57. Hancock, Diaspora I, supra note 38, at 615; Ian Hancock, On the Migration and Affiliation of the
Dbmba: Iranian Wbrds in Rom, Lon and Dom Gypsy (Occasional Papers, Int'l Romani Union, Series F,
No. 8, 1992); see also DONALD KENRICK & GRATrAN PUXON, THE DESTINY OF EUROPE'S GYPSIES 14-15
(1972). For theories on the origins of Gypsies, see BLOCK, supra note 44, at 32-47; CLtBERT, supra note
44, at 15-23, 26-42; FRASER, supra note 28, at 25-29, 33-40; SWAY, supra note 52, at 31-33; YOORS,
GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 9-10; John Sampson, On the Origin and Early Migrations of the Gypsies, 2 i.
GYPSY LORE SOC'Y 156, 159 (1923).
58. See JOHN B. MCLAUGHLIN, GYPSY LIFESTYLES 3 (1980).
59. Reportedly, Gypsies entered the Americas with Columbus on his third voyage in 1498. England
began deporting Romanichal Gypsies in 1544. Large numbers of Gypsies were sent from England to
Virginia and Georgia in 1695. Queen Christina of Sweden had Gypsies deported to her colony in Delaware
in 1648. Gypsies from Germany escaped "Gypsy hunts" that had been legalized after the Thirty Years War
by coming to America. Ian F. Hancock, The Romani Diaspora Part 2, 1989 THE WORLD & T 644
[hereinafter Hancock, Diaspora I1].
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indicate their last host home as their nationality.60 Finally, the presence of
other non-white population groups helped the Roma to blend in unnoticed.61
B. Functions of Concepts of Impurity (Marime)
The Gypsies' determination not to assimilate into the dominant society has
been crucial to their survival as a separate population. This drive stems in part
from the Roma's belief that non-Gypsies are in a state of defilement because
of their ignorance about rules on purity and impurity. Gypsy society relies
heavily on distinctions between behavior that is pure (vujo) and polluted
(marime).62 The marime concept has powerful significance for Gypsies.
Marime has a dual meaning: it refers both to a state of pollution as well as to
the sentence of expulsion imposed for violation of purity rules or any behavior
disruptive to the Gypsy community. Pollution and rejection are thus closely
associated with one another.63 The marime rules minimize and regulate
association between Gypsy and non-Gypsy. Although the notion of marime
supports the Roma's desire for autonomy, Gypsy pollution taboos evolved in
part to prevent dissension and disease among people living in deprived and
unstable conditions. 64
60. Vogel,supra note 29, at 35 ("Rom from Germany are listed as Germans."); see also MCLAUGHLIN,
supra note 58, at 3. According to Hancock, the United States adopted immigration policies in the 1880's
restricting entrance of Gypsies. Hancock, Diaspora 11, supra note 59, at 646-47; see also Ian F. Hancock,
Gypsies, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 440, 441 (1980) (hereinafter
Hancock, Gypsies]. On the history of American immigration law, especially the aggressive xenophobia
advocated in the nineteenth century by the political movements of Native Americanism and the
Know-Nothings, see FRANK G. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 184-300 (1906).
61. Hancock, Diaspora 11, supra note 59, at 647.
62. SwAY, supra note 52, at 46-59; see also HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 115-16;
JUDITH OKELY, THE TRAVELLER-GYPSIES 77-78 (1983) [hereinafter OKELY, TRAVELLER]; YOORS, GYPSIES,
supra note 42, at 150; Carol J. Miller, American Rom and the Ideology of Defilement, in GYPSIES, TINKERS
AND OTHER TRAVELLERS 41, 45-46 (Famham Rehfisch ed., 1975) [hereinafter Miller, Defilement] (noting
that gajikane living habits confuse pure and impure and invite spreading of contagious disease, especially
venereal disease); Judith Okely, Gypsy Women: Models in Conflict, in PERCEIVING WoMEN 55, 59-60
(Shirley Ardener ed., 1975) [hereinafter Okely, Gypsy Women]; cf. JACOB NEUSNER, THE IDEA OF PURITY
IN ANCIENT JUDAISM 108 (1973) (discussing purity and impurity as metaphors for moral and religious
behavior relating to sex and unethical conduct).
63. SWAY, supra note 52, at 53; FRASER, supra note 28, at 245-47; Carol J. Miller, Ma~waya Gypsy
Marim 5 (1968) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington (Seattle)) [hereinafter Miller, Thesis];
Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 40. Miller's pathbreaking field research dealt only with Ma~waya
families that belong to the Rom-Vlax group. According to Hancock marime is a Vlax word, unknown to
other Romani populations. Some populations have no word for ritual pollution; other groups use a variation
of the Indian-derived word makhardo, meaning smeared. Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 74-75. Not
all Gypsy groups adhere to the precise beliefs and practices discussed in this Article, although most Gypsies
employ concepts of "pollution" in one form or another.
The notion of pollution exists in most cultures, but it usually does not have the same crucial religious
and legal significance as in the case of the Gypsies. Lawrence S. Kubie, The Fantasy of Dirt, 6
PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 388 (1937) (describing dirtiness as cultural construct); see also Martha G. Duncan,
In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming March
1994) (on file with authors).
64. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 19. But see OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 78-83
[Vol. 103: 323
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According to romaniya,65 or Gypsy law, the human body is both pure and
impure. The waist is the equator, or dividing line. The lower body is marime
because the genital areas and the feet and legs may cause pollution and
defilement.6 The upper body is fundamentally pure and clean. Any
unguarded contact between the lower and upper bodies is marime.67 Rituals
of purification preserve the power attributed to the upper half of the body and
the health of the Gypsy concerned.65 Only the hands may transgress the
boundary line between the upper and lower parts of the body. 9
Notions of purity and impurity follow the life cycle. Gypsies consider
children marime for six weeks after birth because the birth canal is a polluting
site.7" After this six-week period, children enjoy a privileged status in society
until puberty, when they become subject to marime taboos.7 1 Following the
onset of puberty, women remain in a latent stage of impurity until they reach
menopause.72 In old age, Gypsies believe that one regains some of the
innocence of childhood. As one scholar has noted, Gypsies consider elders
"close to the gods and the ancestors." 73 Postmenopausal women do not have
the power to pollute by tossing their skirts (as they can before they reach
menopause), because they no longer menstruate or bear children.74
(stressing concern with inner purity).
65. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 101-02, 263-64, 319 (defining romaniya in Glossary as "the laws
and traditions of the Rom"). Romaniya in essence means that which is considered right, true, correct, and
acceptable regarding all aspects of living. Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 443. It covers relationships
between Gypsies and with non-Gypsies, including matters of health, food, morality, as well as procedures
and rituals. Id. The antithesis of romaniya is marimos, meaning defilement, pollution, or banishment. If
something is marime, it is in violation of Gypsy law. Id.
66. Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 443; Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 41-42.
67. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 258, 264; SWAY, supra note 52, at 53; Miller, Defilement, supra
note 62, at 42.
68. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 255-87; Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 42-43.
69. Miller, Defilement, supra, note 62, at 43. Washing rituals must be performed assiduously after
contact with the lower body, especially before food preparation or religious rituals. Id.; see also Miller,
Thesis, supra note 63, at 9-14.
70. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 262; see also Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 42-44 ("three
days... to several weeks").
71. SUrHERLAND, supra note 29, at 262.
72. See Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 44; see also ELWOOD B. TRIGO, GYPsIEs, DEMONS AND
DIVINMES 55 (1973); Aparna Rao, Some Manug Conceptions and Attitudes, in GYPSIES, TINKERS AND
OTHER TRAVELLERS, supra note 62, at 139, 154-55. The power of the female's lower body to pollute
accounts for the segregation of males and females following puberty. See Rao, supra, at 155; Carol
Silverman, Negotiating "Gypsiness": Strategy in Context, 101 J. AM. FOLKLORE 261, 264 (1988)
[hereinafter Silverman, Gypsiness]. An exception to sexual segregation occurs while Gypsies watch
television. Rao, supra, at 155.
73. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 44. Miller notes that elders are believed no longer to have
an interest in sex. Id. at44 n.10. The conception of age among Gypsies appears to be different from that
of non-Gypsies. The advent of old age is signalled by the arrival of the second or third grandchild. See
SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 263. Many Roma do not know their exact age, so they judge by life cycles
(puberty, adulthood and marriage, old age) and visible factors, such as the presence or absence of wrinkles
and gray hair. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 12; see also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 150-51.
74. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 44 (noting that older women lose power to contaminate by
"tossing the skirt"); id. at 51-52 (discussing skirt-tossing as symbolic power to pollute); see also infra note
79 and accompanying text.
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Pollution taboos vary from group to group and often among smaller
Romani units.75 Nevertheless, Gypsies define themselves in part by their
adherence to these cleanliness rituals.76 There may be class distinctions
among some Roma, based on how strictly individuals or families maintain
distinctions between purity and impurity.77 All these taboos involve rules that
are aspirational. The actual behavior of the Gypsy people is likely to fall short
of the communal expectations expressed in the taboos.
According to Elwood Trigg, the marime rules fall into four overlapping
categories: (1) taboos directly or indirectly related to the fear of being
contaminated by women; (2) sexual taboos; (3) things considered to be dirty
or unhygienic; and (4) disdain of socially disruptive behavior Adherence
to these ritual purity laws is central in setting Gypsies apart from their host
cultures.
1. Contamination by Women 79
Women may contaminate men in a number of ways.8" Because of
menstruation and childbirth, the Gypsies consider the female genitalia impure.
75. See Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 443.
76. See OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 83. The marime taboos are not completely known or
understood by non-Gypsies, who adhere to different and often incompatible notions of cleanliness.
77. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 260; see also Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 442; MATr T.
SALO & SHEILA M. SALO, THE KALDERAS IN EASTERN CANADA 115-16 (Canadian Centre for Folk Culture
Studies Paper No. 21, 1977). According to LItGEOIS, supra note 52, at 76, the marime code enables Gypsy
subgroups to distinguish among themselves, and also helps maintain their separation from non-Gypsies.
Gypsies use peer pressure to point out behavior that amounts to impurity. They then take action to maintain
separation from the behavior to avoid becoming polluted.
78. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 55. Trigg's work focused largely on European Gypsy populations. He
uses the term mokadi, as distinguished from marime, in his book. It is probably a derivation of the word
makhardo (smeared) of Indian origin. The term marime is derived from Greek and used only by the Vlax.
Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 74-75.
79. It should be noted that many of the elements of Gypsy law described in this Article have come
to light only recently, significantly through the efforts of female scholars. The guardians of romaniya are
primarily Gypsy women who orally transmit knowledge to their children. Gajikane males could not have
obtained this confidential information, because Gypsy women would never reveal many important aspects
of Gypsy law, including those which relate to sexual taboos and other highly intimate matters, to a non-
Gypsy man. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at xiii (crediting female scholars with discovery of the Gypsy
"moral code"). Women scholars have also noted the problems of scientific ethics connected with gathering
intimate and confidential information. RENA C. GROPPER, GYPSIES IN THE CITY: CULTURE PATrERNS AND
SURVIVAL at ix (1975) (noting promises made to Gypsy informants and invasion of privacy); SUTHERLAND,
supra note 29, at xii (noting danger of use by police). These same concerns apply to this Article, which
disseminates confidential information to a wider public.
Problems similar to those posed by Gypsy law find parallels in other areas of religious law. Female
legal scholars have been concerned with reexamining ancient notions of purity and pollution as contained
in Jewish and Christian tradition from a feminist perspective. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of
Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 466-67
(1992); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary
Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1190-95 (1990).
80. See TRIGG, supra note 72, at 55; Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 42. The gaji (a non-Gypsy
female) normally cannot defile a Rom, and as such is perceived as being outside the scope of the Romani
legal system. SALO & SALO, supra note 77, at 125.
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A severe state of marime befalls any man if a woman lifts her skirt and
exposes her genitals to him ("skirt-tossing")." A woman must never walk by
a seated man because her genitals would be at the same height as his face.82
A man may not walk under a clothesline where women's clothes are
hanging.83 Women cover their legs when they sit down and, in mixed
company, single women keep their legs together when seated. These stringent
rules may explain the traditionally long and wide skirts worn by Gypsy
women.' Especially in the United States, clothing has changed among Gypsy
women, but skirts typically are still long. Slacks have also become acceptable
apparel for women.s5
Historically, marime taboos were quite strict. For example, if a woman
stepped into a stream, no one could drink from it for several hours because the
water had been exposed to her genitals.86 The same taboo extended to food
and dishes, all of which were thrown out if a woman stepped over them. 87
Even today, some Roma will not rent a lower floor apartment for fear that a
woman living upstairs will at some point pollute them by walking overhead.88
81. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 51-52. According to Miller, a woman may toss her shoe at
a man's face with the same effect. Id. at 51 n.20. Because of the severe consequences for the man, in all
likelihood neither of these things ever happen. If they did occur, the defiled male Rom would be cast out
of the society permanently. Id. at 52. In most cases, after a period of time the woman would simply deny
that it ever happened or say that it was a mistake if it is doubtful that the defilement could be proven. To
attempt to deny a man forgiveness under such uncertain circumstances would eventually deadlock a Gypsy
judicial proceeding. Miller, Thesis, supra note 63, at 22-23.
A Gypsy male will often take his wife with him when meeting an unknown Gypsy. This assures him
that in the event of a squabble he is armed. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 51-52 n.20; see also
YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 151. Interestingly, tossing the skirt has been successful in combating
the gaje. In one case, police officers attempting to arrest Gypsy males were distracted when "'one of the
women lifted her dress over her head' .... 'While the cops stared at her, her companions had time to
flee."' Stanley Penn, Gypsy Gangs Range Across the Country, Stealing Rugs, Gems, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
1988, at Al, AI0 (quoting Chicago police detective Donald Kuchar).
82. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20; SALO & SALO, supra note 77, at 122; SUTHERLAND, supra
note 29, at 151; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 58; see Thomas W. Thompson, The Uncleanness of Women
Among English Gypsies, I J. GYPSY LORE SOc'Y 15, 23 (1922). In an interview with a Mavaya couple,
one investigator was told that many young women do not observe this rule. Marie W. Clark, Vanishing
Vagabonds: The American Gypsies, TEX. Q., Summer 1967, 204, 205-06.
83. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20.
84. Id.; SWAY supra note 52, at 54; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 58; Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note
62, at 63; Thompson, supra note 82, at 22.
85. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20 (observing that Gypsy women sometimes wear blue jeans
or slacks); OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 207; SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that
Gypsies sometime wear "American clothes" in public places); Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 63.
On the question of whether the women's movement has had any effect on Gypsy households, Hancock
notes that when Romani women speak of feminism they usually are talking about non-Gypsy women,
because some changes due to feminism are seen as contradicting romaniya (Gypsy law). Letter from Ian
Hancock, Professor of Linguistics, University of Texas, to Maureen A. Bell (July 8, 1989) (on file with
authors).
86. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20.
87. Rao, supra note 72, at 151; see GROPPER, supra note 79, at 92-93; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58,
at 20; SWAY, supra note 52, at 54; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 56; YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 150;
Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 64; Thompson, supra note 82, at 21.
88. SWAY, supra note 52, at 55; Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 442; David . Pickett, The
Gypsies of Mexico, 45 J. GYPSY LORE Soc'Y 6, 12 (1966).
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Similarly, a woman may get out of the car if her husband has to look under
it because of mechanical trouble.
When a Gypsy woman goes to the toilet, special precautions must be taken
to prevent any man from entering. Even a married couple will not share the
bathroom at the same time.89 A man can become marime by using a toilet
seat that a woman has sat on. To avoid this problem, Gypsies prefer to rent or
buy residences that have two bathrooms.' ° Among some groups, a woman
cannot comb her hair or let it down in the presence of a man.9' A wife must
undress with her back to her husband and get into bed before him. She must
also rise in the morning before he does.92
During her menstrual cycle, a woman is marime and must avoid contact
with others. Among some groups, a menstruating woman must eat alone and
cannot prepare food that will be eaten by a man.93 In addition, she must not
sleep with her husband, or he will become polluted.94 With the onset of
menstruation at puberty, a girl's clothing cannot be washed with men's, boys',
or premenstrual girls' clothing. Some researchers have indicated that much of
the Gypsies' fixation with menstruation originates in India.95
89. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20. Many ritual bhaviors focus around the bathroom in Ma~vaya
households. Miller, Thesis, supra note 63, at 14. The strict prohibitions may even survive mixed marriages.
See, e.g., Letter from Patti J. Jeatran to Walter O. Weyrauch (Nov. 21, 1990) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Jeatran Letter].
90. SwAY, supra note 52, at 55; see also Jeatran Letter, supra note 89. Romaniya makes no distinction
between custom and law. See supra note 65. Furthermore, many Gypsy customs have direct legal
consequences. See, e.g., LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 37 ("Plumbing is a trade forbidden to
Gypsies by their own law. A Gypsy man would be defiled by handling toilet fixtures and would run the
grave risk of being socially ostracized.").
Germans often complain that Gypsy refugees urinate and defecate outdoors. See, e.g., Fisher,
Germany's Gypsies, supra note 41, at Fl (quoting aide of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl). Gypsy asylum
seekers may prefer the outdoors to the polluted facilities provided, which they cannot use without becoming
marime. The German and Romani notions of legal behavior directly conflict with one another.
91. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 58; see Thompson, supra note 82,
at 23-24.
92. LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 45-47 (describing bed rituals). Gypsies traditionally sleep
on the floor. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 4 n.43; see also YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 17-19,
37 (observing that Gypsies traditionally sleep in open air when climate permits).
93. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 61; Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note
62, at 65; Thompson, supra note 82, at 38-39. Some Gypsy branches prohibit menstruating women from
handling "red" meat or any meat. Id. at 27, 37.
94. KATHARINE ESTY, THE GYPSIES: WANDERERS IN TIME 73-74 (1969); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note
58, at 20. In former times even mentioning menstruation in mixed company would place men in danger
of being polluted. Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 65; Thompson, supra note 82, at 38. "Sexual
intercourse during the proper time of the month (12th day of [female] cycle to onset of menstruation) is
not a polluting act. Sex during a woman's period is very marime." Letter from Marlene Sway to Maureen
A. Bell (June 30, 1989) (on file with authors). For an interesting parallel in Mosaic law, see Leviticus 15:24
(man impure for seven days if he lies with a woman during her period). Bleeding in consummation of
marriage is a matter of great pride as evidence of virginity. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 226-27.
95. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 92-93 (separate laundering); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20;
Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 65; Thompson, supra note 82, at 28. The distinction between
melyardo (soiled) and marime (polluted or unclean) is applicable to garments worn and separated for
washing. See infra note 113. For example, clothing worn above the waist can be vujo if it is clean and
melyardo if it is soiled, but clothing worn below the waist is marime. Children's clothing can at worst be
melyardo. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 268. Regarding the taboos surrounding menstruation in India,
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Pregnancy also signals danger of pollution for others. A pregnant woman
may not prepare food for other Gypsies. She is expected to eat by herself and
her food must be cooked in her own pots and pans.96 She cannot share a bed
with her husband.97 Even after birth, there is still a period of time, up to six
weeks, during which a woman is unclean. In former times, a pregnant
woman's clothing, bedding, utensils, and even her tent were burned. Today,
Gypsies view childbirth in hospitals as a convenience because the gaje dispose
of the polluted items.98 In public, couples strictly observe marime taboos, but
privately husbands and wives may relax the standards somewhat. 9
2. Sexual Taboos
Sexual taboos have great importance in Gypsy law. The potential for
defilement is greatly heightened at marriage because Gypsies perceive it as the
end of a woman's innocence.' ° Traditionally, marriage for Gypsies has
see MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20; GABRIELLE TYRNER-STASTNY, THE GYPSY IN NoRTH EsT
AMERICA 14 (1977). On the other hand, menstruation and the capacity of women to pollute also has been
of intense concern in Jewish and Christian religious law. Becker, supra note 79, 466 (discussing
menstruation and childbirth as polluting). See generally BLOOD MAGIC: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
MENSTRUATION (Thomas Buckley & Alma Gottlieb eds., 1988).
96. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21; OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 210-11; TRIGG, supra
note 72, at 59; Thompson, supra note 82, at 26, 32.
97. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21. Among the Ma~vaya and Kalderasha, sexual intercourse
between husband and wife is not taboo during a pregnancy as long as there is no vaginal spotting and
bleeding. Letter from Marlene Sway, supra note 94.
98. SALO & SALO, supra note 77, at 131; Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 66-67. According
to McLaughlin, at the end of this untouchable period, a woman who has given birth "must undergo an
elaborate ceremony to cleanse herself. She must destroy everything that she wore during her period of
defilement, and she must wait another 40 days before resuming sexual relations with her husband."
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21; see also Becker, supra note 79, at 466 (discussing purification by ritual
bath after menstruation and child birth in Jewish tradition).
99. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 266. Generally autonomous systems can exist within other
autonomous systems. Thus, the Gypsy family, in relaxing otherwise binding restrictions of romaniya within
its jurisdiction, may enjoy a certain degree of autonomy within the larger autonomous legal system of the
Gypsies.
100. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 43-44.
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occurred early, after age nine but usually before age fourteen."t ' Gajikano
influence may have undermined this tradition. 2
Sexual mores are rigorously enforced and a wife's complaint of "shameful
practices" is ground for annulment as well as a sentence of marime and
banishment of the husband. Gypsy law considers oral sex, sodomy, and
homosexuality crimes against nature and prohibits them, although these acts
may occur in secrecy.10 3 Moreover, even "appropriate" sexual activity
between husband and wife may be "tinged with shame."' 4 Merely making
implicit references to genitals, defecation, or sexual intercourse brings shame,
especially when both sexes are present. In addition, Gypsies consider yawning
or looking sleepy shameful, because they suggest that one is thinking about
going to bed. 05
In spite of myths of Gypsy immorality, most Roma follow strict rules of
sexual behavior. Prostitution and infidelity are unusual. 6 Marime rules are
particularly harsh on women. For example, if a Gypsy male marries a gaff
(non-Gypsy female), his community will eventually accept her, provided that
she adopts the Gypsy way of life. But it is a worse violation of the marime
code for a Gypsy female to marry a gajo (non-Gypsy male),
101. See generally MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 14-15; Mama F. Fisher, Gypsies, in MINORITY
PROBLEMS 50, 51 (Caroline B. Rose & Arnold M. Rose eds., 1st ed. 1965) [hereinafter Fisher, Gypsy
Minorities]. According to Sutherland, a first marriage ideally occurs before the eighteenth birthday.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 223. Marital age among the Kalderasha in Canada has risen to an average
age of eighteen, although marriage between fourteen-year-olds is not uncommon. SALO & SALO, supra note
77, at 144-45. Among the urban Gitanos in Spain, most men wed between seventeen and twenty-two.
Women wed between fifteen and seventeen years of age, which is young in comparison with the Spanish
non-Gypsy population. Teresa San Romdn, Kinship, Marriage, Law and Leadership in Two Urban Gypsy
Settlements in Spain, in GYPSIES, TINKERS AND OTHER TRAVELLERS supra note 62 at 169, 182. For similar
observations among the Gypsy population in Britain, see OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 153.
Premarital sex reduces the amount of the bride price drastically. See SWAY, supra note 52, at 64. Yet
abortion is exceedingly rare among Gypsies. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 162. According to Hancock, Gypsy
boys typically date non-Gypsy girls (raklia). It is through these encounters that they acquire sexual
expertise. Nonetheless, adult Gypsies discourage romantic involvement with raklia. Hancock, Review, supra
note 35, at 77-78.
102. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 65.
103. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 175; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 64-65; Miller, Defilement, supra note
62, at 42. No distinction is made between married or single Gypsies in regard to these prohibitions.
104. Silverman, Gypsiness, supra note 72, at 263. Silverman does not explain this observation. Okely
indicates that loss of virginity even within marriage is viewed as a loss of purity, an unclean act. OKELY,
TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 209. The Romani word for "deflowered" is porradi, which means "spread
apart," "split open," or "broken." Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 4 n.49. Parallels exist in Christianity.
See I Corinthians 7:7-9 (stating Paul's admonition that staying unmarried is preferable to marriage,
although marriage is permissible for those who cannot contain themselves); see also Schroeder, supra note
79, at 1190-95 (discussing views of medieval theologians that female sexuality is ritually polluting).
105. Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 42 n.3. Roma avoid the word pato for bed and use the
euphemism than (place) instead. Hancock, Notes, supra note 3 1, at 4 n.48.
106. CL12BERT, supra note 44, at 175; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 62-64. But it is not unusual, and
sometimes even encouraged, for a Gypsy male to have clandestine sexual relations with a gajikani female.
He must act with utmost discretion, because if he were found out he and his family would be marime. See
Miller, Thesis, supra note 63, at 32-34; SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 262-63; see also San Roman, supra
note 101, at 193.
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because Gypsy women are the guarantors for the survival of the
population. 7 Gypsies expect females to be virgins when they marry and to
remain faithful to their husbands until death. Infidelity in marriage historically
has had serious consequences for the wife, including mutilation or a sentence
of marime.05
3. Hygienic Matters
Complex rules also govern tangible items considered dirty or
unhygienic109 In Romani society, food preparation is replete with ritual. A
woman must serve a man from behind and guard against reaching across or in
front of him. Gypsies use the dining table exclusively for eating and keep it
immaculately clean. In the past, women wore full white aprons when preparing
meals or mending men's clothing in order to protect the food or clothing from
the "dirt" of their dresses."0 Gypsies guard their dishes and utensils closely
and generally do not share them with their gajikane guests. Visitors have to
107. Miller suggests that the temporary period of marime for the gajikani wife lasts for approximately
three to four months. During this time the gaji is taught proper washing and avoidance behavior. Miller,
Thesis, supra note 63, at 15. Intermarriage remains rare. Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 442.
According to a Romani source, intermarriage may have undesirable results because the mixed couple loses
the full support of the Roma without gaining the respect of gajikano society. LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra
note 29, at 104, 117. Concern about intermarriage has also been raised in Jewish communities. See R.
Gustav Niebuhr, Keeping the Faith: Marriage and Family No Longer Are Ties That Bind to Judaism, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 1991, at Al. According to Jewish law, which is matrilineal, the religion of the mother
determines whether the child is born Jewish. Id. at A6.
With regard to marriages of Gypsy women to gajikane men, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at
247-53; Miller, Defilement, supra note 62, at 45. Such a marriage is likely to be perceived as a rejection
of romaniya (Gypsy law). The character and quality of a Gypsy woman is largely judged by whether she
is perceived to be respectable, which is determined by whether she follows Gypsy laws and customs. LEE,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 57.
JOS. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 175-76; TRIOG, supra note 72, at 62-64. Quintana and Floyd assert
that Gypsy females in Spain strongly support the double standard as well as the punishments. The Gitana
maintain that their fidelity is further proof of their superiority. BERTHA B. QUINTANA & Lois G. FLOYD,
1QuI GITANO! GYPSIES OF SOUTHERN SPAIN 36 (1972).
109. Trigg groups various Romani taboos under the heading mokadi. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 54-55.
The Vlax Roma distinguish between things that are melyade (visibly dirty) and things that are marime
(ritually polluted). These concepts are perceived differently by the Vlax Roma and the non-Gypsies. The
gaje focus on visible dirt. The Roma, however, are concerned with inward cleanliness. Each perceives the
other as dirty or polluted. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 91. An untidy or unkept home would not be marime,
assuming adherence to marime regulations regarding washing and preparation of food. Instead, the home
would be considered melyade. Untidiness can generate much gossip, even heated debate within a kumpania
.(a group of Roma living or travelling together). A house, however, that has been occupied only by Roma,
even if it is melyade, is still considered "cleaner" than a home formerly occupied by non-Gypsies or by
a banished Roma family. The Gypsies consider the latter two marime. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 270;
see also supra note 62.
The Vlax also have a concept of pokelime for something that is already defiled. Gajikane movies,
literature, mass communication, and advertisements are pokelime, because they were polluted at their
inception. Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 74-75 (noting also the differences in terminology among
various Romani populations).
I 10. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21 (discussing eating rituals). According to Okely, small aprons
are still worn today and symbolize "a true Gypsy." OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 208; see also
TRIGG, supra note 72, at 56-57; Thompson, supra note 82, at 19, 24.
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provide their own. If necessary, their hosts provide them with a set which
traditionally must be destroyed afterwards or saved for other non-Gypsy
visitors. Today, Gypsies use paper or plastic plates and tableware for this
purpose. Silverware may regain purity after being soaked in bleach. Food in
which a hair has been found must be discarded. Blowing one's nose or
sneezing would pollute the food and make the offender marime, as would
neglecting to wash one's hands before eating. A man who touches a woman's
skirt should not handle food without washing his hands first."1 ' Even a
shadow can pollute food." 2
A kitchen sink cannot be used for washing hands or clothes, only for
cleaning dishes and silverware. A Rom who accidentally washes his hands in
a basin for washing dishes is marime. Dishes that are mistakenly washed in a
"polluted" place, regardless of their apparent cleanliness, must be destroyed or
soaked in bleach. Gypsies divide their living quarters into marime and vujo
areas. The front of the house could be marime unless protective measures are
taken, since this is where the gaje may enter. Gypsies often reserve one chair
for gajikane visitors. A Rom must never sit in this chair, for if he does, he will
be deemed marime. Today, other furniture is protected from pollution with
plastic covers. Gypsies never permit gaje in the back of the house. t3
The division between pure and impure extends to bodily by-products.
Gypsies consider tears, spit, and even vomit clean because they emanate from
the top half of the body, whereas emissions from the lower half of the body
are polluting. Gypsies will take extreme measures to conceal the fact that they
need to urinate."1
4
Marime taboos extend to animals as well, from the edibility of certain
types of meat to pet ownership. For example, dogs and cats, as opposed to
horses, are considered polluted because of their unclean living habits. Gypsies
111. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21-22; SALO & SALO, supra note 77, at 120-21; cf RAV ZVi
COHEN, TEVILATH KELIM: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 17, 37, 115 (1988) (discussing Judaic laws that
require ritual washing of utensils acquired through purchase or gift from non-Jewish sources); MOSHE
MORGAN, A GUIDE TO THE LAWS OF KASHRUS 107 (discussing whether it is permissible to use refrigerator
which has been used by non-Jew). The reader is cautioned that rules in communities of different ethnic
backgrounds, even if outwardly comparable, may be based on substantially different rationales.
112. The shadow of the gaje is particularly polluting. Judith Okely, Why Gypsies Hate Cats but Love
Horses, 63 NEw Soc'Y 251, 252 (1983) [hereinafter Okely, Cats].
113. On cleanliness and visitors, see generally MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 21-22; YOORS,
GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 150; Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 60; Thompson, supra note 82, at
20. If used and washed properly, items commonly used for food preparation such as tablecloths, dish
towels, and dishes can become melyade. They do not become marime unless prohibited contact is made,
for example, when a towel falls on the floor. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 266-69. When moving into
a house that has been occupied by gaje, Gypsies may board up sinks or replace them with new ones for
fear that the original facilities were used for improper purposes, in particular urination. OKELY, TRAVELLER,
supra note 62, at 82; SALO & SALO, supra note 77, at 120.
114. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 265-66; YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 30. According to
Vogel, supra note 29, at 37, even flushing the toilet can be embarrassing for many Roma. Among the




consider cats particularly unclean because they lick their paws after burying
their feces. The critical concern (as with dogs licking themselves) is that the
uncleanliness of the external world may defile the purity of the inner self if it
is permitted to enter the body through the mouth. Cats are also a sign of
impending death. If a cat sets foot in a Gypsy's house, trailer, or automobile,
a purification ceremony is required. Dogs are also unclean, but to a lesser
extent. Dogs are tolerated outside the house because of their value as
watchdogs." 5
4. Social Transgressions
Socially disruptive behavior may result in legal sanctions, including a
sentence of marime. In addition to strong taboos against exploiting or stealing
from a fellow member of the Gypsy community, Gypsies consider crimes of
violence and noncommercial association with gaje as crimes against Romani
society as a whole and therefore marime."6 A marime label can be removed
by the forgiveness of the offended party, the passage of time or by a Gypsy
legal proceeding called kris Romani. Readmission to Gypsy society following
a sentence of marime is cause for celebration.1
17
In all cases of marime, enforcement depends primarily on a superstitious
fear of the consequences of violating the marime rules. The individual who
violates a marime prohibition has succumbed to powers of evil and destruction
that are so frightening that even his own family shuns him for fear of
contamination. Such an individual becomes tainted and can be redeemed only
by making the prescribed amends." 8
115. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 22; OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 91-97; TRIGG, supra
note 72, at 69; Okely, Cats, supra note 112, at 253 (describing rejection of cats for being polluted). The
Biblical rules, Leviticus 11:2-22; Deuteronomy 14:4-21, prohibit eating dogs and cats. For many people,
regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation, these prohibitions have become rules of oral legal tradition.
116. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 90, 106; SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 257-58; SWAY, supra note
52, at 78; YooRs, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 176-79 (describing a Gypsy trial relating to theft); Miller,
Defilement, supra note 62, at 46 (discussing noneconomic association with gaje); San Romin, supra note
101, at 191-94 (describing substantive criminal law among Gitanos in Spain). Much behavior that is
acceptable to and commonplace among non-Gypsies is taboo for the Roma. Consequently, any exchange
with gaje entails a risk of pollution. LIIGEOIs, supra note 52, at 76.
117. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 20 (noting ways in which one can remove oneself from marime
state).
118. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 55. Trigg uses the term mokadi instead of marime. The terms vary
depending on the particular Romani population involved. The fear of being declared marime is a powerful
means of social control. Letter from Marlene Sway, supra note 94 ("Even if a Gypsy is tried on a marime
charge and is cleared by the kris, the stigma or cloud of doubt lingers for his or her entire lifetime."). Some
observers have suggested similar aspects in our own proceedings that prevent rehabilitation. Goffman notes
that "barbarous ceremonies" in our society, such as criminal trials and courts-martial, have the sole purpose
of preventing the accused from saving face. Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of
Adaptation to Failure, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451,462 (1952). Disclosure of arrest records, whether the accused
was convicted or not, are required on immigration and naturalization applications, applications for law
schools, applications for taking the bar examination and for being admitted to the practice of law. For
example, see Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Application for Admission to the Florida Bar, form 1,
revised Dec. 1992, Question No. 20 a:
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C. Administration of Justice
Because of the general lack of territorial boundaries, each Gypsy group can
determine its own form of adjudication. Although there are many words for
"group" in the Gypsy language, four primary associations can be identified:
natsia, meaning nation; kumpania, an alliance of households not necessarily
of the same natsia but of the same geographic area bound together for
socioeconomic reasons; vitsa, or clan; and familia, which consists of the
individual extended family." 9 Each associational unit is involved in the
administration of justice, beginning with the smallest, the familia, which
informally settles minor disputes, and extending to the larger units with
increasing formality.
1. Role of Chiefs
Gypsies have no kings in the traditional meaning of the term. 2 Every
vitsa has a rom baro, literally meaning "Big Man," commonly referred to as
the chief. The chief is elected for life, and the position is not inheritable.'
2
'
If a chief dies or falls into disgrace, another chief is chosen to replace him.
The main criteria for chiefdom are intelligence and a sense of fairness. Wealth
and large physical stature are not required, although they help. Most chiefs are
List all instances in your entire life (including while you were a juvenile) in which you have
been arrested, detained or restrained, given a warning or taken into custody or accused, formally
or informally, of the violation of a law, or ordinance, or accused, formally or informally, of
committing a delinquent act and attach a detailed explanation of the facts and the subsequent
actions taken by the authorities.
A preamble clarifies in greater detail that no expunging or sealing of records, or dismissing, vacating or
setting aside any arrest "shall excuse less than full disclosure, irrespective of any advice from any source
that such information need not be disclosed." See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482
(1948) ("Arrest without more may nevertheless impair or cloud one's reputation."); Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486, 491 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Presumably the fact of arrest indicates some possibility that the
individual concerned engaged in the criminal activity with which he was charged.").
119. See also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 10-13, 32-34, 181-205; SwAY, supra note 52, at 61;
YOORS, GYPsIES, supra note 42, at 134-35; Anne Sutherland, Gypsies: The Hidden Americans, 12 SOCiETY
27, 28 (1975); LItGEOIS, supra note 52, at 57-66. Within each kumpania, there are further divisions called
wortacha (partners). These groups are formed between members of the same sex who work together. They
may include fathers and sons, or mothers and daughters. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 66-68. But see
Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 442 (noting that Romanichals only divided into clans and families).
The Lovara do not use the term vitsa. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 5 n.56.
120. On the absence of law enforcement, see YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 174. On the absence
of kings, see SWAY, supra note 52, at 61. According to Yoors, "kings" existed among the European Lovara,
but not as portrayed by the media. These kings were actually informal intermediaries between the real
chiefs and the local gajikane authorities. YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 114-16. GROPPER, supra note
79, at 70-72, indicates that these false "kings" do not exist in the United States. For an illustration of how
the label "king" was attached to a Gypsy spokesman by a reporter, see LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note
29, at 111-21.
121. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 126-28. Yet GROPPER, supra note 79, at 71, notes that one of the sons
of a former chief typically becomes the next leader.
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literate. 2 Elders are considered particularly suited to this role because they
have greater knowledge of romaniya and are believed to be less susceptible to
the temptations of violating the marime code. The chief chairs the council of
elders, generally the patriarchs of the extended families. He is held accountable
if he himself violates Gypsy law or ignores the other chiefs. All chiefs have
equal authority and decide jointly about when the larger group should
migrate. 12
3
There is a female counterpart to the chief. Her power is unofficial but
substantial. The Vlax call her mami, daki-dei or dadeski-dei. Other Gypsy
groups use the term phuri-dae (old mother). She is the guardian of the moral
code and helps decide matters involving women and children. In important
affairs involving the entire kumpania, she is the spokeswoman for Gypsy
women.
124
The tribal chiefs are not necessarily aware of all the laws; not only are the
laws too numerous, but many laws have been lost because they have never
been written down. The Gypsies interpret laws according to contemporary
custom. Former rationales and interpretations of laws gradually may be revised
as the needs of the community evolve. The exclusive reliance on oral
transmission has led to a high degree of flexibility. Nevertheless, there is a
shared, though not necessarily realistic, feeling that the law is clearly defined.
Few ever challenge this notion. This strict adherence to the law in part
accounts for the continued cohesion of the Gypsies in spite of their persecution
and forced migration. Secrecy surrounds Gypsy law; unauthorized disclosure
to the gaje may lead to sanctions."2
Each chief handles all day-to-day conflicts within his population. When
conflict emerges between Gypsies of different vitsi or kumpaniyi (singular
kumpania), a divano may assemble. 2 6 A divano is an informal proceeding
122. With regard to the Roma, see CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 126. Some authors suggest that the rom
baro is self-appointed and not selected or elected. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 16; SALO & SALO,
supra note 77, at 55-56. According to SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 116, a rom baro should ideally be
tall and have a large body frame and head. Literacy may be desirable or even necessary because of the rom
baro's role as a liaison between the Roma and the gajikane authorities. On literacy see GROPPER, supra
note 79, at 71; SwAY, supra note 52, at 61.
123. CLUBERT, supra note 44, at 126-28. See generally GROPPER, supra note 79, at 70-80, 102.
According to SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 104, there is a positive correlation between age and
knowledge of romaniya (Gypsy law).
124. CLIBERT, supra note 44, at 128; SwAY, supra note 52, at 61-62. According to BLOCK, supra note
44, at 170-71, the old mother traditionally had some formal powers. For example, although the chief had
to be present at weddings, it was the old mother who performed the ceremony. If the chief was unavailable
for dispute consultation, it was the old mother who made the final adjudication. So powerful was her
presence that even her glance and cry, "I am old, I am old," struck fear in all, because she had the power
to inflict curses and bring bad luck. See also Rao, supra note 72, at 143-44.
125. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 131-32 (discussing secrecy); GROPPER, supra note 79, at 98
(discussing flexibility of romaniya and oral tradition).
126. LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 68; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 22-23. According
to Pickett, supra note 88, at 6-7, the Gypsies of Mexico successfully used the divano for dispute resolution.
But see Jan Yoors, Lowari Law and Jurisdiction, 26 J. GYPSY LORE SOC'Y 1, 2 (1947) [hereinafter Yoors,
Lowari Law] (noting that divano may perpetuate quarrels and result in interminable discussions).
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where the chiefs of the various clans try to mediate a dispute. The parties
themselves are not required to attend-and they are not technically bound by
the chiefs' suggestions. But the contestants sometimes do bow to peer pressure
and settle the case. Blatant disregard for the chiefs' recommendations could
cost them the respect of the community. 27
2. Role of Courts (Kris)
When the Roma cannot settle a controversy amicably in a divano, a kris
may become necessary. 28 In former times, the kris usually adjudicated three
kinds of cases: property losses, matters of honor, and moral or religious issues,
including nonobservance of marime taboos. 129 Brawls, demands by parents
for return of their married daughters, defaults in payments of debts, marime
violations and personal retribution all required the attention of the kris.30 In




Divorce cases are complex. Even today, most Gypsy marriages (which
may not be legal marriages according to gajikano law) are arranged, and the
groom's family pays a bride price. If the marriage ends in divorce, a kris may
The Emirate of Kuwait has an institution called diwaniya. In regularly scheduled meetings, headed
by the Crown Prince, friends and members of the extended family gather to discuss grievances. John
Kifner, After the War: Emir Disparaged at Kuwaiti Forums, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at AS. The word
divano is of Persian origin and means council of state or court of justice. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 20
n.1.
127. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23; see also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 131. According
to a Gypsy saying, "It's better to part as friends from a divano, than as enemies from a kris." Hancock,
Notes, supra note 31, at 5 n.59.
128. SWAY, supra note 52, at 77. For an excellent description of the kris and the applicable law, see
Lee, Kris, supra note 51. Lee cites with approval GROPPER, supra note 79, and SALO & SALO, supra note
77. See also David J. Nemeth, Gypsy Justice in America, 1 J. GYPSY LORE SOC'Y 3 (1974); David J.
Nemeth, Field Notes from 1970: A Kris in River City, in 100 YEARS OF GYPSY STUDIES 117 (Matt T. Salo
ed., 1990) [hereinafter Nemeth, Field Notes]. The word kris is not of Indian origin. The term derives from
the Greek word krisis, meaning judgment. FRASER, supra note 28, at 56; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 19.
The kris as a judicial institution exists among the Vlax, the most numerous Romani group in the United
States. It appears that the conditions of slavery in Rumania, under which the Vlax lived for five centuries,
helped to preserve the kris as part of their distinct culture. See Hancock, Diaspora , supra note 38, at 617.
The Vlax kris may be modeled after a council of elders of non-Gypsy villagers in Rumania that also settled
disputes. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at5 n.59. The Romanichals (British Gypsies) and the descendants
of Balkan Gypsies, who were not enslaved, do not have the kris. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 19.
129. Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 3. During kris proceedings the litigants agree to a truce.
Id. at 11. According to GROPPER, supra note 79, at 82, a judge will not accept a case for a kris unless the
litigants take an oath promising to abide by the decision. See also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23.
130. C.-H. Tillhagen, III. Conception of Justice Among the Swedish Gypsies, 38 J. GYPSY LORE SOc'Y
18, 19 (1959) [hereinafter Tillhagen, Ill]. A detailed list of controversies falling under the jurisdiction of
the kris is also contained in Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 21-22. See also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at
292-304 (giving account of two Gypsy trials: (1) kris Romani in New Orleans and (2) divano in Wichita,
reported by John Marks, party to proceedings).
131. According to GROPPER, supra note 79, at 85-91, four kinds of cases dominate the kris calendar
in the United States: (1) work related, e.g., unfair division of profits; (2) divorce; (3) feuding between
extended families and bands; and (4) matters similar to our criminal cases, e.g., murder, rape, theft (marime
violations). See also Salo & Salo, supra note 77, at 59, for parallels to Kalderasha in Canada.
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be called to determine how much, if any, of the bride price should be returned
to the groom's family.'
Economic cases, on the other hand, cover such issues as who has the right
to engage in fortune-telling in a specific territory. Gypsies believe that every
Gypsy has the right to work. Accordingly, groups divide territory into
economic units. Controversies may result when some Gypsies poach on others'
turf, and then a kris is called. A first-time offender may receive a warning by
the kris. Repeated violations result in a sentence of marime.133
In all cases, it is the aggrieved party who must request the kris, which is
then held at a neutral kumpania. If the alleged victim is old, sick, or very
young, the victim's nearest male relative brings the case to the kris. If the
welfare of the community demands joint action, the entire clan may be a
plaintiff.
134
The elders of the tribes then hold a meeting and select one or more men
to act as the krisnitorya (singular krisnitori), or judges. The plaintiff is allowed
to choose the judge who will preside over his case, but the defendant has a
right to veto that choice.135 Among the Roma in the United States it is not
unusual for more than one judge to preside. 36 The senior judge is
132. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 88-89; SWAY, supra note 52, at 73. According to Hancock, Gypsies,
supra note 60, at 442, arranged marriages are fairly common among both the Romanichals and the Roma
(Gypsies of eastern and southern Europe, principally the Mavaya, Kalderasha, Churara, and Lovara).
Sometimes the marriage agreement, arranged by the parents, is completed prior to the child's birth.
A Gypsy woman may occasionally use the gajikane courts to get a more favorable divorce settlement.
But this is a violation of romaniya (Gypsy law) and may result in a kris. It appears that Gypsy marriages
and divorces are de facto recognized by the gajikano legal system. This tolerance may be due to official
indifference, or it may be due to American state-law presumptions of what constitutes marriage. See Walter
0. Weyraueh, Informal Marriage and Formal Marriage: An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization,
28 U. CHI. L. REv. 88, 105-08 (1960). Moreover, some states still recognize common-law marriage. The
requirements for the presumption of marriage and common-law marriage are identical: cohabitation and the
repute of being married. The minimum ages for a valid common-law marriage were, and in some states
still are, 12 for the female and 14 for the male. HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (on cohabitation and repute of being married), 89 n.8 (on age limits) (2d ed.
student ed. 1988).
133. SwAY, supra note 52, at 88-89.
134. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23; SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 134; Yoors, Lowari Law,
supra note 126, at 3-9 (noting that Romani group may act as plaintiff if victim fails to complain about an
act that shames community as whole, e.g., adultery; winner pays for feast following kris). According to
SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 132, the public and not the litigants decide to have a kris, in serious civil
matters as well as in criminal matters.
In the United States, calling a kris involves notifying the parties, renting a "courtroom" or hall, and
making provisions for food and beverage for all in attendance. The guilty party pays all the costs including
travel expenses. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 96; SWAY, supra note 52, at 78.
135. Tillhagen, III, supra note 130, at 21 (describing selection of judge for Swedish kris). The
procedure for the American kris is probably similar because it requires the parties to agree on the judge,
usually after protracted haggling. See Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 26, 29.
136. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23. No firm rule suggests when more than one judge should be
selected. YOORS, GYPstES, supra note 42, at 174, states that without a permanent judicial cadre, the
selection of judges would depend upon the number of qualified men available. Lee refers to the krisnitorya
as an advisory body sitting together with the judge or judges. Since these men appear to be "associate
judges" rather than a jury, they may sometimes have been mistakenly counted as judges. Lee, Kris, supra
note 51, at 26.
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surrounded by the members of the kris council, who act as associate
judges. t37 Generally, five or more men from both sides, usually the elders,
form the council. In the United States, the council may have as many as
twenty-five members.'38
The audience of a kris was once largely male. Women and unmarried or
childless men were allowed to attend only if they were needed as witnesses.
It is now acceptable, if unusual, to have the entire family present for
support.'39 Witnesses may speak freely about the case, for the Gypsies
believe there can be no justice without hearing the matter out to its fullest. 40
Exaggerated claims and ornate stories referring to folktales and mythology are
common.'4 ' When members of the audience think the witness is not being
truthful or responsive, they hiss or make jokes. 42 In some delicate matters,
such as adultery, the public and witnesses can be excluded. 43 At a kris only
Romani may be spoken, and participants discourage lapses into English by
shouting and hissing. Furthermore, arguments are often presented in a special
oratory that differs grammatically from ordinary Romani and resembles a legal
jargon.' 44 When the accused testify on their own behalf they are expected to
be truthful. t45 The kris can further insure their honesty by invoking the magic
137. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 130.
138. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23. It should be remembered that the kris procedure is based on
oral tradition and may vary from case to case and depending on what particular Romani group is involved.
YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 174. These variations may also determine who may participate and on
what terms. See supra note 136.
139. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 83 (noting that no Gypsy would be denied admission to kris); Yoors,
Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 6. Among the Swedish Gypsies, women accompanied their husbands to
the kris. Tillhagen, 11, supra note 130, at 21. The Gitanos in Spain do not tolerate the presence of women.
See QUINTANA & FLOYD, supra note 108, at 73. Their presence at the kris is also not permitted in Canada,
except in the capacity of witness. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 26.
Jeatran, the daughter of a Lovara Rom and a gajikani woman, has studied American Gypsies and
reports that women may attend the kris, although they are not permitted to speak unless they are litigants
or witnesses. A Romani informant has told Jeatran that "because we are in America now, so we have to
respect the 'Women's Lib.' Patti J. Jeatran, Disputing and Social Control Among American Gypsies 22
(Nov. 14, 1990) (unpublished paper, University of Illinois Department of Criminal Justice, on file with
authors) [hereinafter Jeatran, Social Control]. According to Jeatran's informant, women are not allowed to
participate in the kris because "if an old one speaks, a young one will start arguing with her and disrupt
everything." Id. at 26. Hancock stresses that he has never been to a kris where women were let into the
hall. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 5 n.60.
140. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 81-84.
141. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23-24.
142. SWAY, supra note 52, at 78 (noting hissing and joking as informal sanctions). Tillhagen, III,
supra note 130, at 24, reports that Swedish Gypsies did not tolerate such disruptions. The European Lovara
also adhered to strict rules of behavior. See Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 11.
143. Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 6. In cases of exclusion, the kris scrutinizes the evidence
of defilement and publicly pronounces the defendant as either clean or marime.
144. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 84-85; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 28. According to Jeatran, Social
Control, supra note 139, at 26, some young Gypsy men in the United States ridicule the formal oratory and
prefer telephone "conference calling" to settle their disputes, perhaps as a preliminary step to a divano.
145. C.-H. Tillhagen, V Conceptions of Justice Among the Swedish Gypsies, 38J. GYPsY LORE SOC'Y
127, 131 (1959) (quoting Romani source on honesty among Gypsies) [hereinafter Tillhagen, 11]. But see
Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 13 (accused tries to elude questions and attempts to make the crime
seem less serious). The Roma present their own case, husbands answering for their wives. Yet, spokesmen,
the equivalent of lawyers, can be employed to plead the case for the parties. They may be young men who
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power of the dead with an oath. If the witnesses must swear an oath, an altar
of justice consisting of icons of the clans present is erected. 146 In complex
situations, the judge may ask for expert opinions from tribal chiefs or the
elders. Nonetheless, only the judge decides guilt and punishment. 47
The judge declares the verdict in public to those who are present. In
former times, if the accused Rom was found guilty, a married Gypsy woman
was symbolically called on to tear a piece of cloth from her dress and throw
it at the Rom, but this ritual is no longer practiced. If the accused is found
innocent, there is a celebration and an oath of peace is sworn. The decision of
the kris is final and binding.1 48 Even in countries such as Spain and the
United States, where the Roma are considered by some gajikane scholars to
be semi-assimilated, the verdict of an official state trial is not final: a kris will
still be held. Beyond its judicial function, the kris plays an important role in
maintaining the customs of the Gypsy people.
49
Recent developments suggest the possibility of cooperation between the
Romani and American judicial systems. By March 1987, local Roma in
Southern California had reportedly established eighteen territorial jurisdictions,
each with its own judge. The idea was that these kris would receive case
referrals from the California state courts of civil and domestic disputes
involving only Gypsies. The local kris would then refer nonbinding
recommendations back to the California courts. 5 In another recent
development, over two hundred Roma gathered for an advisory kris in Houston
to discuss improving the rights of divorced women under the Romani legal
system, to keep pace with developments in American law and to remove the
incentive for Gypsy women to appeal to the American legal system for a
test their rhetorical skills and their capacity for leadership. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 82-84;
McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23-24; Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 3. Jeatran, Social Control,
supra note 139, at 20, describes two exceptional cases in which non-Gypsies attended a kris: a local
gajikano attorney acting as informal counsel in a child custody matter and a California social worker
appearing at the Gypsies request for informational purposes.
146. CItBERT, supra note 44, at 130; YOORS, GYPsIEs, supra note 42, at 177-79; see also Yoors,
Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 17 (describing solemn oath, solax, administered when no decision can be
reached). According to GROPPER, supra note 79, at 83, a new trial must be held if the krisnitorya cannot
reach a decision. Parties may also swear an oath before the kris, agreeing to abide by the decision.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 134-35.
147. CLIBERT, supra note 43, at 130. As long as the kris has not proceeded beyond hearing from the
witnesses and final instructions, either the plaintiff or the defendant may request permission to settle the
case outside the kris. Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 14. After hearing from both sides, but before
giving the decision, an impartial elder may emerge to attack the litigants' arguments. Id. at 16. Among the
Lovara, if a judge appears to be wrong on a point of law, the council can ask him to justify his decision.
Id. at 4.
148. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 132. But see Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at 5 (observing
that appeals are allowed among European Lovara, but severely frowned upon); see also CLtBERT, supra
note 44, at 130 (oath of peace).
149. Cf. CLIBERT, supra note 44, at 130-31; GROPPER, supra note 79, at 180.
150. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 32. We were not able to confirm that this procedure, if approved,
was ever implemented, but the Gypsies' desire for any affiliation with the American court system is
unprecedented. Telephone Interview with Barry A. Fisher, Attorney-at-Law, Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 8,
1993), who has represented Romani interests in the past.
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stronger remedy. 5' These developments could conceivably lead to the
establishment of standing Romani courts within each state. 5 2 But it is
unclear how the American legal system would respond to such a system, since
it does not recognize Romani law as binding. Gypsies, too, might find it
difficult to abandon their traditional distrust of American courts.
3. Legal Sanctions
The kris imposes punishment according to the seriousness of the offense.
The death penalty, once an acceptable option, is now virtually
unknownt--possibly because of the Gypsies' fear of spirits and belief that
the angry ghost of the deceased will take revenge upon the executioner. In
times when the death penalty was still employed, the entire community would
participate in the execution to prevent revenge by the spirit. The Roma seemed
to feel a joint undertaking was safer, although today they rarely test this
belief.'54 Nowadays, the kris relies primarily on such sanctions as fines,
corporal punishment, and banishment. The responsibility to pay a kris-imposed
fine, called glaba, falls collectively on the wrongdoer's lineage.' 55 Corporal
151. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 32-33. Hancock, who participated in a Houston kris that dealt with
the topics of child support and divorce, reports:
The issue was that divorced women were going to the gajikane dukaturya (non-Gypsy lawyers)
for relief because the kris wasn't satisfactory. The main concern was that by going to the gaje,
the power of the kris was being undermined. In order for it to maintain its strength (krisaki
putyerya) it would have to provide better resolutions to divorcees (divorced according to
Romani tradition, not American tradition). So control cuts both ways. The decision was to
enforce more responsibility on the part of the father.
Letter from Ian F. Hancock, Romani Union, Professor of Linguistics, University of Texas, to Walter 0.
Weyrauch, at 5 nA6 (July 1990) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Hancock, Letter].
Hancock also describes a kris in California that debated the issue of whether Romani women could
wear jeans. He adds that European Roma think that this topic is too trivial to require a kris and that a
divano would have been more appropriate. See also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 131-32 (divano
involving many vitsi may decide matters of general policy). These consultative functions of the kris or
divano resemble the Weistum in medieval Germany, in which learned authorities gave legal advice. In the
contemporary American context, these functions resemble the opinions of the attorneys general. On the
divano, see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
152. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 34.
153. CLIBERT, supra note 44, at 130.
154. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 100-02. Gropper also notes that a permanent sentence of marime is
seen as equivalent to a death sentence; the permanent outcast, in fact, often commits suicide. A death
sentence thus becomes unnecessary, and the sentence of marime also provides a form of sanctuary against
revenge of the spirit. Id.; see also FRASER, supra note 28, at 243 (fear of spirits). Reisman comments that
interviews with Gypsy defectors could be the subject of an interesting follow-up study. Reisman, Comment,
supra note 46, at 404. In Canada, resettling outside the Gypsy community has occurred. See infra note 160.
155. LItGEOIS, supra note 52, at 76-77. In her study of Gitano urban populations, San Romin, supra
note 101, at 192-93, divides "wrongs" in Gypsy society into two categories: (1) wrongs that have
consequences for the wrongdoer's lineage and the victim's lineage, and (2) wrongs that have consequences
only for the wrongdoer and the victim's lineage. The first category of wrongs consists of serious offenses
like murder, bloodshed, serious assault and "naming the dead" (insults directed toward a deceased relative).
Bloodshed and assault may or may not be avenged. These wrongs are generally dealt with on the spot by
a fight among members of the respective lineages present. However, murder and "naming the dead" are
crimes that must be addressed by the kris Romani. Murder is extremely rare because of the Gypsies' fear
of ghosts.
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punishment, rarely employed today, is typically used only in cases of a wife's
infidelity.
A sentence of marime, or banishment, is today considered the most severe
punishment. Marime stigmatizes all wrongdoers as polluted and justifies their
expulsion from the community. No one will eat with them. If they touch an
object it must be destroyed, no matter what the value. Nobody will even
attempt to kill them, for fear of contamination. When they die, no one will
bury them, and they will not have a funeral. They will soon be forgotten.
156
No marriages are arranged for those stigmatized as marime, and without
marriage in Gypsy society one's economic and social life is over.15 7 In other
words, permanent banishment is the equivalent of social death. Such
punishment is rare and used only for serious crimes such as murder. An escape
into gajikano society is not an alternative for the banished wrongdoer,
however. Disdain for the non-Gypsy world, acquired in early infancy,
maintains its hold over most Roma even after their expulsion from the
community.
A temporary marime sentence may be imposed for less serious crimes. If
a Gypsy steals from another Gypsy, for example, the thief is publicly shamed
and banished from the community until he or she has repaid the victim. The
kris may impose a form of "community service" and require the marime Rom
to work for an indefinite time without pay in order to compensate Gypsy
society for violating the taboo of stealing from another Gypsy. Temporary
sentences of marime are also imposed for offenses such as familiarity with the
gaje or failure to pay a debt on time.5
The entire Gypsy community is responsible for enforcing sanctions.
Gypsies have no police or prisons; they have no "law enforcement" in the
gajikano sense. Peer pressure fanned by gossip and communal knowledge of
the verdict tend to ensure the wrongdoer's compliance. 59 The Gypsy
community may place a curse on the guilty party to insure that he or she
accepts the chosen punishment, and it appears that this practice is still
effective. Only in rare cases, when the Roma have difficulty enforcing a
The second category of wrongs involves mostly sexual offenses such as rape and incest. In Gitano
society, the male is held primarily responsible for these wrongs. Women are held less accountable because
of their assumed inferiority. Nonetheless, depending on the group, infidelity may carry serious penalties
for a female. QUINTANA & FLOYD, supra note 108, at 35, report that among the Gypsies in Spain
punishments may include facial disfigurement and other mutilation, public beatings, and death.
156. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 124-25 (quoting Mateo Maximoff). A person who receives a
permanent sentence of marime is treated very much like someone in today's society who is diagnosed with
an infectious disease. See also SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 98-99. Hancock reports that a Rom with
AIDS committed suicide in New York City three years ago because of the shame (Iajav) associated with
the illness. Hancock, Notes, supra note 31, at 6 n.66.
157. Cf. SWAY, supra note 52, at 118.
158. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 70-71.
159. SWAY, supra note 52, at 119; YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 174; see also Anne Sutherland,
Gypsies, The Hidden Americans, SOCIETY, Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 30 (discussing gossip as means of social
control).
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judgment by the kris, do they turn to the gajikano penal system. The kris may
ask the gajikane authorities to arrest the renegade, and if necessary will
employ false charges as a basis for the arrest. At this point, the wrongdoer will
usually accept the punishment and the charges will be dropped. Should the
wrongdoer persist, however, he or she might be forced to endure a gajikano
court trial.1
6 0
D. Conflict Between Host Legal System and Gypsy Law
Gypsy sources consistently assert the superiority of their legal system,
noting the following three elements:
(1) Gypsy law acts as a cohesive force serving to protect Gypsy
interests, rights, traditions, and ethnic distinctiveness; (2) Gypsy law
is more democratic than any other law because it does not
discriminate against individuals without financial or other influence;
and (3) because Gypsy law has maintained its basic form, even
though older methods of punishment have given way largely to
banishment or social ostracism, it must be more nearly perfect than
other laws, which appear to be undergoing constant change.'
6
'
These attitudes have an impact on how the Gypsies approach conflicts with the
gajikano legal system. Romaniya has no equivalent to the concept of conflict
of laws. Gypsy law is self-contained and cannot incorporate rules of a foreign
legal system. Consequently, severe clashes of inherently incompatible legal
notions occasionally occur. The gajikano legal system is equally insular so far
as romaniya is concerned. But unlike the gaje who know nothing about
romaniya, Gypsies are necessarily aware of non-Gypsy law. They may tolerate
it or violate it, all the while maintaining that their own law is the only true
law.
Studies indicate that the most frequent violations of the host countries'
laws by Gypsies are theft and fraud.' 62 Some have interpreted this
160. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 103-05; McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 24; SWAY, supra note 52,
at 82. According to BLOCK, supra note 44, at 172, in former times the defendant who did not show up at
the kris became an outlaw. There were special signs (patrin) that this Gypsy was being hunted. Any Rom
who saw the signs was obliged to help in the search. An accused who resisted when caught could be shot.
Gajikane authorities who investigated would learn only of a tragic accident. The potential ineffectiveness
of the kris under contemporary conditions in Eastern Canada is discussed in Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at
31-32 (describing how Rom can evade Gypsy law and resettle outside Gypsy communities). Lee points out
that the kris remains effective in the United States.
161. QUINTANA & FLOYD, supra note 108, at 38-39. Although the quotation relates to Gitanos in
Spain, it seems to represent the ways most Romani people feel about their laws. Quintana and Floyd merely
convey the subjective ideas of their sources; they express no opinion on the accuracy of these views. The
authors also note that it is extremely difficult to get Gypsy informants to discuss their laws. Id. at 37-38.
Fully one-third of the sample refused to answer. Typical responses were: "'I do not think of these things.
Are you being paid to find out?' 'It is better not to answer. Who knows what may come of it."'
162. San Romin, supra note 101, at 188-89. San Roman's work deals with the urban Gitano
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phenomenon as a reflection of a Gypsy penchant for lawlessness. The Gypsies,
however, have no moral objections to these activities so long as one does not
victimize another Gypsy, causes no physical harm, 63 and takes no more than
is necessary to survive. t64 Thus what is permissible under romaniya may be
criminal under the host legal system. Other sources have argued that, to a
Gypsy, stealing from a gajo is even praiseworthy because of the skill and
courage involved. Moreover, subsistence theft may be permitted under Gypsy
law because the gaje are seen as overindulgent and exploitative; thus there is
nothing wrong in taking from them what they do not need.165
So-called swindling is considered a common means for Gypsies to make
a living.1 66 There is a danger, however, that the dominant culture can use the
term "swindling" ethnocentrically to stigmatize minority groups. A host culture
may tolerate essentially fraudulent advertising and sales practices-for
example, in so-called clearance sales and "bait-and-switch" schemes-as long
as they are employed by people who are perceived as members of the
dominant culture and who meet the minimum standards of local custom t67
When ethnic minorities such as Gypsies use comparable sales techniques, the
doctrine of caveat enptor no longer applies and the whole group becomes
population. According to Hancock, Diaspora 1, supra note 59, at 654, subsistence stealing largely occurs
in the United States among recent European Gypsy immigrants. Most American Roma abhor this behavior
because it results in stereotyping of the whole population. It should be noted that much of the information
on alleged Gypsy criminality has been collected by law enforcement agencies, and this reflects the
perspective of the host legal system.
Thomas Acton, as quoted in Ian Hancock, The Roots oflnequity: Romani Cultural Rights in Their
Historical and Social Context, IMMIGRANTS & MINORITIES, Mar. 1992, at 3, 7, has maintained that the
emphasis on Gypsy crime is misplaced: "Compared with the massive record of murder, theft, kidnapping
and other crimes by non-Gypsies against Gypsies (throughout history), Gypsy crime against non-Gypsies
pales almost into insignificance, so that to prioritize the study of the latter over the former shows a twisted
sense of values." For example, more than 600 Gypsy children were kidnapped by the Swiss Pro Juventute
program between 1926 and 1973. Thomas W. Netter, Swiss Gypsies: A Tale of Vanishing Children, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 9, 1986, at A9. The scandal resulted in a formal apology by Alphons Egli, President of
Switzerland. After the fall of the Ceau~escu regime in Rumania, persecution and poverty left thousands of
Gypsy children homeless or housed in orphanages. Kathleen Hunt, Romania's Lost Children: A Photo
Essay by James Nachtwey, N.Y. TIME, June 24, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 28; see also Pavel, supra note
2, at 12 (detailing Gypsy persecution under new government). Efforts of U.S. citizens to adopt some of
these children were thwarted because parental consent was missing or flawed. Battle over Romanian
Adoptions Continues, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 561 (1993).
163. San Romdn, supra note 101, at 188-89.
164. YooRS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 34; see also Fisher, Gypsy Minorities, supra note 101, at
51-52.
165. TRIGG, supra note 72, at 72-73. For a detailed discussion of Romani rules on theft, see Linnet
Myers, Circling the Wagons, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1992, at CI.
166. San Romn, supra note 101, at 189. See the account of a minor fraud perpetrated by a Gypsy
in LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 26-27. The Rom's explanation in this case was, "The
non-Gypsy is a fool" ("Gazho si dilo").
167. ARTHUR A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 134-37 (clearance sale), 143-46 (bait-and-switch)
(1976). In discussing his theory that swindling and selling are based on essentially similar dynamics, Leff
contends that the so-called Gypsy switch is related to most forms of selling. The "Gypsy switch" involves
an exchange in which something of value is offered but, by a sleight of hand, something of no or little
value is substituted. Leff suggests that in successful selling, particularly advertising, the seller tends to
promise more than he can deliver. Leff concludes that somehow a "switch," in other words, a form of
confidence game, has been pulled. Id. at 12-13, 155-57.
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stigmatized. Thus, claims of Gypsy criminality must be examined in
comparison to the host culture which criminalizes those activities. While the
dominant culture may overlook its own members' transgressions, it notes the
Gypsy practice with indignation and may even prosecute it. The host society's
occasional leniency toward such Gypsy behavior may be due not to ideas of
fairness but to difficulties in communicating with alien people or limited
resources. Realistically, prosecution of Gypsies often results not from their
violation of the formal laws of the host culture (which members of the host
culture may also violate), but instead from Gypsies' adherence to their own
informal laws which conflict with the host nation's informal laws.
Host countries often view fortune-telling, a traditional occupation of Gypsy
women, as swindling. Not practiced among the Roma themselves,
fortune-telling involves the use of ritual and charms meant to dazzle the
gajikano customer. Many host countries have reacted to this traditional Gypsy
practice by banning fortune-telling, although authorities often do not enforce
these laws against the Gypsies with the same stringency they do other
laws.'68 Indeed, the dominant culture has reluctantly begun to recognize that
its own cultural values are not necessarily absolute. Cultural defenses have
been increasingly permitted in American trials. 169 In addition, some courts
have considered the issue under gajikano law of whether a fortune-teller who
believes in magic and ancient healing powers can form a criminal intent. 7 '
Thus the American host legal system has taken some steps to accommodate
Gypsy practices.
The issue of fortune-telling is actually more complex than it appears. On
the one hand, Gypsies believe in their magical powers, as exemplified by their
use of curses and the practice of fortune-telling. On the other hand, they
practice fortune-telling not among themselves but only for the benefit of gaje.
168. Roma have successfully challenged state laws banning fortune-telling. See, e.g., Spiritual Psychic
Science Church of Truth v. Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985); see also Dan Morain, State High Court
Rules Out Ban on Fortune-Tellers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1985, pt. 1, at 3. On fortune-telling, see generally
LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29 (autobiographical account containing illustrations and explanations
of tarot cards); SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 85-89; TRIGG, supra note 72, at 74-75; San Romdn, supra
note 101, at 189.
169. See, e.g., Mull v. United States, 402 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1107
(1969) (dictum) (noting claim that Native American may lack criminal intent because of cultural beliefs);
State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 351 N.W.2d 758, 770 (Wis. CL App. 1984) (Bablitch, J., concurring) (stating
that sexual customs of Cuban culture should be considered when sentencing for rape); People v. Kimura,
No. A-091133 (Los Angeles City Super. Ct. filed Apr. 24, 1985), cited in Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash
of Cultures, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 5, 1985, at I (considering Japanese custom in murder case); see also Paul
J. Magnarella, Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The Cultural Defense on Trial, J. ETHNIC STUD.,
Fall 1991, at 65; Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986); Rorie
Sherman, "Cultural" Defenses Draw Fire, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 17, 1989, at 3.
170. Azusa, 703 P.2d at 1126 ("[S]ome persons believe they possess the power to predict what has
not yet come to pass. When such persons impart their beliefs to others, they are not acting fraudulently.").
On the difference between advising and fortune-telling, see Ian F Hancock, The Gypsies, Indian World
Citizens, in GLOBAL MIGRATION OF INDIANS: SAGA OF ADVENTURE, ENTERPRISE, IDENTITY AND
INTEGRATION (Jagat K. Motwani ed., forthcoming winter 1993-94) (manuscript at 5, on file with authors)
[hereinafter Hancock, World Citizens].
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Thus their beliefs in their own magical powers may appear to stand on shaky
ground. This apparent paradox has a relatively simple explanation. The concept
of fortune-telling contains several independent elements that are misleadingly
grouped together. One element is foretelling the future. Perhaps because of its
inherent dangerousness, this activity is not practiced internally among Gypsies.
Another element, according to Sanskrit sources, relates to "making well" and
healing powers, which the Gypsies do practice among themselves.' The
healing elements of fortune-telling are reflected in Gypsy references to
fortune-telling as "advising." Both elements are based on a belief in magic,
although they often appear to the non-Gypsy world as scams.
In addition to fortune-telling and healing, Gypsies engage in deliberately
fraudulent practices. In Spain, Gypsies have been reported to misrepresent
goods and trade unfit horses. In the United States, there have been reports of
used car scams and home repair deceptions. These scams reflect the disdain
that many Gypsies are said to have for the gaje.172 In the United States,
many Gypsies consider welfare to be the ultimate scam, as it proves the
naivet6 of the gaje. 173 One study gives a detailed account of the strategies
Gypsies use to obtain benefits from welfare agencies.174 Gypsy women
aggressively negotiate with social workers, while the men stand by passive and
mute, often pretending to be mentally retarded and unemployable. One Gypsy
explained how he was able to score low on a test:
The trick is never to protest anything but act like you are doing
everything right and are, you know, simple-minded and goodhearted
about it. Anything she asks me I just give some wrong answer. For
instance there was a picture of this doll, and I was supposed to
connect the arms and legs. Well I put the legs in the armholes and the
arms below. She kept trying to help me but I stuck with that like I
was sure it must be right. 75
Under Gypsy law, theft and fraud are crimes only when perpetrated against
other Gypsies. These actions severely violate the basic Romani tenets of
171. Hancock, World Citizens, supra note 170 (manuscript at 5) (noting Sanskrit sources of
fortune-telling).
172. San Romdn, supra note 101, at 189 (Spain); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 51-56, 71 (United
States). Since most of these scams are widely practiced by non-Gypsies as well, and to some extent
condoned, the focus on the Gypsies may be an expression of xenophobia. See HANCOCK, PARIAH
SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 115-28 ("Anti-Gypsyism"), 143-62 ("Media Representation of Gypsies").
173. LIDGEOIs, supra note 52, at 82. Gypsies may not realize, however, that in some cases they may
be entitled to public assistance and thus are not committing a crime under host country law.
174. SUtHERLAND, supra note 29, at 75-85.
175. Id. at 81; see also SWAY, supra note 52, at 11. Field research of this type presents a professional
dilemma. The information gained is likely to become known to law enforcement and welfare agencies who
then are prone to use it to the detriment of those attempting the "revealed" practices. On the other hand,
if a researcher is not able to obtain the confidence of Romani informants, the information is worthless and
only adds to a growing pool of similar "evidence." SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at ix-x, xii.
19931
The Yale Law Journal
mutual cooperation,176 and may result in a kris and stringent sanctions. When
the victim is a non-Gypsy, however, a kris and sanctions are unlikely to result.
To that extent, the kris is ethnocentric because it is limited to parties and
participants who are Gypsies. The gaje may take no part in these proceedings.
Victimized Gypsies may be sued and have standing to complain in gajikane
courts. Yet victimized non-Gypsies may only sue in non-Gypsy courts. These
victims have no standing to complain by way of a kris. In other words,
Gypsies would have to invoke the jurisdiction of Romani courts on behalf of
non-Gypsies, a procedural impossibility because romaniya is only meant to
protect the Gypsy community. No Rom would be likely to accept a judgeship
in a case that an outsider attempted to bring.
It is imaginable, although probably more hypothetical than real, that in
instances of extreme misconduct toward non-Gypsies, the jurisdiction of a kris
could be invoked. The complainants, however, would be other Roma who were
endangered or subjected to persecution, and thus victimized, as a result of the
reckless conduct of a fellow Gypsy toward gaje. Even under these
circumstances, though, a kris might not occur because community members
fear the attention it could draw. Substantively, the crime involved would be
reckless endangerment of other Gypsies, rather than violation of the rights of
the gaje.
The host country and Gypsy systems inevitably conflict. Nevertheless, host
authorities often do not interfere with Gypsy society and in many respects are
unequipped to deal with Romani culture when conflict occurs. But local
gajikane authorities do intervene in cases of serious crimes, like murder. Even
then, Gypsy law has a way of asserting itself.177 A study of urban Gitano
populations provides two examples. 17 In the first, a Gypsy murdered another
Gypsy and was sentenced to death by a gajikano court. While in prison, the
convicted Gypsy died after eating food that other Gypsies had brought to him.
This may be one of the rare instances in which a Romani population imposed
and executed a death sentence. On the other hand, the convict may have eaten
the poisoned food willingly, in order to commit suicide. In either case, the
Romani law prevented the gajikane authorities from executing their death
sentence. Gypsy law prevailed over the law of the host country without the
Spanish authorities' knowledge.
The second example in the study describes cases in which a Romani chief
has committed a crime under gajikano law. The elders will decide that, if there
is a police investigation, a younger member of the group, usually the son of
the actual culprit, will accept blame for the crime. This subterfuge protects the
176. The fundamental spirit of cooperation is exemplified by the Romani word pal, meaning close
friend, brother, or accomplice, now in American usage but of Sanskrit origin. See WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra
note 31, at 1622.
177. See Fisher, Gypsy Minorities, supra note 101, at 51.
178. San Romdn, supra note 101, at 190.
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chief, who is more important to the group as a whole. If the gaje imprison the
young man, members of the group will visit him in prison and give him any
convenience possible. By the time of his release, he will have gained the
gratitude and respect of the group. As in the first case, Gypsy law has
effectively circumvented the host country's justice system.
According to a study of the Gypsy population in Sweden, if a Gypsy is
called before a gajikano tribunal, a crowd of Gypsies escorts the individual.
In so doing, the Gypsies hope either to show support for the accused or to
influence the judge. If neither works, the Gypsies may utter magic curses to
interfere with evidence taking or sentencing. Gypsy women disrupted one trial
by chewing bread, spitting it out in their palms, and kneading the bread as they
whispered curses. One Gypsy commented that at a gajikano trial "we tell lies,
we make up stories, we pretend to forget things, so that in the end no one
knows which is front and which is back!"
179
Most Roma learn their native language, Romani, and may use it
strategically to create confusion and indirection. 180 Spoken by millions of
Gypsies, Romani is known to only a few researchers. 181 In addition, Gypsies
from some groups may have several names: a secret name used in rituals, a
name given at baptism and used among brethren, and one or more names
reserved for the gaje. According to a study written by a non-Gypsy, Gypsies
do not record births, marriages, or divorces; they do not file income taxes; they
do not pay property taxes; they rarely maintain bank accounts; and they often
obtain credit for short periods of time under aliases.182 These practices would
make Gypsies difficult to track and would prevent authorities from gaining
access to information. Romani sources, however, dispute such stereotypes.
18 3
179. Tillhagen, V, supra note 145, at 131-32.
180. CLtBERT, supra note 44, at 191 (noting Sanskrit origin of Romani); Beverly N. Lauwagie, Ethnic
Boundaries in Modern States: Romano Lavo-Lil Revisited, 85 AM. J. SOC. 310, 321 (1979); Carol
Silverman, Everyday Drama: Impression Management of Urban Gypsies, II URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 377,
382-83 (1982) [hereinafter Silverman, Impression Management]. The Romanichals, Gypsies of English
origin, have adopted English surnames, such as Ronald Lee, while the Vlax group originating from
Walachia uses Romani names in addition to surnames common in the host country. Hancock, Gypsies,
supra note 60, at 442. For example, Ian Hancock's Romani name is 0 Yanko Le Redosko. 1 WHO's WHO
IN AMERICA 1427 (47th ed. 1992-1993).
181. YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 7 ("When approached directly, they show a total disregard
for consistency and may become totally incomprehensible about any matter they do not want to discuss
.... "). Some characteristics of Romani may facilitate hiding information from the rare outsiders who
understand the language. It contains 'loan' words from many countries enabling the speaker to express the
same content in different ways. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 84-85.
182. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 78; see also CLIBERT, supra note 44, at 166-67 (discussing
multiple names).
183. The Romani sources note that numerous Gypsies adhere to the laws of their host countries, pay
taxes, are professionals, authors, or entertainers; and that Gypsies regularly have a lower violent crime rate
than their hosts. See, e.g., HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note I, at 111-14 (criticizing authors of
law enforcement orientation). Hancock also gives an account of the literature and media reporting that have
reflected negative stereotyping of Gypsies. Il at 115-62; see also supra note 162. Gypsies generally do
not engage in crimes of violence (murder, rape, robbery, and assault and battery) in order to gain money.
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 86-87. Hancock stresses that prominent respected Romani Americans are
known within their Gypsy communities, but avoid drawing attention to their ethnic origin. Hancock,
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Gajikane legal authorities consequently face unusual problems obtaining
evidence and have often chosen to ignore the Roma rather than prosecute them
for minor offenses. Unfortunately, in some cases where the police have become
active, they have seriously violated the Roma's civil rights under American
law.' Such violations appear to be due not merely to frustration and
difficulties in obtaining evidence, but also to the assumption that Gypsies are
so universally despised that nobody will come to their aid. The police are more
likely to engage in official misconduct when they know that Gypsies do not
customarily complain to non-Gypsy authorities about abuses and do not seek
legal redress from the host system. 85 Gypsies believe they cannot expect
sympathy or even neutrality from the host country, 8 6 an attitude that
undoubtedly affects some of their conduct.
Although Gypsy law sometimes conflicts with statutory or common law,
it is virtually impossible for it to violate the United States Constitution. The
Diaspora II, supra note 59, at 653-54.
184. On June 18, 1986, the Spokane Police Department and Sheriff's Office raided a local Gypsy
home without a proper search warrant. The officers seized $1.6 million in cash held in trust for the Gypsy
Church of the Northwest and more than 600 pieces of jewelry. The seized property has been ordered to
be returned but is still partly unrecovered. Members of the family, including women and young children,
were body searched. The state supreme court declared that the police had engaged in "egregious behavior."
State v. Marks, 790 P.2d 138, 142 (Wash. 1990).
In a subsequent federal suit for civil rights violations, which is still pending, the Gypsies sought $40
million in damages. The city and county admitted liability and agreed that they would accept a ruling by
Judge Robert McNichols regarding the amount of damages, provided that the Gypsies agreed not to seek
punitive damages. Ian Hancock was asked to testify as an expert witness on the damage caused by the
illegal police search. In addition to losing the unretumed property, the whole family has become marime
(outcasts to other Roma), because the family's chief, Grover Marks, lost credibility and because its
members have been contaminated through physical contact with gajikane men. The marital prospects of
the young Romani girls, in view of the intimate body search by the police officers, look very dim. The
settlement is now being questioned because Judge McNichols, who heard the evidence, died, and the case
has been reassigned to a new judge. For details on this case, see Claudia G. Dowling & Linda Gomez,
Gypsies, LIFE, Oct. 1992, at 47-53; Timothy Egan, Police Raid and Suit Open Window into Gypsy Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at A16; Bill Morlin, New Judge Takes Over Gypsy Case: McNichols Too Ill
To Continue, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN REv., Dec. 16, 1992, at Al; Bill Morlin & Rebecca Nappi, Gypsy
Daughters Say 1986 Search Violated Culture, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN REV., Sept. 18, 1992, at Al.
The Spokane litigation is a rare instance of Roma invoking the jurisdiction of host courts. The
personality of Judge McNichols may have influenced the family in their decision to sue in the American
system. He was a highly respected jurist and known for his compassion. See Bill Morlin, U.S. District
Judge Robert McNichols Dies, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN REv., Dec. 22, 1992, at BI.
185. According to HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 105-06, local laws discriminating
against Gypsies were still in effect in 1987. Despite some changes in recent years, Gypsies remain reluctant
to bring their grievances to gajikane courts. If these discriminatory laws are not challenged, however, they
may remain in effect indefinitely. For a contemporary illustration, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1 (West
1991) ("The governing body may make, amend, repeal and enforce ordinances to license and regulate:...
k. Roving bands of nomads, commonly called gypsies .... ).
Hancock states that attempts to strike such laws have been successful but slow. He reports that when
these laws were brought to the attention of the Federal Office of Civil Rights in 1986, the Office said that
the term "living like a Gypsy" referred to all those living a nomadic life and was not targeted against the
Gypsies as an ethnic minority. Hancock, Diaspora II, supra note 59, at 647-48. For corresponding problems
under English law, see FRASER, supra note 28, at 2-7.
186. In national opinion polls taken both in 1964 and 1989, Gypsies had the lowest social standing
of 58 ethnic minorities included in the surveys. See Tamar Lewin, Study Points to Increase in Tolerance
of Ethnicity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A12.
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Constitution primarily restrains the activities of state actors, not private parties
or autonomous legal systems. Even when Gypsy law establishes repressive
regimes or violates what would be 'called due process in the state system, it
cannot be considered "unconstitutional." These actions may be tolerated by
authorities because Gypsy law is not visible to the state or because the state
does not perceive Gypsies as "lawmakers." The situation is analogous to that
of the informal rules established within the family which are authoritarian and
violate democratic ideals, but nevertheless go unchallenged by the state.'87
The state may occasionally try to regulate what goes on in the family, just as
it may also try to regulate Gypsy practices such as fortune-telling. In either
case, however, the regulations are likely to be held to violate constitutional
rights.' Thus, the state is practically incapable of regulating at this level of
private lawmaking.
E. Previous Attempts at Theory
1. Some Trends in the Nonlegal Literature
Most scholars do not analyze Gypsy law's legal significance but rather its
general cultural significance. Their scholarship focuses on customs, traditions,
norms, and rules. As a consequence, it does not devote significant attention to
legal institutions as such. Even if the literature refers to legal terms, such as
"procedure" and "courts," these terms inevitably have connotations different
from those used in law.' 89
The literature has sometimes described the Gypsy mode of life as
"primitive,"'" or has stressed the alleged illiteracy of the Gypsies. 9 ' These
characterizations, however, have little analytical value. The often
incomprehensible conduct of the non-Gypsy world, as seen by a Gypsy, could
187. See Schmideberg, supra note 10.
188. Compare, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut statute
prohibiting use of contraceptives unconstitutional as violating right of marital privacy) with Spiritual
Psychic Science Church of Truth v. Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985) (holding city ordinance prohibiting
fortune-telling violative of California Constitution's freedom of speech clause). Without a stimulus such
as oppressive state legislation, however, it is unlikely that members of the Gypsy community will bring
complaints.
In many respects, private lawmaking, including Gypsy law, is beyond the practical reach of any state
authority. Government does not have the economic resources, personnel, and expertise to regulate on this
amorphous level. This inactivity is due to a lack of power and knowledge and not necessarily an intent to
foster private lawmaking. But see Reisman, Comment, supra note 46, at 409-10.
189. See generally Thomas A. Cowan, What Law Can Do for Social Science, in LAW .AND
SOCIOLOGY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 91 (William M. Evan ed., 1962).
190. See, e.g., C.-H. Tillhagen, Conception of Justice Among the Swedish Gypsies, 37 J. GYPSY LORE
Soc'Y 82, 83 (1958) [hereinafter Tillhagen, I]. In recent years, characterization of population groups as
"primitive" is found less frequently in the literature. See, e.g., Dell Hymes, The Use of Anthropology:
Critical, Political, Personal, in REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 3,27 (Dell Hymes ed., Vintage Books 1974)
(1972) (criticizing use of the term "primitive").
191. See, e.g., SWAY, supra note 52, at 124.
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with equal justification be characterized as "primitive," in the sense that the
gajikane values may appear to be rudimentary and irregular to anybody who
does not share them. Similarly, one could maintain that the non-Gypsies are
illiterate because they are ignorant of the Romani language and of fundamental
skills needed for effective communication, as seen from a Gypsy
perspective."' In other words, from a Gypsy's point of view the gaje are
uncivilized.
In so-called primitive societies, as characterized by Jonathan Turner, laws
are typically not recorded, and are steeped in custom, religion, and tradition.
Yet, there are traces of a distinction between substantive and procedural
law.193 In applying the characteristics ascribed by Turner to primitive legal
systems, substantive law in Gypsy society consists largely of the marime
taboos, which specify pure and impure acts and things. Procedurally,
enforcement occurs through informal social control via the divano, the kris,
and the dreaded marime sanction. Mediation and the courts, such as the divano
and the kris, are summoned in an ad hoc fashion as conflicts arise, and owe
their existence only to the specific case. At least two clearly identifiable legal
actors participate within these "courts": judges or krisnitorya, who decide on
both facts and law; and the parties, who have sworn an oath to respect the
authority of the krisnitorya.
Although the Roma's legal system seems in many ways to fit into this
scheme, Turner's primitive legal systems are generally "typical of hunting and
gathering and simple agrarian societies."' 94 The Gypsies' dependence on the
dominant host economy makes them different from other societies; their need
for ongoing relations with the gaje is an essential feature of their culture.' 95
This dependence is not confined to economic matters. The threat of gajikane
authorities and their legal system reinforce the Romani way of life and culture.
These unique characteristics of the Roma invite comparisons with other forms
of private lawmaking that are neglected in legal scholarship. Yet the link
between tribal law and private lawmaking seems to be insufficiently noted in
the nonlegal literature as well.
Many researchers have attempted to find a framework in which they can
place Gypsies, a group that most host countries regard as an anomaly. For
example, Robert Redfield has described what he calls an idealized primitive
192. Indeed, a Romani source declares, perhaps facetiously, that people who are illiterate are better
off and that an inevitable result of literacy is stupidity. LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 27-28; see
also Sally F. Moore, Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What To Say to Africans About
Running "Their Own" Native Courts, 26 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 11, 26-27 (1992) (stating that emphasis on
literacy not always helpful when dealing with foreign cultures).
193. JONATHAN H. TURNER, PATTERNS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 216-18 (1972) (describing primitive
legal systems); see also HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 114.
194. TURNER, supra note 193, at 216, 217-18 (scheme of courts in primitive legal systems).
195. OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 28-29.
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or "folk society," which he contrasts with urban society.196 He conceives of
the Roma as having retained many of the traits of his ideal folk society, in
spite of their continuing migration throughout the world.197 He perceives the
Roma as isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, motivated by a pervasive
feeling of group identity-characteristics typical of a folk society. In addition,
folk societies and Gypsies are governed by strict rules of convention that can
be neither effectively challenged by individual members, nor controlled by
outsiders. These conventions do not depend on discipline but are internalized
among the members of the society, who conform to them in a consistent way
and without much reflection. Consequently, there is no need for
legislation.193 The members of Redfield's folk society act not as individuals,
but spontaneously and uncritically according to tradition and as members of the
clan. 99 Religion and conceptions of status prevail in all phases of life.2"
Redfield calls rules of convention or coherent patterns "culture,"20'
although this Article would call them "law." The difference is not merely a
matter of terminology.' 2 Reference to law as a cultural phenomenon strips
it of centuries of meanings that are attached to the term "law." Although some
detachment is gained by looking at law as a pattern, the change of terms
demystifies law and alters its meaning in a negative fashion. In addition,
reference to Gypsy laws as rules of convention and cultural patterns insulates
them from comparison with the concepts of law that are traditionally employed
in legal scholarship. Stressing that romaniya is law therefore is an important
clarification of an historical distortion.
Many authors wrestle with the problem, also faced by this Article, that
identifying commonalities among all Gypsies is difficult. The stress on literacy
(which varies substantially among different Romani groups) seems to
compound the problem.0 3 Illiteracy, according to Marlene Sway, is assumed
to bar the Roma from entering any middle-class or professional occupations.
On the other hand, the low-level positions available to them, such as factory
work, conflict with the Gypsies' sense of dignity and need for autonomy.
Illiteracy also prevents the cultural and intellectual values of the gaje from
infiltrating and undermining traditional Gypsy society.204 Basic tenets of
196. Robert Redfield, The Folk Society, 52 AM. J. Soc. 293 (1947).
197. Id. at 296.
198. Id. at 299-300.
199. Id. at 301.
200. Id. at 305.
201. Id. at 299-300.
202. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 290-91; SWAY, supra note 52, at 124.
204. Id. Hancock, a noted linguist and Romanichal-Lovara Rom, in reviewing Sway's book, objects
to her emphasis on illiteracy, and provides numerous examples of literate Romani professionals. Hancock,
Review, supra note 35, at 73, 79-80. Hancock acknowledges, though, that the majority of Gypsies feel
uneasy about schooling because Romani children are kept uncomfortably close to gajikane children for
hours. Hancock, Gypsies, supra note 60, at 444.
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marime would begin to crumble with exposure. These conceptions of
supposedly universal Gypsy illiteracy, combined with our own society's
illiteracy of romani (Gypsy language) and ignorance of romaniya (Gypsy law),
contribute to the difficulties experienced by gajikane legal authorities.
Some have compared Gypsies with other ethnic minority groups. But such
comparisons may be confusing as they tend to oversimplify similarities and
differences between groups. A correlation between the Gypsies and the Amish
has been suggested.205 Both the Amish and the Roma are unusual minority
groups because they have successfully separated themselves from the outside
community. According to this view, the Amish are like the Roma in that they
have their own rules of behavior, which in the case of the Amish are moral
values and beliefs derived from the Bible.36 In Amish society, anyone who
violates the rules may be shunned or even excommunicated. The shunned
person may be asked to leave the community to prevent the stigma from
tainting other family members. The punishment is not indefinite, and the
wrongdoer can return to the fold after making prescribed amends. Likewise,
the Amish have strict social boundaries isolating them from non-Amish,0 7
as well as clearly delineated rules for attire, language use, sexual roles and
practices. Respecting elders and avoiding contact with outside institutions are
two other similarities between the Amish and the Roma.205
While a comparison of the Roma with other ethnic groups is interesting,
it can also be misleading. Apparently similar practices may serve entirely
different functions and have completely separate histories. What appears to be
a similarity may be coincidental. Comparisons here may also detract from the
primary focus of attention, Gypsy law.
2. Integration, Assimilation, and Adaptation
The literature has contributed the concepts of integration, assimilation and
adaptation which prove to be helpful terms when analyzing to what extent the
Among the Vlax Roma the conception of marime appears to be a critical factor in forming attitudes
toward schooling and literacy. According to Vogel, the arrangements in public schools almost inevitably
lead to pollution. Eating in lunchrooms, use of public bathrooms and shower facilities, integration of
adolescent boys with girls, and programs of sex education are so problematic for some Gypsies that they
prefer to keep their children out of school altogether. Vogel, supra note 29, at 37. For a Romani voice, see
LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 131 ("They were all too ready to give us ... their own brand of
lobotomizing education, but they would never give us equality of culture."). Cf. Grumet v. Board of Educ.,
62 U.S.L.W. 2045, 1993 WL 241389 (N.Y. July 6, 1993) (New York school district established for Hasidic
Jews).
205. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 5-7. Sway compares Romani culture and Jewish culture. SWAY,
supra note 52, at 47-48, 54-55; see also supra notes 47, 62, 79, 94-95, 98, 107, I11, 115, 206, and infra
notes 286, 303 (references to Jewish tradition). But see Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 75-76 (noting
strained comparisons of Romani with Jewish culture).
206. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 6.
207. Id. at 5-6.
208. Id. at 6.
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Roma can be classified as an autonomous group. As the Article progresses, it
will become increasingly apparent that true isolation is not possible, even for
the Romani people. Autonomy and isolation are interrelated concepts. The
degree of isolation determines the level of autonomy which a group can claim.
Assimilation and integration undermine isolation and, therefore, group
autonomy. Adaption, however, is a form of adjustment to the greater
environment which preserves the inner character of an autonomous system.
Indeed, a key problem in understanding Romani culture in its relation to
non-Romani cultures, including that of the United States, could be the
distinction between assimilation and adaptation. The two concepts are not
synonymous. Assimilation implies the demise of a distinct culture, or at least
its merger into a dominant culture. Adaptation, on the other hand, implies the
survival of a minority culture, despite conscious adjustments by its members
to cope with a surrounding environment that is different and often hostile.
Assimilation and adaptation are not necessarily exclusive of each other in
practice, although conceptually they seem to be.209 Hancock's observation
that gradual integration may lead in time to assimilation acknowledges this
possibility.
Although the anthropological literature does not provide distinct legal
analysis, it does explore the concepts of integration, assimilation and adaptation
in a form that could prove to be useful for legal scholars. Sutherland suggests
that the success of a minority group's integration into American culture can be
measured by the degree to which members identify themselves as American
and the degree to which they participate in a main aspect of social
structure.10 She finds that Gypsies are less integrated into and identified
with American society than are other ethnic groups.2 '
A Romani source confirms that Gypsies do not identify with American
society. Accordingly, most Gypsies born in the United States refer to
Americans as though they themselves were not included in this group and
perceive American values as conflicting with their own beliefs. 2 Sutherland
adds that although the Gypsies have largely adapted to living surrounded by
a foreign culture, their social organization fosters the separation of Gypsy from
non-Gypsy. This separation places Gypsies at a greater disadvantage than
other, less separatist ethnic groups. For example, African Americans and
Latinos have suffered from discrimination in a number of areas, such as the
educational system, but the Roma have tended to stay apart by choice.
209. Lee speaks of "incognito Gypsies," Roma who have adapted enough to pass as gaje, but are in
danger of losing their identity. LEE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 82-83, 116.
210. Id. at 290.
211. Id.
212. Hancock, Diaspora II, supra note 59, at 651. According to Hancock, this is even true of most
fourth- and fifth-generation American-born Gypsies. Hancock stresses that Gypsies have for centuries
adapted to their host cultures. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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Although illiteracy (according to gajikane standards) may help the Roma
preserve their ethnic identity by isolating them, it also handicaps them in the
modem bureaucratic state.2 t3 Yet according to Hancock, many Roma are
slowly integrating and participating in the mainstream of American culture
without compromising their identity.214 He concedes that over time
integration could lead to assimilation.15
It has been increasingly difficult for Gypsies to maintain a separate cultural
identity, especially with the advent of mass media. Television follows them
even if they migrate. Perhaps the closely knit Romani family and the presence
of older women provide some measure of immunity to these "foreign"
influences. These traditional Gypsies may accept television programs as no
more than entertainment. If children watch the programs with adults, the latter
are bound to comment on what is shown according to traditional Gypsy values.
Furthermore, to the extent that television signals a shift from writing and print
toward oral communication, it may move American culture closer to the oral
traditions which have been longstanding features of Gypsy culture.
Although Gypsies have inevitably been exposed to popular culture as much
as any other ethnic groups, their reactions have differed from those who more
closely identify themselves as American. Indeed, minority status, civil rights,
and integration are terms that do not necessarily have the same meaning for the
Romani people as for African Americans, Latinos and Native Americans.
21 6
In the case of the Gypsies, centuries of often vicious persecution seem to have
strengthened the insularity of the culture, counteracting influences toward
assimilation. As Sutherland observes, Gypsies have participated less in
American social processes than have other minority groups.217 They have
213. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 290-91.
214. Hancock, Diaspora II, supra note 59, at 651-52. Silverman, too, notes that American Gypsies
have successfully adapted to their environment without losing their identity. In her view, the appearance
of assimilation may actually be a cover that hides a robust Romani culture from the non-Gypsy world.
Gypsies may encourage and exaggerate gajikane stereotypes about themselves, thereby concealing their
culture. Silverman, Gypsiness, supra note 72, at 266. Quoting Jan Yoors, she somewhat facetiously suggests
that the large volume of college-educated people in the United States "prepares them for
psychoanalysis-and for fortune telling." Id. at 270. Gypsies have also been adept at using modem
technology to support their culture. Telephones, for example, are extensively used by Gypsies for
communication with other Roma, for news about business opportunities, and for lucrative fortune-telling
The telephone encourages the orality of Romani culture. Id. at 271. Silverman gives numerous other
illustrations of how "Gypsiness" has been used innovatively to adapt to an American setting. In an earlier
article she maintained that close proximity to non-Gypsies and economic dependence on them forces
Gypsies to adapt as a means of survival. Silverman, Impression Management, supra note 180.
215. HANCOCK, PARIAH SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 130.
216. On some possible disadvantages of adaptation, especially if it results in greater visibility to
American-style bureaucracies, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 290-91. In contrast, Hancock views
adaptation positively. He maintains that throughout their history Gypsies have adapted successfully to their
environment without assimilation. Trading with horses, for example, shifted to trading with cars. Similar
changes among non-Gypsies, he notes, would be called progress. Hancock cautions that reasoning against
adaptation might "keep Roma in a time capsule, or in a compound as a protected species!" Hancock, Letter,
supra note 151, at 8 nn.100 & 102.
217. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 290-91.
[Vol. 103: 323
Autonomous Lawmaking
little inclination to contribute actively to the politics of non-Gypsies. African
Americans and Latinos on the other hand have sought to increase their
participation in American society, turning to highly visible civil rights litigation
when their efforts have been rebuffed. If the Romani people move down the
road of adaptation to American culture, it is likely that they too will bring
increased demands for civil rights under the host legal system.
The operative and autonomous legal system governing Gypsy society has
played a central role in promoting the astounding survival and integrity of
Gypsy culture. Indeed, it is that law-related aspect of the problem that makes
a study of Gypsy law, existing in our midst unnoticed, so vitally interesting.
A close examination of the Gypsies' autonomous legal system sheds new light
on aspects of American private lawmaking that have been overlooked.
IV. CENTRAL FEATURES OF GYPSY LAW AND OTHER FORMS OF PRivATE
LAWMAKING
All forms of private lawmaking share certain basic features. Some of these
features have parallels in state-made law and some do not. This Part first
describes the centrality of the oral tradition to private lawmaking, discussing
the natural progression of private lawmaking, from the memorization, storage,
and retrieval of rules to their eventual expression and qualification. The oral
character of private law is closely intertwined with the types of procedures the
Gypsies have adopted. These procedures reinforce the importance of oral
advocacy, thus encouraging the use of allusion. This Part next turns to the
evidentiary rules of the Gypsies and draws lessons about our own legal system.
Whether they are all-inclusive or exclusionary, rules of evidence have a critical
effect on the outcome of legal controversies. Such rules determine whether
only a narrow issue of dispute has been settled or whether a more searching
inquiry into the roots of controversy will be undertaken.
A. Oral Legal Tradition
Reliance on orally transmitted tradition characterizes Gypsy law as well
as other forms of private lawmaking.21 This feature distinguishes private law
from the laws of the state, which are contained in printed sources. Even the
invocation of state law occurs mostly non-orally, for example, by filing a
218. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. Laws that are based purely on oral tradition are
customarily perceived to be of an inferior nature, are occasionally ridiculed, and are not considered worthy
of study. Ehrlich traces this attitude to the sixteenth century in Europe, when judges became law-trained
officials of the state and were no longer required to know unwritten law. According to Ehrlich, the demise
of customary law was complete by the end of the eighteenth century. EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 15. Since
then, law based on oral tradition has been treated as a fact to be proven by the parties under stringent
burdens-in other words, not as a matter of judicial notice.
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written complaint. While printed or written sources-such as charters and
bylaws of corporations or contracts-exist in private lawmaking, most private
law never reaches this level of articulation. Yet private law still regulates
conduct effectively by creating informal and implicit understandings that
determine behavior and result in sanctions if violated.219 There can be little
doubt that Gypsy law and adjudication, as employed in the kris of the Vlax
people, is effective. What factors account for this high degree of effectiveness
of oral legal traditions? A comparison of oral and printed law may furnish
clues.
1. Legal Functions of Memory
Private lawmaking relies largely on memory and, as a result, encourages
development of the mental capacity to retain information. Knowledge of past
private lawmaking, to the extent that it is based on oral traditions, is acquired
casually and almost effortlessly. For instance, in the case of the Gypsies, law
may be transmitted through stories told by women or men,' 0 through the
relation of illustrative and entertaining gossip, and through personal
observation. Similarly, when we describe someone as an "experienced lawyer,"
we acknowledge the wealth of legal knowledge that person has accumulated
from sources other than written law. Much of this knowledge has been
acquired over time by observation and by listening to stories told by
colleagues. A person who comprehends only written law would be
inadequately prepared to practice law.
219. Id. at 86.
220. YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 142-47. Yoors explains that two forms of storytelling are
known among the Lovara. Swatura are colorful stories based on personal or group experiences. Paramitsha
are fairy tales. The fairy tales differ among the various Romani groups, and are sometimes influenced by
stories in the respective host country. An original Romani fairy tale, contained in a German collection,
reflects various implicit rules of law. The devil, disguised as a young Romani man of unknown origin,
courted a young Gypsy woman. He asked her father whether he would give her to him in marriage. The
father replied that it would be all right with him, if it was agreeable to her. She expressed her willingness.
Ultimately, the young couple departed under some pretext without being married. Arriving at the young
man's tent, the woman soon discovered that her companion was the devil. She induced him to return to
her parents on a visit. While the devil was drunk in the parental tent, a priest was brought to the scene. The
devil escaped a ceremony of consecration, but a week later the young woman died. ZIGEUNERMnRCHEN
266-68, 381 n.55 (Walther Aichele & Martin Block eds., 1962).
Keeping in mind that the "young woman" in the fairy tale may have been a child, see supra note 101
and accompanying text, the rules of law implied by the story are:
(1) A marriage should be a concern of the families involved, not of the individuals.
(2) One should not marry unknown outsiders because they may turn out to be evil.
(3) Young women should not impose their will on elders.
(4) Elders should exercise control over their offspring.
(5) The sanction for violation of the rules could be death.
For a general description of the relationship among folktales, lore, and law, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL &




The most important tenets of private law are experienced and absorbed
into the individual's psyche and reservoir of knowledge. What Sigmund Freud
has called the superego is largely an internalized reflection, as well as a
continued source, of private lawmaking.2"' Although oral legal traditions may
restrict individual liberty, their coercive features are not necessarily perceived
by the members of the society. Even if the society notices the coerciveness of
these legal traditions, it tends to tolerate them because they present themselves
in the popular mind as "the way things always were" and consequently are
more readily accepted than the printed laws imposed by the state.2
Memory may also affect the ways in which laws are changed. In an oral
system, the chiefs who are trusted for their wisdom and knowledge may
influence law over time by the ways they remember it. For example, the chiefs
may make imperceptible changes in those legal traditions that no longer serve
useful functions or reflect notions of times long gone by. Just as Gypsies
change law in this fashion,' much unwritten institutional law is gradually
altered by selective forgetting. Such changes are hardly noted because they
come about through organic growth or evolution. If the new rules are formally
articulated as changes, so that participants become fully conscious of the fact
221. A definition of the superego illustrates the relation between this concept and private lawmaking:
"[a] Freudian term for that aspect of the psyche which has internalized parental and social prohibitions or
ideals early in life and imposes them as a censor on the wishes of the ego .... 17 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 217 (2d ed. 1989). Although the relation to Gypsy law and other forms of private lawmaking
is evident, the definition seems to be less applicable to state law, especially in its technical aspects. We are
indebted to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Department of Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley, for
suggesting a relationship between private lawmaking and internalized standards of conscience.
222. VON SAVIGNY, supra note 6, at 24 ("In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the
law will be found to have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their language,
manners and constitution .... That which binds them into one whole is the common conviction of the
people, the kindred consciousness of an inward necessity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary
origin.").
223. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 98-100, mentions several ways in which romaniya (Gypsy law)
changes: (1) Archaic laws such as the prohibition against living in urban apartment complexes are simply
ignored. Older rules disallowed such living arrangements because of the belief that women on higher floors
were a polluting presence; (2) Use of hospitals for childbirth modifies older and restrictive marime rules;
(3) The conflicting precedents of kris trials are used for creative court arguments. As in our legal system,
precedent thus becomes a safety valve that permits rapid legal change; (4) Extenuating circumstances are
often invoked to adjust the law to the hardship of an individual case. One could look generally at law
reform as a set of emerging competing norms that are slowly incorporated into the earlier traditional norms,
sometimes replacing them.
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that changes are taking place, then those changes might be rejected.224 In this
respect, articulation can become a conservative force preventing innovation.
A legal system that relies solely on collective memory might not require
experts in the law, because such a regime is manageable enough to be
essentially self-executing. Nevertheless, individuals who know the law, or even
better, who conform to it, may receive favored treatment. Among the Gypsies,
for example, an individual's stature may increase to the point that the person
becomes a candidate for leadership positions, such as a judge in a kris.' 5
Finally, although oral law exists at all levels of lawmaking, it is most
effective within smaller social units: a family, a clan, or an institutional group,
such as a faculty, a board of directors, a committee or a court. 6 Although
each of these units may have unwritten understandings, uniformity among them
is not guaranteed or even a goal, which in turn may encourage dispute.
224. Weyrauch observed a similar phenomenon in an experimental setting on the Berkeley campus.
This experiment, financed by NASA, took place in the spring of 1965 and was primarily concerned with
nutritional aspects of prolonged space exploration. Nine male volunteers, between twenty-one and thirty
years of age, were confined under close observation for about three months. Weyrauch's task was to
observe and catalog the law that the experimental group generated under strict confinement. The
fundamental rules that evolved within the group included:
1. Rules are not to be articulated. In case of articulation they are to be discarded,
regardless of whether such articulation was accidental or deliberate. If a substantial segment of
the group has in fact talked about the rule, the necessary level of articulation is reached and its
existence is acknowledged.
A rule that has become spurious by articulation and acknowledgment can be discarded by
any form of behavior designed to destroy its effectiveness, for instance by deliberate disregard
in a demonstrative fashion without the normal group sanctions which otherwise would have
been imposed.
2. The closer a rule comes to a taboo area, the less articulate it should be. Minor
administrative matters may be articulated.
3. The stringency of a rule is determined by the level of its articulation. The more
articulate it is, the less the necessity to follow it.
Veyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 6, at 59; see also WEYRAUCH, THE LAW OF A SMALL GROUP, supra note
6, at 40-41; eyrauch, Law in Isolation, supra note 6, at 39, 41-45.
Professor Funk has commented that the rule of "nonarticulation" seems to apply to law faculties: "We
do certain things in fact, though we sometimes do not want to admit it. If someone identifies and articulates
what we really do, the group may change its actions. Our prior rule of behavior has changed because we
cannot face its articulation." GROUP DYNAMIC LAW, supra note 6, at 178.
225. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 82-84; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 25-26.
226. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. A collegial court, for example, would apply the
formal laws governing its jurisdiction as well as the unwritten law that governs its members. In fact, the
latter may be crucial to the ultimate outcome of a particular litigation. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 24.
For a popular account of the informal rules of the Supreme Court, see BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979). Former Chief Justice Burger's
complaints about the low "quality" of attorneys appearing before the Supreme Court may have included
an objection to their ignorance about the unwritten rules and understandings of the Court. Id. at 379. A
high-ranking German appellate judge expressed similar views:
A selected group of specialized attorneys who constantly argue cases before us are not likely
to waste our time. They know what we justices want to hear, and they bring just that. The
out-of-town attorneys have no experience before a court of last resort. They talk too much.
WALTER 0. ,VEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 230 (1964) (footnote omitted). As in any other
social setting, the Supreme Court may have factions, which develop their own legal systems. WOODWARD
& ARMSTRONG, supra, at 65-69 (describing conservative faction within Burger Court). The informal law
of a faction may clash with the law of other factions and the law of the group as a whole. See supra note
99 (autonomous systems within autonomous systems).
1993] Autonomous Lawmaking
Fundamentally, oral systems do not address themselves to the needs of a mass
society as such, even though they satisfy the needs of the smaller units that
comprise a mass society. Rather, printed laws are better equipped to serve the
needs of mass governance.227
2. Oral and Printed Law Contrasted
Law based on printed sources contrasts dramatically with oral legal
traditions. Since voluminous libraries house most of the printed sources of law,
these sources can only be retrieved through catalogues, indices, and computers.
Inevitably, print discourages the use of memory.228 It also requires literacy
in the traditional sense. This reliance on literacy in legal society partially
explains why non-Gypsy cultures object to the alleged illiteracy of
Gypsies.229 Since literacy assists in the control and governance of large
masses, a person perceived to be illiterate is more suspect to the host
authorities and consequently more vulnerable to persecution. 230
Under a system of printed law, then, memorization of legal sources is
practically impossible and is in fact discouraged.23' The ability to retain
knowledge of law through memory, as in an oral legal culture, fades.
Eventually the doctrine of constructive notice emerges; the content of printed
law is deemed to be known by all. In other words, a legal fiction compensates
for the growing inability to remember and is sufficient to hold people legally
responsible despite their lack of knowledge or even their capacity to know.12
227. For example, contemporary tax collection, without a code or some other printed source, would
be impossible.
228. The same is likely to be true of computers. See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and
Government Administration. The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS
LJ. 1321, 1355 (1992) (claiming that extensively trained professionals have been replaced by clerks who
are only expected to process paper and operate machines); see also Moore, supra note 192, at 26-28
(describing conflict between oral tradition and record-keeping reform in colonial Africa).
229. See, e.g., McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 37 (stating that "most gypsies [in America] are illiterate
or, at best, semiliterate"). But see Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 73 (noting that among Vlax men
literacy is not unusual; among Bashalde and Romanichal literacy is common). The persistent emphasis on
Gypsy illiteracy, see supra note 204, reflects a disturbing hubris. According to a U.S. Department of
Education report, based on a Princeton Educational Testing Service survey, nearly half of the American
adult population has a low level of literacy-lower than that which a moderately demanding job would
require. But when asked whether they read well or very well, 71% of those in the bottom fifth replied
"yes." Paul Gray, Adding Up the Under-Skilled: A Survey Finds Nearly Half of U.S. Adults Lack the
Literacy To Cope with Modern Life, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993, at 75.
230. People who are illiterate ordinarily cannot be naturalized as U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988).
231. See, e.g., EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 458 (referring to Georg F. Puchta's statement "As the law
develops, the mass of legal material increases to such an extent, and the science of law becomes so refined
that a comprehensive knowledge and a scientific mastery of the law can be found only among the jurists.").
Although Ehrlich refers in this context to "juristic law" as a means of articulating customary law, one may
assume that at this advanced stage of development, the sources of law can no longer be found in oral
tradition, but rather exist in custom that has been reduced to writing. Id. at 450.
232. For a discussion of fictions, see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FIcTIONS (1967); HANS VAIHINGER, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (Charles K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. 1935); see also FRANK, supra note 15, app. VII
at 338-50 (commenting on Vaihinger's book).
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Actual knowledge of printed sources of law promulgated by the state, to the
extent that it is still required or needed for purposes of legal education,
admission to the bar, or administration of justice, is acquired by a process of
forced memorization. This compulsory process breeds resentment and results
in a reduced ability to retain the learned information. 1 3 It also creates a
professional class of lawyers. 34
The rules of law as represented in printed sources tend to become
increasingly abstract. 5 Concrete legal stories are no longer viewed as
primary sources of law, although they have to some extent survived in
common law systems that rely on case collection. The more compact and
abstract the printed norms, the more they lend themselves to the development
of theory-a feature that is not present in private lawmaking based on oral
traditions.236 The capacity for abstract and theoretical thinking becomes a
mark of intelligence, as distinguished from wisdom, in mass society. Tests
develop to designate at an early phase potential candidates for key positions
along these lines of merit.237
Printed law tends to be relatively static and is difficult to alter. Once law
is reduced to print, one is often "stuck with it," unless an ambiguity can be
found; even then change or adaptation requires special effort. The procedures
for change are complex, especially in comparison to the ease with which oral
law can be altered.238 Printed law can be changed by statutory amendment,
by overruling precedent, or by reinterpreting existing law to accommodate new
circumstances. Some of these methods of reform may employ subterfuge.239
Therefore, realizing these changes usually requires a conscious effort.240
Merely forgetting or employing a qualified oral account will not suffice.
233. See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 409, 469 n.121 (1986) (noting that cramming can temporarily improve performance, but leads to
decline of performance in long run).
234. TURNER, supra note 193, at 225-26 (discussing how differentiation of law requires
professionalized lawyers and judges).
235. On abstract rules, see PosPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 20-37. The law of the
Romani people and the private laws in our society do not depend on the abstract rules described by
Pospisil. They rely on legal tradition as communicated by word of mouth and observation. These forms of
autonomous lawmaking continue to exist contemporaneously, usually unnoticed, with abstract rules of the
law of the state. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
236. EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 348 (describing evolution of "juristic science").
237. Weyrauch, Governance, supra note 46, at 150-53; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1166-67 (1969). For example, the notion that the capacity for abstract thinking
(as opposed to other forms of intelligence) is at the core of American IQ tests has been developed in Arthur
R. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDuc. REv. 1, 19 (1969).
Jensen's article, perhaps inadvertently, exposes the cultural and ethnic biases in prevailing conceptions of
intelligence. See supra note 46.
238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (ease with which romaniya changes).
239. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 70-76, 97-105; HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 23-32
(Henry Holt & Co. 1906) (1861); HENRY S. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 118-21 (London, John
Murray 1891); JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENsIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 130-33 (1966).
240. This method of expressing law in a fashion that outwardly conforms to precedent but actually
submits it in an altered form seems to be common in Romani legal proceedings and can also be observed
in other gatherings that rely on oral tradition, such as committee and faculty meetings.
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Printed law of the state may also result in dead-letter law, namely, law that is
no longer applied but continues to retain a nuisance value by being on the
official books. Such dead laws may sometimes come to life in unpredictable
ways.24' Furthermore, as outdated laws grow unfamiliar, the populace
perceives their application to be oppressive and unfair.
The jurisprudential distinction between the law-in-books and the
law-in-action suggests an emphasis on printed sources in legal systems which
place value on written law. Yet, even where institutions of written legal history
prevail, law-in-action may shape legal practice and thereby incorporate private
lawmaking into the law of the state.242 Accordingly, the dichotomy between
oral legal traditions and the written law of the state is not absolute. The actual
outcomes of cases tend to be influenced by norms of unwritten law which are
never fully articulated. These unwritten norms may prevail in clashes with the
traditional printed sources of law because such norms have greater
persuasiveness.
211
This analysis demonstrates that, while there are fundamental differences
between legal systems exclusively based on oral tradition, such as Gypsy law,
and those based on written tradition, the law of the state is based much less on
written law than is commonly assumed. In fact, the law of the state could not
survive without the continued influence of orally transmitted legal traditions.
241. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 26-27. For a discussion of dead laws and
how they may be reinstituted, see Robert C. Berry, Spirits of the Past-Coping with Old Laws, 19 U. FLA.
L. REV. 24 (1966). Mashbum points out that seemingly dead rules are dangerous because they lend
themselves to unpredictable and selective enforcement. Amy R. Mashbum, Pragmatism and Paradox:
Reinhold Niebuhr's Critical Social Ethic and the Regulation of Lawyers, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 737,
783-84 (1993). As illustration, she refers to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983),
according to which attorneys must report the misconduct of other attorneys. This rule is essentially
unenforced, but in one controversial case, an Illinois attorney was suspended from practice for violating
the rule. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty To Report
Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 977.
242. POUND, supra note 18, at 19.
243. This statement may apply more to legal processes in the United States than in civil law countries
that rely on essentially written procedures in the courts. See, e.g., Richard C. Maxwell & Marvin G.
Goldman, Mexican Legal Education, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 170 n.62 (1963) (noting anomaly that
Mexican lawyers, after passing oral examinations, apply written procedures in court, while American
lawyers pass written tests and then use oral advocacy before judge and jury). American law relies heavily
on oral skills and thereby facilitates the influx of notions based on oral tradition. In divorce cases, for
example, written law may grant husband and wife equal rights to the custody of their children. In spite of
this, it is difficult for a divorced husband to obtain custody of his twelve-year-old daughter. There is an
unarticulated cultural norm, no matter how factually inaccurate, that a single adult male cannot be trusted
in an intimate living arrangement with a young female. It would be impossible, however, to articulate this
highly prejudicial concern openly in court. Lawyers instead prefer veiled references to sexual concerns by
arguing that the daughter is "maturing" and needs the guidance of the mother in "hygienic matters." See,
e.g., Boroff v. Boroff, 250 N.W.2d 613, 617-18 (Neb. 1977) (noting that although Nebraska law provides
both parents with legal right to custody of their children and twelve-year-old girl expressed preference to
live with her father, trial court improperly awarded custody to mother until twelve-year-old "gets through
maturity"). On the dominance of unwritten and often prejudicial private law in child custody matters, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Mashburn offers another illustration demonstrating how unwritten private law prevails over written
law. Experience demonstrates that the informal private law among lawyers prevails over the official and
written mandate to report on each other. Mashburn, supra note 241, at 783-84, 788.
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Yet this influence often goes unnoticed, and the nature of law is increasingly
viewed by legal scholars in terms of the written law of the state. Consequently,
misunderstandings permeate every phase of law and affect legislation, judicial
processes, the practice of law, and legal education. Perhaps the most significant
impact of these misunderstandings can be seen in popular misconceptions of
law. Law is often viewed as an oppressive force that runs counter to what is
truly sound and just, but the popular conception of law usually is based only
on the law of the state and those who apply it. It fails to include a broader
understanding of law that also considers the effects of private lawmaking.
Accordingly, those who are dissatisfied with law may not realize that some of
the more oppressive elements of the law may stem from the spheres of private
lawmaking.
B. Procedure and Substance
Unlike state law, private lawmaking does not draw a strict distinction
between procedural and substantive rules. In systems of law that are based on
oral tradition, procedure and substance do not serve identifiably discrete
functions." Nevertheless, some of the rules of oral legal systems might be
described as more procedural than substantive in nature. For example, Gypsy
law emphasizes that grievances are not to be resolved by violence; rather,
certain procedures must be followed to obtain redress. In the case of the Vlax,
a divano has to be called, possibly followed by a kris. These procedures
require the resolution of several issues: who may serve as a judge (krisnitori);
who may present evidence as a witness; who may be present at the
proceedings; and what language will be used in the proceedings. Language,
in particular, has consequences for substantive legal issues as well as
procedural ones.
1. Role of Language
One may view language, which shares certain characteristics with law in
general, as a form of private lawmaking. For example, language is shaped by
strict rules that may result in sanctions when violations occur.245
Inappropriate or casual usage at the wrong occasion (for example, in a formal
setting or examination) can permanently mar the offender's social status and
244. Though our legal system has highly sophisticated and distinct roles for procedural and substantive
rules, it is important to note that decisions based on procedure often mask substantive results. Stanley
Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control,
56 B.U. L. REv. 266, 270-73 (1976); Walter O. Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66
CAL. L. REv. 699, 714-26 (1978) [hereinafter Weyrauch, Law as Mask].
245. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that same-sex partners
are incapable of entering into marriage because dictionary definition of the word "marriage" requires union
of male and female).
[Vol. 103: 323
Autonomous Lawmaking
professional career. In a Vlax kris only Romani may be spoken; those who
inadvertently switch to English are shouted down and may lose some social
esteem in the eyes of their peers.246 Those speaking in a kris use a special
oratory, comparable to the elocution of lawyers or politicians, which differs in
grammar and content from ordinary speech. A Gypsy who masters this oratory
gains respect and may be selected as a chief or krisnitori.
247
Proper use of language, especially the skillful use of nuance and
connotation, may be one vehicle for private lawmaking. Because legal
allusions, implications, and inferences tend to be more effective than
articulated rules, 24  it may be more important for a non-Gypsy lawyer to
know what can be inferred from the law, rather than to know what the law
actually says. Interpretations of rules reach matters that are not fully articulated
in the rules themselves. Thus interpretation becomes a method by which
private lawmaking and the printed rules of the state are fused.249 Most
private lawmaking has low visibility, but the rules governing construction,
interpretation, implication, and inference in relation to state laws are of major
significance, even though they must be applied differently in each set of
circumstances if they are to be effective.
Because language remains unrecognized as a form of private lawmaking,
it is often unevenly applied, leading to seemingly inconsistent results. For
instance, in litigation under the laws of the state, a party may lose because of
the blunders of counsel who communicated the wrong inferences at the wrong
time or who relied on a technically correct legal argument, without realizing
that the argument also conveyed negative implicationsao Language thus
246. Hancock, Letter, supra note 151, at 4 n.44; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 28.
247. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also GROPPER, supra note 79, at 84-85.
248. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J.) ("Generalities about statutory construction help us little. They are not rules of law but merely axioms
of experience."). Justice Holmes made the same point in Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278
U.S. 41, 48 (1928); see also FRANK E. COOPER, LIVING THE LAW 71 (1958) ("The law in action is
principally concerned with problems of statutory interpretation and application."); GRAY, supra note 7, at
125 ("Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly
the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.") (quoting
Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor, from his sermon preached before the King in 1717). These authorities
lend support to the proposition that interpretation may be a surreptitious means by which private lawmaking
tends to prevail over written law. The "axioms of experience" referred to by Justices Frankfurter and
Holmes, then, are really incidents of unrecognized private lawmaking.
250. Any lawyer can attest to numerous experiences of this kind, both on the trial and appellate level.
The problem may also exist in other contexts such as negotiation. In spite of their negative impact, these
occurrences ordinarily go unrecorded. Furthermore, lawyers do not view them as violations of oral legal
traditions, but as inadvertent slips or as the result of incompetence.
Gossip is one of the main enforcement mechanisms of private lawmaking in romaniya, as well as
within a law firm or university faculty. SUTHERLAND, supra note 29, at 100 (noting gossip as major form
of social control among the Roma). The absence of due process in gossip is self-evident. Yet, gossip is a
double-edged sword. It may result in severe sanctions if used unjustifiably. Tillhagen, 111, supra note 130,
at 29-30 (referring to kris sentences against gossiping women among Swedish Roma).
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affects the application of both private and state law and brings about results
that may be hard to remedy.
The reasons for the lack of procedural remedies may be different, though,
in private and state law. In private lawmaking, certainly in the case of Gypsy
law, language and law are indistinguishable, and the ultimate outcome of a
controversy must be accepted. In proceedings under state law, language is not
recognized as falling under the traditional definitions of law, although it
obviously affects outcomes. A damaging implication, even though inadvertent,
creates problems on appeal, partly because the record may not reflect it and
partly because the parties, viewed as having had their day in court, are held
responsible for any avoidable mishaps. Realistically, language must be
recognized as a form of private lawmaking that is necessary for the state law
system.
2. Role of Legal Strategy
The misguided notion that substantive law promulgated by the state can
uniformly and mechanically resolve disputes relegates procedural strategy to
a secondary and disparaged status. Similarly, emphasizing theory over practice
often neglects the role of strategy in the application of law.' Strategy
incorporates private lawmaking into the process of adjudication. Because
strategy plays a role in the resolution of legal disputes the more skillful
advocate is likely to prevail, regardless of what the law of the state may
ordain.
An essential element of strategy is the exploitation of the preconceptions
of the people who are addressed, whether they are part of a court or some
other decisionmaking body. If this were done directly, it would probably be
resented or considered insulting. If, however, the advocacy remains at the level
of innuendo, it confirms the preconceptions of the addressee and thus
establishes sympathy for the advocate and the cause. The persuasive power of
innuendo in legal argumentation may have its source in private lawmaking.
The innuendos imply that the lawyer who makes them is "in the know." There
is no need for the advocate to be direct because the participants are assumed
to be knowledgeable anyway. Furthermore, articulation of the lawyer's reliance
on private lawmaking might paradoxically result in the judge's or jury's
decision to refuse to consider the informal rule.252 The advocate's
implications tend to relate to informal processes that, rather than being based
on state law, reflect what law "actually means." Whether the inferences in fact
do so is a matter of conjecture, but this approach tends to be persuasive. One
251. See, e.g., I ANN F. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS at ix-x (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing uneasy relationship between legal theory and practice in United States).
252. See supra note 224.
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could ask whether such strategies merely appeal to power relationships. But it
is more accurate to assume that when such strategies are employed, private
lawmaking (premised on communal authority as a higher form of law) is
invoked.
Consequently, private lawmaking, although often neglected by legal theory
and administration, actually plays a critical role in determining legal outcomes.
One might argue that legal strategy, as well as emphasis on forms of private
lawmaking, could detract from or damage law by propagating skills that are
devious or unethical, such as winning a controversy by creating innuendos that
are hard to refute and impossible to review. A response to this objection is that
these strategies permeate law at all levels and cannot be eliminated.
Furthermore, these strategies should be considered a generally beneficial
intersection between public law and norms that are widely held, but
unacknowledged because they are products of private lawmaking.
Lynn LoPucki has expressed a related thought: because legal strategies
have determined the outcome of cases, without regard to the cases' merits,
many people have concluded that the development of legal strategies is
unethical, regardless of whether the "rules of the legal game" were observed.
In such instances the superior strategists would be better manipulators of the
system, not better thinkers. 53 LoPucki counters that the development and
publication of legal strategies is highly ethical. Exposing contradictions
between legal theory and practice encourages and facilitates law reform. It
would be unfortunate, LoPucki concludes, if those who expose the need for
reform face the stigma of being labeled "unethical." 4
253. LYNN M. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS at xxix (1st ed.
1985).
254. Id. at xxx; see also ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS at x-xi (2d ed. 1973)
(observing that candid discussion increases appreciation and understanding of danger).
For an illustration of the crucial impact of strategy on litigation, see the closing argument of
Pennzoil's lead trial counsel in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988), resulting in a verdict in excess of $11 billion against Texaco:
You people here, you jury, are the conscience, not only of this community now in this
hour, but of this country. What you decide is going to set the standard of morality in business
in America for years to come.
Now, you can turn your back on Pennzoil and say, "Okay, that's fine, we like that kind
of deal. That's slick stuff. Go on out and do this kind of thing. Take the company, fire the
employees, loot the pension fund. You can do a deal that's already been done."
That's not going to happen.
I have got a chance. Me. Juror.
I can stop this. And I am going to stop it. And you might pull this on somebody else, but
you are not going to run it through me and tell me to wash it for you.
You can send a message to corporate America, the business world. Because it's just
people who make up those things. It isn't as though we are numbers and robots. We are people.
And you can tell them that "you are not going to get away with this."
I ask you to remember that you are in a once-in-a-lifetime situation. It won't happen
again. It just won't happen. You have a chance to right a wrong, a grievous wrong, a serious
wrong.
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Yet what LoPucki calls the "merits" of a case is an elusive concept that
often cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. Such a determination,
elusive as it is, comes primarily from the laws of the state rather than private
law. Indeed, the strategies or rules of the legal game to which LoPucki refers
are in fact an application of private lawmaking to the process of adjudication.
But law reform is exclusively focused on the formal laws of the state. Law
reform in that limited sense is not likely to reach private lawmaking, which,
like Gypsy law, is shielded by its invisibility. But the invisible forms of private
lawmaking around us are governed by identifiable patterns that can be
observed and learned. To that extent, perhaps private lawmaking can be
regulated somewhat. At a minimum, legal theory would no longer limit itself
to analysis of an essentially closed system of law, but would become more
comprehensive by acknowledging that competing private legal systems exist.
Strategy plays a role in the kris of the Vlax, although the Gypsies may not
be conscious of a dichotomy between strategy and the merits of a case. The
Gypsies use what might be called strategy in the preliminary phase of the
proceedings, attempting to use the selection of the krisnitorya to influence the
outcome. This strategy is, however, of limited effectiveness; both prospective
litigants must agree on the choice of judge and voluntarily consent to abide by
the decision of the kris. If one party attempts to use strategy too forcefully, the
other party may refuse to cooperate. 5 During the trial, the parties or their
chosen representatives attempt to influence the resolution of the controversy
by skillfully presenting the case, resorting to precedent and even folkloreY2
6
These maneuverings are not, however, fully "strategy" in the gajikano sense
of the word, for Gypsies believe that supernatural powers, not tactics, decide
the merits of a case. 7 Gypsy law traditionally places great emphasis on the
oath in the examination of the parties and of witnesses, a practice that might
be compared to elements in our own law with an historical origin, such as the
ordeal and adversarial advocacy258
THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL AND HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS 398-99 (1987); see also Michael
Ansaldi, Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the Masses: A Contracts Postmortem, 27 HoUS. L. REV. 733,
836 n.396 (1990). Earlier, Pennzoil had succeeded in removing the case from the Delaware courts, which
are known for their expertise in corporate law, to Texas, for a trial by jury. Id. at 835 & n.394. The
emphasis thus shifted from application of the law of the state to private lawmaking.
255. See, e.g., GROPPER, supra note 79, at 81-82; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 26, 29.
256. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 83-85; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 29; Nemeth, Field Notes, supra
note 128, at 128-33.
257. Jeatran, Social Control, supra note 139, at 25 ('The kris has a sacred aspect which is absent in
American courts. The concept of marime is an important part of Gypsy religious thought, and its presence
in the kris tends to blur the distinction between crime and sin. One observer has likened the kris to a
religious cleansing, much like the (Roman Catholic) sacrament of confession."); see also Hancock, World
Citizens, supra note 170 (manuscript at 5) (describing Romani belief in kintdla, a state of spiritual
"balance" that includes strict adherence to Gypsy law).
258. See, e.g., Helen Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J 1329 (1959); Helen Silving, The Oath: 11,
68 YALE L.J. 1527 (1959). Descriptions of the oath in Romani procedures (Gypsy law) can be found in
YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 177-79; Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 28-29; Tillhagen, 111, supra note
130, at 21-24. On the ordeals, wager of law, and trial by battle, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEMT, A
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In the Anglo-American tradition, calling upon God as a witness while
falsely swearing an oath was assumed to bring about the wrath of divine
powers, regardless of whether the perjury was ever discovered. Similarly, the
ancient ordeals (e.g., gripping a heated iron without serious consequence)
invoked the powers of divinity to furnish proof of a witness' veracity. Some
of these notions have survived in contemporary proceedings under state law.
The oath is still available as a method of evidence. Declining fear of divine
punishment, however, has weakened the oath as a legal institution-witness the
modem state's need to impose worldly penalties on perjurers. The notion has
also survived that, in a competitive contest between two attorneys in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the truth emerges. Irreversible
negative consequences of minor flaws in strategy, committed not by the parties
but by their legal representatives, are considered justified and sometimes even
hailed as indications that the winner had a better case. Indeed, although
declining fear of divine punishment has weakened the significance of the oath
in our own law, the oath persists as a mode of evidence. Such practices,
common to both Gypsy law and contemporary law of the state, attest to the
underlying belief that powers beyond human control favor the person who is
right. To the extent that the authority of the kris stems from a belief in divine
powers, a dichotomy between strategy and merits is not really possible. The
Gypsies perceive the outcome to be determined on a plane that is beyond the
reach of human manipulation, and even strategy is viewed as a manifestation
of a higher will.
3. Role of Substance
There is no clear demarcation between procedure and substance in Gypsy
law."s9 Similarly, those aspects of Gypsy law that can be viewed as
essentially substantive in nature cannot be subdivided into criminal law, civil
law, or other branches of law. There is no need for such distinctions because
Gypsy dispute resolution dispenses corrective measures against socially
inappropriate or deviant behavior regardless of whether such behavior would
be criminal or civil under our classification scheme; Gypsy law uniformly
applies the same standards of evidence and methods of proof, without concern
CONcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 113-19 (5th ed. 1956). Similar to the old English ordeal of the
"cursed morsel," id. at 114, Gypsy law provided for a form of ordeal, at least in Europe. In the Gypsy
ceremony, a substance would be given to the plaintiff and defendant to swallow; the party who became ill
would be assumed to be at fault. See GROPPER, supra note 79, at 97. For a comparison of lie detector tests,
oaths, and ordeals, see id.
259. The Romani word kris reflects the various aspects of Gypsy law combining procedure and
substance. It has been defined by Gropper as "justice" or "court trial." GROPPER, supra note 79, at 205.
Gropper writes: "This concept is central to Gypsy culture and refers to a whole complex of ideas and
behavior patterns, including the whole body of customary law, the procedures of holding a court trial, and
the underlying world view and value system." Id.
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for the type of case.260 By contrast, in the law of the state, the standards of
evidence and proof, as well as sanctions, differ in civil and criminal
proceedings because of the social opprobrium that attaches to criminal but not
civil violations. This differentiation is more appropriate in non-Gypsy society,
which is not as cohesive as Romani society (although divisions exist there,
too). Treating all segments of the non-Gypsy society according to such a
uniform standard for all infractions is not possible in a culturally diverse
society.
These differences are reflected in the differing roles of substantive law.
Gypsy law's emphasis on states of purity or pollution seems removed from our
perceptions of the nature and function of law. The treatment of women and
sexual matters by Gypsy law appears irrational and antiquated by non-Gypsy
standards. But this apparent irrationality may be a clue to the effectiveness of
Gypsy law. Under these orally transmitted rules, a whole culture has succeeded
in protecting itself from the pervasive influences of host countries.
Reference to matters of an intimate and sexual nature may have a
mnemonic function that should not be underestimated. In an oral legal
tradition, rules must be preserved in a form that allows for easy recall, such
as stories.26' Such stories must have a content that catches the attention of
the audience. Any rule that incorporates intimate matters directly or indirectly
related to procreation will more likely be remembered and observed because
it is concerned with the survival of the species. The rigidity of such rules and
their apparent absurdity to the contemporary non-Gypsy observer erect
protective hurdles against interaction with persons belonging to the surrounding
cultures. This separation results in an assertively endogamous society in which
the women have a special role in safeguarding cultural identity through the
enforcement of substantive rules of law.262 Indeed, law of this type plays a
260. Cf supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also HOLLEMAN, supra note 20, at 5-9.
According to Holleman, the main function of tribal procedure is to maximize rather than to restrict the
scope of substantive inquiry. Although Holleman discusses tribal law within African cultures, much of his
argument is applicable to romaniya (Gypsy law). It is also applicable to informal adjudication of private
lawmaking in western societies, as it occurs in institutional settings. Illustrations include ways in which it
is traditionally decided whether an associate in a law firm should be made partner; whether in a university
faculty a candidate should be granted promotion or tenure; whether and to what extent salary increases
should be given; whether disciplinary measures should be initiated; and in what form they should be
imposed. On the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings' resemblance to a tribal adjudication, see supra
note 23.
261. Such was the function of rhymes, assonance, and alliteration in early epic poems and sagas
handed down orally at a time when print was not available. See, e.g., Charles Collier, Origins and
Development of Medieval European Epic: The Problem of Cultural Transmission and Transformation, 9
MEDIAEVALIA 45 (1983). On the role of story, myth, and magic in the oral tradition of the Romani people,
see CLIBERT, supra note 44, at 161-90; see also Rade Uhlik, Serbo-Bosnian Gypsy Folk-Tales, 38 J. GYPSY
LORE SOC'Y 134 (B. Gilliat-Smith ed. & trans., 1959).
262. See supra notes 80-108 and accompanying text. Subordination of Gypsy women to men has been
stressed in the literature, see Okely, Gypsy Women, supra note 62, at 58-60. Yet, "Marime is what a woman
has-that's her power." Miller, Thesis, supra note 63, at 40 (quotation from Romani source). One aspect
of this apparent subordination is that women have become central figures in Romani culture. It is
conceivable that the concept of gender subordination derives from contemporary gajikano culture (our
[Vol. 103: 323
Autonomous Lawmaking
critical role in these respects because it cements the cultural unity of the
people.
This role for law appears at first glance to be unique to the Gypsy culture,
but there are parallels in the American legal system. Although American law
presents itself as neutral, it still functions to cement the cultural unity of the
people. As in Gypsy law, many elements of United States law represent
aspirational norms that are rarely fully realized, but instead hold out a
promise.263 Since there is commonality of neither ethnic origin nor religion
in the United States, law assumes a major role in expressing common hopes:
the equality of all people, for example. To the extent that the law of the state
relies openly on aspirational fiction, it issues demands that are justified on the
basis of facts and reasoning which do not correspond to reality. Some rules of
law that have been attacked for generations because of their apparent
irrationality have shown an uncanny capacity to survive and persuade when
argued in court.264
The parallels between Gypsy lawmaking and private lawmaking are even
more apparent. Institutional ritual, especially if it appears to be irrational, can
often have great staying power. Sometimes it is frozen in articulated form,
such as Robert's Rules of Order or the various collections relating to social
etiquette.265 The apparent irrationality in institutional rituals may actually
enhance institutional cohesion and continuity. The willingness of participants
to submit themselves to the government of these private rules, especially if
they are tedious, may attest to institutional loyalty. If some members attempt
to deviate from the rituals, they become known as persons on whom one
cannot rely, and are prevented from assuming significant responsibility.
Whether their protests are justified under the traditional law of the state is not
the issue. The determinative factor is whether objecting members violate the
mandates of unwritten private law, a reason why private law tends to prevail
when it collides with laws of the state.
society) and provides little understanding of the status of women among Romani people. Their status is
likely to be greater than perceived from the outside. See also CLlBERT, supra note 44, at 140-41 (noting
propensity of Gypsies to have cults of the female). Perhaps these factors should be considered in
determining whether the treatment of Gypsy women violates international human rights standards. See
Reisman, Comment, supra note 46, at 416.
263. FULLER, MORALITY, supra note 11, at 41-44 (aspirations of law), 104 (aspirations of
constitutional law); see also supra note 12 (referring to theories of Grey).
264. Among such rules are the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., 2 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 275, at 14 (1950) (noting statute of frauds promotes "illusion of
certainty"); 3 id. § 573, at 370 (1960) (noting parol evidence rule "presents many problems" in "its
practical application"). With regard to procedure, see FREDERIC NV. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO, THE FORMS
OF AcTION AT COMMON LAW-Two COURSES OF LECTURES 296 (1929) (common law forms of action rule
us from their graves).
265. HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER (Sarah C. Robert ed., 1990); see also, e.g.,
JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE TO EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECT BEHAVIOR (Warner Books 1983)
(1982).
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The sanctions imposed on a person who has violated an unwritten code
within an institution or business often cannot be ameliorated through the
remedies available under the laws of the state.2 66 The whistleblower, for
example, may conform to a moral and legal duty to inform, but such an act
invariably violates the unwritten internal law not to inform.267 Even if the
whistleblower.wins in court and receives damages for wrongful discharge or
reinstatement, he or she will not likely survive as a member of the group
whose unwritten code has been breached. Similarly, a legislatively required
loyalty oath may be constitutionally flawed. Yet if governmental employees
raise this issue and withhold their signatures, they may find themselves
unemployed, and even if they win in court they will rarely in fact be
reinstated. More likely they will settle and voluntarily go elsewhere. In other
words, the unwritten group norm which demands punishment for an employee
who is disloyal to the group is likely to prevail over any remedy mandated by
the state.268
The illustration of the discharged government employee can be
generalized. A legal provision that is void or questionable under the law of the
state, if operative within an institutional context, can serve to identify those
willing to raise a legal issue, thus revealing their proclivity to cause trouble.
The institution can then neutralize or eliminate the individual through sanctions
invoked under informal procedures. Although some institutional standards of
fairness may exist, due process tends to be relatively ineffective at this level.
The individual under scrutiny often must forego all legal claims under the
external law of the state and embrace the demands of the internal law of the
group in order to avoid some of the more dire consequences of being named
a "troublemaker."
In fact, every controversy can be analyzed from this dual perspective: what
the law of the state outwardly mandates and what unwritten private law
internally demands. The law of the state may, on occasion, adapt itself to the
266. For an example of such a violation with severe consequences, see Lopucki v. Ford Motor Co.,
311 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding work-related suicide is compensable under state law).
267. See, e.g., DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
(1991); see also MASHBURN, supra notes 241, at 783-84, 788 (describing how professional duty of
attorneys to report unethical conduct of other attorneys violates operative rule among lawyers: "Do not
report other attorneys").
In cases of this nature, as in the whistleblower situations, an attorney could commit a form of
malpractice, even though advice to the client was correct under the law of the state. This could happen if
the attorney neglected to point out the risks of private sanctions. In other words, an attorney could be under
a legal duty to know the external law of the state and, in addition, to be informed of potential risks that
result from private lawmaking within the institution or business employing the client.
268. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (per curiam), aff'g in part and rev'g
in part 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (holding Florida statutory loyalty oath, in its unconstitutional
portion, cannot provide for dismissal without hearing or inquiry required by due process). After lengthy
negotiations about the terms of reinstatement, a dismissed professor affected by the ruling decided to stay
at his new location.
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demands of private lawmaking. But in most cases of direct clashes between the
two, private lawmaking in one form or another will prevail.269
C. Laws of Evidence
1. Absence of Exclusionary Rules
Rules of evidence play a critical role in Gypsy law. They encourage a
broad scope of inquiry and, contrary to non-Gypsy proceedings, are not
designed to keep out information which is only remotely related to the
controversy. Neither exclusionary rules nor rules against hearsay evidence
exist;270 the parties or their spokesmen may speak freely and at length about
their grievances. Similarly, the witnesses may present their testimony colorfully
and expansively. In short, they may refer to past events, use exaggerations, and
try to gain the favor of the judges and audience. The presentation of facts does
not focus on clarifying a single issue.
To evaluate the disparity between Gypsy and gajikane standards of
evidence one must examine the purposes of a broad scope of inquiry. The
Gypsies appear to be concerned primarily with the presentation of a complete
picture of events and evidence, even at the expense of what non-Gypsies might
call due process and the rights of the individual. The litigants air their
grievances before representatives of a tightly knit group who will most likely
be very familiar with every aspect of their lives. Audience members come
269. In clashes between gajikano law (the law of the state) and romaniya (Gypsy law), the latter is
likely to prevail. See supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text; see also GROPPER, supra note 79, at
103-06; Tillhagen, V, supra note 145, at 131-33.
Similar dynamics prevail within Gypsy law. A Rom may be entitled to a legal remedy through a kris.
However, according to competing norms of a more private nature, see supra note 99, a stigma attaches to
one who informs on another Rom. In a case reported in YOORS, GYPSIEs, supra note 42, at 176-79, a
Gypsy woman stole some gold coins from another Gypsy woman. A kris was held to detect the Rom who
had committed this serious offense, but she escaped detection by falsely swearing an oath as to her
innocence, in spite of the curse that she might die in horrible pain. Much later, upon her deathbed, she
confessed in agony to her misdeed and the coins were recovered. Nevertheless, the original victim felt
guilty for having initiated the proceedings which had seemingly caused the death. In her view, this was an
indirect murder. GROPPER, supra note 79, at 97 (reporting interview with Yoors supplementing his earlier
account with additional facts).
According to a Gypsy source, the traditional Romani form of initiating a complaint by skirt-tossing
as a means to contaminate the alleged offender is now discredited among American Gypsies. Attempting
such an act might cause the skirt-tosser and her family to become marime themselves. See Jeatran, Social
Control, supra note 139, at 27. This report seems to indicate that private norms of proper conduct
sometimes prevail over the more archaic norms of Gypsy law, thereby bringing about change.
270. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. These assertions are based on the characteristics
of tribal adjudications, as developed by Holleman, supra note 20, at 5-9. Although Holleman was concerned
with African tribal law, similar observations have been made about the kris of the Vlax Gypsies. See, e.g.,
GROPPER, supra note 79, at 81-85; McLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 23-24; Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note
126, at 12-17. A scheme of cross-cultural procedural preferences has been suggested by Stephen LaTour,
Pauline Houlden, Laurens Walker, and John Thibaut. The degree of disputant control over evidence
presentation is a crucial factor for parties' satisfaction with the procedures followed and the outcomes
thereof. Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258,
280-84 (1976).
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from the same community as the parties, and thus follow the proceedings with
an intense sense of participation and a strong desire that justice be done. This
attitude may lead to spontaneous offers of testimony, as well as expressions of
approval or disapproval from the audience.27 Evidentiary relevance cannot
be determined in advance, but rather gradually emerges as the discussion
progresses.
While the judges have been chosen because of their personal authority,272
they are expected to allow behavior that might be considered prejudicial or
disruptive in non-Gypsy trials. Participation by the audience is expected and
encouraged by custom. Members of the audience, although not formally called
as witnesses, may feel justified in expressing views. Whether their contribution
to the proceedings is based on personal observation or opinion does not matter.
Ultimately the judge does not apply an exclusionary standard of relevance, but
rather weighs the probative value of the cumulative evidence to make rulings.
The extent to which the decisionmakers can identify with what has been said
might be a significant standard in the mind of the judge as he assesses the
probative weight of the evidence. Parties or witnesses will be perceived as
credible if their statements have "the ring of truth." A person who can
demonstrate in court that he or she has conformed to accepted communal
standards may also be considered credible by the court.
A method of proof dependent on communal standards may at first appear
prejudicial under our conceptions of legal theory. Nonetheless, it may in fact
closely resemble what often transpires in our own courtrooms, especially when
a jury makes the determination of fact. In a closely knit society, such as that
of the Gypsies, this method of presenting and evaluating evidence may be as
accurate as possible under the circumstances. The vindication of individuals'
rights, as understood in a non-Gypsy context, is not of the utmost significance
in a Gypsy kris. Instead, the reestablishment of peace in the group is the
proceeding's prime objective; because all participants share essentially the
same social values, the proceedings of the kris can easily be accepted by the
entirety of the concerned population. Individuals will view themselves as
members of a larger group that has been treated in accordance with the law,
even if they lose the case. A feeling that justice has prevailed pervades.273
271. See, e.g., GROPPER, supra note 79, at 83 (viewing the audience as a form of "jury");
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 24 (noting that members of audience act as devil's advocates); Lee, Kris,
supra note 51, at 26 (noting that members of audience may question witnesses and argue about testimony);
Tillhagen, III, supra note 130, at 24 (noting that audience may remind court of incidents that litigants have
forgotten or did not want to raise).
272. See GROPPER, supra note 79, at 82 (noting high respect for certain judges); Lee, Kris, supra note
51, at 25 (noting high repute and distinguished track record of judges).
273. The tradition of having a feast upon termination of the kris symbolizes the cathartic effect of the
proceedings. Custom requires that the aggrieved parties and others involved be present. Tillhagen, V, supra
note 145, at 127 (loser is usually host; sometimes winner pays); Yoors, Lowari Law, supra note 126, at
9 (stating that in spirit of reconciliation winner pays in carefree manner). Of course, if the sentence is for
temporary or permanent marime there is no celebration. Yet if at a later time after a separate kris the
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2. Getting at the Roots of Controversy
This account, although somewhat speculative, suggests that the basic
policies governing the admission of evidence in Gypsy societies are drastically
different from those of the law of the state. By extending the judicial inquiry
to remote aspects of the controversy, such as matters of the distant past, the
proceedings will be more likely to uncover the roots of the current trouble. As
a consequence of this process, the parties feel satisfied that they had an
opportunity to be fully heard. 4 A skillful judge, aided by the spokesmen of
the litigants and assisted by the audience, may steer the parties toward a
possible settlement. In such instances, the spokesmen act more as mediators
than as attorneys. 5
These types of resolutions are favored over the drastic sanction of a
sentence of marime. The whole proceeding alms to reestablish peace between
the warring parties by exposing and hopefully eradicating the source of
disruption. The proceedings must also make the participants feel respect and
appreciation for their leaders, their peers, the kris, and the law. For Gypsy
societies, surrounded by a foreign and essentially hostile environment and
dependent upon mutual assistance and good fellowship, such conciliatory
results and evidentiary methods are vitally important. Even when sanctions
such as temporary marime must be imposed, they are likely to be accepted
because they are based on ancient custom and because there is little other
choice.276
marime is lifted, the rehabilitated Rom rejoins the community in a "ritual of commensality." See Miller,
Defilement, supra note 62, at 52. The social life of a Gypsy centers around commensality, the spiritual and
moral bond created by sharing food and drink. Miller, Thesis, supra note 63, at 17-19. Commensality is
antithetical to rejection or pollution (which may occur by being publicly defiled by a woman tossing her
skirt or by being declared marime in a kris). The resulting state of pollution means that commensality is
to be withheld from the rejected person. Id. at 19. Consequently, any ceremonial readmission to the Romani
community involves joint eating and drinking celebrations, which symbolize that the Gypsy concerned is
again in good graces. Id. at 20-21. Reinstatement involves "a long, arduous and expensive procedure
requiring frequent appeals for a new kris and new evidence." Id. at 42 n.7.
274. Similar observations have been made by Holleman, supra note 20, at 6, in discussing standards
of pleading and proof in African tribal procedures. Since the controversy may have a long history, the
parties are urged to reveal even remote aspects. Although individual redress is sought, the parties are also
concerned with reestablishing their esteem in the community.
275. In matters concerning damages or payment of debts the parties are assumed to have made their
requests with an implicit understanding that bargaining may take place within certain margins. The judge
is expected to become active within these boundaries. Tillhagen, III, supra note 130, at 25 (discussing
Roma in Sweden).
276. This presentation corresponds to the aspirations of romaniya (Gypsy law). In reality, Romani
participants may sometimes be dissatisfied with the actual or potential dispositions of a kris and resort to
"extralegal" remedies, such as moving elsewhere. Lee, Kris, supra note 51, at 31-32 (describing how
Canadian Rom avoided jurisdiction of kris by disappearing); Tillhagen, V, supra note 145, at 127-30
(discussing self-help); see also GROPPER, supra note 79, at 102 (stating that institution of kris is predicated
upon "voluntary participation"); YOORS, GYPSIES, supra note 42, at 174 (noting that kris may have to resort
to supernatural sanctions, such as curses, to prevent defiance).
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The exclusion of evidence in adjudications under the laws of the state rests
on assumptions different from those of the kris.7" In a legal culture such as
that of the United States inquiries are narrowed to lessen confusion and
conflict among groups holding a diverse set of values. Procedures limit the
trial to a narrow scope of inquiry, whether or not other matters appear relevant
to a party. The non-Gypsy system presumes that a wide range of investigation
may cause more trouble than benefits. Matters of a personal or intimate nature
may not be raised if they would infringe on individual rights, even if justice
in the isolated case before the court would be better served by the disclosure.
A broad scope of inquiry would inevitably slow down the proceedings, and
may also distract attention from the specific incidents that have triggered the
controversy. Most importantly, the litigants in our culture do not have
confidence that they share basic values with others who are involved in the
process. To allow floods of complaints and grievances under such
circumstances would serve no beneficial purpose. The narrow focus of inquiry
in adjudicative proceedings278 therefore seems to suggest that a society such
as the United States has highly diverse basic values, many of which are not
compatible with each other.
In the state law adjudication system, the losing party will likely feel that
justice has not been served by the narrow inquiry, since exclusionary rules of
evidence prevented, in the loser's view, a full presentation of the case. As a
result, parties do not fully trust judges, and they suspect attorneys of being
manipulators and hairsplitters. 2 9 In contrast, private lawmaking has more in
common with tribal law and the proceedings in the kris. Within an institutional
or otherwise private context, controversies tend to be discussed and settled
without the use of exclusionary rules of evidence, and are usually not even as
formal as the kris of the Vlax. A skillful leader in this setting will draw on
communal support much as an experienced tribal chief would, rather than
relying on rigid rules or running roughshod over the proceedings. This use of
private lawmaking inevitably involves resort to custom. The laws of the state,
with their exclusionary standards of evidence and relevance, will be invoked
only when institutional resources have failed. Even in these instances, the
rigidity of the laws of the state will be tempered by the customs of private
lawmaking. 8 °
277. For a comparison of restrictive western standards of evidence with all-inclusive standards in
African tribal law, see Holleman, supra note 20, at 5-9. The principles developed in that article are fully
applicable to the procedure of the kris, as practiced by the Vlax group of the Romani people. For further
details, see Johan F. Holleman, Some Problems of Evidence in Shona Tribal Law, in STUDIES IN AFRICAN
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (Meyer Fortes & Sheila Patterson eds., 1975).
278. Weyrauch, Law as Mask, supra note 244, at 706.
279. This is a perennial complaint about American law. See, e.g., ALBRECHT MENDELSSOHN-
BARTHOLDY, DAS IMPERIUM DES RIcHTERs 151 (1908).
280. See supra notes 243 and 248 and accompanying text.
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Much unnoticed and informal lawmaking and adjudication takes place in
many legal systems. The private law aspects of proceedings before the kris of
the Vlax find their parallels in other widely disparate legal cultures. The role
of the chief as judge, the participation of the audience in the proceedings, the
broad scope of inquiry, and the effort to mediate and expose the roots of the
controversy find surprising parallels in African tribal adjudications28 as well
as in Asian societies such as China and Japan.282 The extraordinary efficacy
of private lawmaking (which may cross the line of oppressiveness) has
occasionally been exploited in state attempts to impose a particular ideology
at the local level, where it can have its strongest effect. The Chinese have used
private lawmaking in this way in mediations and adjudications where efforts
to get "to the roots of the problem" are perceived as ideological struggles.283
In Cuba, similar attempts have been made to politicize and control
neighborhoods.2m But these efforts ignore the reality that private lawmaking
is almost impossible to control, even in repressive societies. It takes place at
all times and places; it is of ancient origin and universal application.
D. General Considerations
Looking at the broad definition of law articulated at the outset of this
Article,285 several observations can be made about romaniya, or Gypsy law,
and other forms of private lawmaking. Although the Romani people do not
formally gather to pursue an objective, their need to survive as a distinct and
isolated group provides them with a common purpose; Gypsy law ensures that
host countries' legal systems and cultures minimally influence Gypsy life.
Although romaniya has sacred aspects that direct Gypsies to lead their lives
281. See Holleman, supra note 20, at 6-7.
282. On China, see Roger Grace, Justice, Chinese Style, CASE & COM., Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 50
(discussing dispute settlement in Chinese-American communities); Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation:
Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967). On Japan, see RUDOLF
B. SCHLESINGER El AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 332-34 & n.108 (5th ed. 1988) (observing that private
lawmaking still prevails in country as highly developed as Japan and even affects proceedings before
ordinary courts and administrative agencies); Nobuaki Iwai, The Judge as Mediator: The Japanese
Experience, 10 Civ. JUST. Q. 108 (1991); Joel Rosch, Institutionalizing Mediation: The Evolution of the
Civil Liberties Bureau in Japan, 21 LAw & Soc'y REV. 243 (1987).
283. For a detailed report by a New York state justice who attended a criminal trial in China, see Mary
J. Lowe, The Trial of Ran Kao-chien, JURIS DR., Apr. 1978, at 12. The Chinese trial had many parallels
with the kris of the Vlax, in particular the wide scope of what is considered relevant; the absence of
evidentiary, constitutional, and procedural hurdles; representation by nonprofessional advocates; and
participation of the audience. Ideological elements included judicial exhortations to confess. See also
Lubman, supra note 282.
284. Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969). But see Luis
Salas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17 LAW & Soc'VY REV. 587 (1983)
(describing increased formality imposed after popular courts came under criticism); Luis Salas, The Judicial
System in Postrevolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA L.J. 43 (1983) (traditional western procedural safeguards
reinstituted). Fidel Castro presumably came to perceive the Popular Tribunals as a potential threat to his
regime; he could not control them to the extent he had anticipated.
285. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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properly by attaining a state of purity and preventing contamination, it does not
advocate proselytizing or imposing its values on non-Gypsies. Its main purpose
is to achieve a state of balance (kintdla) that pleases the spirits of the ancestors
(mule).286 Conversion of the gaje would not make much sense because they
and their ancestors are outside the Gypsy universe.
Dissent within the Gypsy community is possible only in a limited number
of realms, such as economic matters and territorial disputes. Dissent is not
permitted with regard to basic social taboos. Outside the romaniya, there is not
much conceded lawmaking within Gypsy communities. Some forms of
behavior are tolerated if they are done with discretion and not openly
acknowledged. For example, young male Gypsies may gain sexual experience
with non-Gypsy women, provided there is no romantic involvement." 7 Yet
these matters continue to be viewed as deviant behavior and do not become
part of romaniya."' They are not even viewed as custom because there is no
acknowledged difference between custom and law. If common behavior creates
visible problems, such as women wearing jeans instead of long skirts, a divano
or kris may be called.289
By comparison, non-Gypsy forms of private lawmaking are equally
concerned with cohesion and survival of the group, at least with regard to their
own distinct characteristics, but they tend to be more vulnerable to external
influences than Gypsy law. If they have aspirational functions, they are less
directed toward lofty moral ideals than toward maintenance of group cohesion.
Instead of an internalized demand for purity, such systems may stress
unwavering group loyalty. Even mere suspicion of disloyalty may lead to
severe sanctions. Adjudication is done informally and without attention to
traditional standards of fairness, such as the right to be heard. 290 In the vast
majority of cases, the law of the state is incapable of, perhaps not even
concerned with, remedying any unfairness that may have occurred in these
private lawmaking systems. Most of the oppressive aspects of private
lawmaking occur outside the scope or even vision of state authorities. While
some may find unsettling the idea that any small group can engage in
286. Hancock, World Citizens, supra note 170 (manuscript at 5). The conceptions of romaniya are of
ancient Indian origin and thus not part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Interestingly, Cover, supra note 6,
at II n.31, uses similar language in describing the Torah as one of the pillars of Judaism: "The Hebrew
'Torah' refers both to law in the sense of a body of regulation and, by extension, to the corpus of all
related normative material and to the teaching and learning of those primary and secondary sources. In this
fully extended sense, the term embraces life itself, or at least the normative dimension of it ....
287. Hancock, Review, supra note 35, at 77-78.
288. Perhaps the routine consumption of alcoholic beverages during Prohibition is comparable. Cover,
supra note 6, at 21 n.63, calls this a "fact of life" rather than an assertion of revolutionary lawmaking
power.
289. See Hancock, Letter, supra note 151, at 5 n.46. On the other hand, Gypsy society, just as any
other society, may in fact be permeated by autonomous subsystems which sometimes deviate from binding
rules of romaniya. Thus, a Gypsy family may relax some restrictions within the confines of the home and
intimate life. See supra note 99.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 265-68.
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lawmaking, such lawmaking is a manifestation of inherent human needs.29'
By imposing a yardstick for measurement of "worthiness" we also project
external standards that have no more intrinsic claim for accuracy than any
other standard, although the observer positioned outside of the group may
strongly sympathize with such universal standards.292
A significant difference between Gypsy law and other forms of private
lawmaking may be that the members of gajikane groups are also members of
numerous other gatherings and participate in a wide range of social discourse.
A law firm, for example, is divided into various subgroups, such as partners,
executive committees, junior partners, associates, and staff members, each
having its own sets of legal norms and implicit threats of sanctions. 93 The
members of the firm are also members of families and participants in a great
number of social organizations, some of them recognized under state law,
others more or less invisible. Each of these groups has its own autonomous
legal system that is not necessarily compatible with the laws of the other
groups or with those of the law firm. This situation results in internal
adjustments by the individual member to these multiple social institutions. The
resulting accommodations, although reached individually, must have an impact
on the laws of all of the groups concerned. True isolation in gajikane society
is utopian, and the continuing adjustments that are achieved on an internal and
individual level are bound to be reflected in lawmaking within each group and
even externally in the laws of the state.294 From that perspective the
dichotomy between private lawmaking and the law of the state disappears, and
law, even in its traditional form, can be viewed as a network of small-group
interactions.
Such a view of law cannot be applicable in the same degree to the
Gypsies, who by choice avoid exposure to conflicting loyalties with the outside
world. Nevertheless, although they need and depend on contacts with their host
countries as a source of their livelihood,295 they do not want to be part of
these societies in any sense that would involve compromise of their basic
beliefs. It is romaniya that makes such separation possible. If there is any
semblance of compromise, it may be in the Gypsies' willingness to adapt to
291. Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 6, at 58.
292. Cover has maintained that the law created by the Mennonites, for purposas of constitutional
meaning, assumes an equal or superior status to the law as interpreted by the Justices of the Supreme Court.
Cover, supra note 6, at 28 (referring to Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). With
regard to the important problem of human rights standards raised in Reisman, Comment, supra note 46,
at 416, see Walter 0. Weyrauch, On Definitions, Tautologies, and Ethnocentrism in Regard to Universal
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 198, 199-200 (Ervin H. Pollack ed., 1971) (discussing difficulties in
defining universal human rights).
293. Weyrauch, Legal Profession, supra note 22, at 480-81.
294. See Cover, supra note 6, at 30-33 (referring to CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA
(1980)); Stone, supra note 6, at 891-92; Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 6, at 56-58.
295. OKELY, TRAVELLER, supra note 62, at 28-29.
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the requirements of their surroundings, although by adapting a Gypsy risks
being assimilated or losing his or her identity as a "Gypsy."296
This isolation of the Romani people is sustained not only by centuries of
persecution, but also by their deep commitment to retain their ethnic identity.
Although they live among their hosts, Romani reservations about the hosts are
strong and, considering historical events, understandable. Perhaps only isolated
island communities have succeeded to a greater degree than the Gypsies in
maintaining their almost utopian autonomy. A rare illustration is Tristan da
Cunha, a territory of the British Colony of St. Helena, midway between Africa
and South America.297 In this case, the separation is physical, with thousands
of miles of ocean in every direction and only sporadic communications with
the outside world.298 The fewer than three hundred island inhabitants have
developed a unique legal system recognizing no leadership of any sort and no
communal decision process.299 There is no crime or violence. The main
sanction for misbehavior is teasing, a powerful deterrent because the island's
inhabitants have nowhere to go to escape.3°° The most serious violations are
assuming a position of superiority and interfering in any way with the life of
other inhabitants. The population is reserved but good-natured and cooperative
toward occasional visitors.
Tristan da Cunha has no religious history. It was founded as a business
partnership between the three initial settlers who were the ancestors of the
present population. The partnership document, dated November 7, 1817,
expressed a fundamental conception of absolute equality.3"' It provided, in
part: "That in order to ensure the harmony of the Firm, No member shall
assume any superiority whatever, but all to be considered as equal in every
respect, each performing his proportion of labour, if not prevented by sickness
.... "3 This was later amended by a document of December 10, 1821,
296. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
297. For details, see generally PETER A. MUNCH, CRISIS IN UTOPIA: THE ORDEAL OF TRISTAN DA
CUNHA (1971).
298. The decline of sailing ships seems to have increased the isolation for many years. The inhabitants
of the islands are said to have learned about World War I only after it was almost over. Carl Mydans,
Strange Story of a Flight from Our Century: Far-Off Exiles of Tristan, LIFE, July 12, 1963, at 72; see also
MUNCH, supra note 297, at 94.
299. MUNCH, supra note 297, at 1-18, 74-91; Letter from Peter A. Munch, Professor of Sociology,
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, to Walter 0. Weyrauch (May 5, 1977) (on file with authors)
(referring to unpublished student paper about informal legal system of Tristan da Cunha: "[She] has not
in my opinion recognized the full impact of the 'legal system' (if one can call it that) of anarchism in
Tristan da Cunha: Looking for 'leaders' and instruments of communal 'decisions,' she did not seem to
recognize that at the time she was concerned with, no instrument of communal decision existed on the
island, and anyone who would assume the role of a 'leader' would find himself without followers and
would be the object of the subtle sanction of avoidance because he would have deviated from the accepted
pattern of proper behavior .... "); see also Peter A. Munch, Anarchy and Anomie in an Atomistic
Community, 9 MAN 243, 250-58 (1974).
300. Mydans, supra note 298, at 77.
301. The full text of the partnership agreement is reproduced in MUNCH, supra note 297, at 29-30.
The original partnership document is now in the British Museum.
302. Id. at 29.
[Vol. 103: 323
Autonomous Lawmaking
signed by all male members of the community: "No person subscribing to
these articles are [sic] to continue reminding particular persons of their Duty
in point of Work, or otherwise, as in such Case nothing but Disunion will be
the consequence ..... 303 These formal pronouncements were later
transformed by custom into the utopian legal microsociety which still exists
today. It seems clear that such a normative state of mind can only be achieved
in situations of extreme geographical isolation. Although the Romani people
may come close, none of the groups engaged in private lawmaking discussed
in this Article can quite match such successful isolation.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional view that law emanates from the state is too narrow.
Numerous sources of private lawmaking, though little noticed, coexist with the
law of the state. This autonomous lawmaking takes place imperceptibly within
institutions, corporations, families, and wherever else people join together to
pursue common objectives. Violation of these informal legal norms, as in the
case of any other infraction of law, results in sanctions applied in private
adjudications. In many respects, these private legal systems have characteristics
similar to those found in tribal law. They are based on highly persuasive oral
traditions that easily adapt to changed conditions. Language plays an important
role in these systems, not only in terms of what is articulated, but also in terms
of what can be inferred and understood in any given setting. If a dispute arises,
any form of evidence, including evidence regarding remote events, can be
submitted to help get at the source of the particular disturbance. Due process
in the American legal sense is markedly absent. Shared values and communal
peace, not individual rights, are the prime interests protected.
In view of the many similarities between private lawmaking and tribal law,
the legal system of the Gypsies provides a useful vehicle for developing
theory. Like other forms of autonomous lawmaking, it is hardly noticed,
although it competes effectively with the laws of the host culture. It assures the
survival of the group by emphasizing group loyalty and relationships over the
rights of individual members, and it usually prevails when it comes into open
clashes with the surrounding legal system of the state.
303. Id. at 37. Professor Robert M. Cover essentially described Tristan da Cunha when he theorized
about an imaginary world:
In an imaginary world in which violence played no part in life, law would indeed grow
exclusively from the hermeneutic impulse-the human need to create and interpret texts. Law
would develop within small communities of mutually committed individuals who cared about
the text, about what each made of the text, and about one another and the common life they
shared. Such communities might split over major issues of interpretation, but the bonds of social
life and mutual concern would permit some interpretive divergence.
Cover, supra note 6, at 40 (citation omitted); see also Stone, supra note 6, at 828-29 (discussing legal
visions within Jewish communities).
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Studying the capacity of any form of private lawmaking to prevail over or
influence official state law enriches legal theory and practice. Clashes between
informal institutional law and the traditional law of the state are frequent and
unavoidable. Yet because participants and decisionmakers traditionally do not
regard private law as law, such norms seldom appear openly in court. Instead,
private law rules are communicated by way of appropriate hints and
suggestions, and are injected into traditional state law by means of
interpretation and construction. These norms influence decisions on the
probative value of evidence. And what is commonly called strategy is in
actuality often an application of the norms of private lawmaking. Juries are
inevitably sensitized to oblique innuendo. Even judges, in their interpretation
of legal materials and in their judgment of the merits of argument, will likely
be swayed by skillfully placed implications. None of this process ordinarily
reaches the level of consciousness. Yet advocates who are able to base their
arguments on unstated innuendo are likely to have an advantage. By contrast,
attorneys who base their arguments on the letter of state law may lose
persuasive power.
But state law and private law commonly interact more subtly than in direct
confrontation. For example, the law of the state may greatly influence the
internal norms of a law firm both through direct regulation and indirectly
through implicit mores which influence the interaction of members of the firm.
State law also influences the law of the Gypsies, albeit to a lesser extent.
Gypsies may acquiesce to some aspects of state law because of economic
necessity, for example, by conforming to administrative laws on regulation of
business. In addition, Gypsies may have adjusted the laws of their own legal
system to the laws of their host countries, particularly if these adjustments do
not clash with their values. The Romani rejection of most crimes of violence
provides an example.
As this Article has demonstrated, autonomous systems also have powerful
influence in shaping state law. Just as oral traditions and unarticulated cultural
norms may play a great role in determining the outcome of disputes in the
formal justice system of the state, values in autonomous systems may gradually
shape the very substance of state law. The Gypsy system is no exception. As
the state either fails to enforce its own norms or overtly acknowledges the
value of norms embodied in the Romani legal system, it responds to the
influence of the autonomous system.
Thus, law reveals itself as a multitude of autonomous systems operating
simultaneously with the formal law of the state. Each system shapes the other
systems with which it has contact. Only total isolation will prevent any legal
system from being shaped by others. Indeed some isolation is required for any
autonomous system to be truly "autonomous," for any group with such a
system must be insular to some extent. The degree of that insularity determines
the shape and the strength of the autonomous system itself.
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As far as American law is concerned, readers may find the degree of de
facto autonomy given to romaniya and to the kris of the Vlax surprising. They
may also find the autonomous informal adjudications in our own private
lawmaking disturbing. Some may prefer to call these adjudications arbitrary
and contrary to American ideals and do not think that they should be part of
the definition of law at all. Yet private lawmaking here and elsewhere can
hardly be successfully regulated or suppressed, except perhaps by relegating
it to the sphere of the unconscious. In addition, it cannot be prevented from
filtering into the traditional proceedings under the law of the state. But it is not
proper to view private lawmaking as a negative phenomenon. Autonomous
legal systems run inextricably through state law. If our traditional legal
proceedings have any effectiveness, it is because of the features of submerged
private lawmaking they possess-features that respond to a desire for group
cohesion and satisfy fundamental human needs. If private lawmaking were
more widely recognized, much of the gap between theory and practice could
be narrowed or at least more effectively explored in an analytical fashion. The
theoretical structure of law could be revitalized, and perhaps the application of
state-made law would even gain somewhat in popular acceptance.
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